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SPEECHES VIII AND X OF THE DEMOSTHENIC CORPUS

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THE genuineness of the *Fourth Philippic* of the Demosthenic corpus and its relation to the speech *On the Chersonese* have been subjects of frequent discussion, beginning with some of the lesser critics of late antiquity. The discussion centers in the fact that the two speeches have a long block of identical material, with only occasional variations of word or phrase, or in some cases of a little more than that. This common material amounts to some eight Teubner pages out of the twenty pages of the speech *On the Chersonese*. The *Fourth Philippic* has other peculiarities, both in matter and style, which have cast grave doubt on its genuineness. All scholars agree that the speech *On the Chersonese* is a genuine work of Demosthenes. The genuineness of the *Fourth Philippic* has been denied by Schaefer,¹ Westermann, Weil, and many others. The editors have, for the most part, held that the *Fourth Philippic* is the work of a rhetorician, weaving together some parts of the published speeches of Demosthenes, together with some phrases of his, and adding other material. Leonhard Spengel, however, after a careful analysis of the two speeches,² came to the conclusion, though not with entire confidence (pp. 104 ff.), that the *Fourth Philippic* is a genuine speech of Demosthenes but that it was not published until after his death. He finds that the material which this speech has in common with the speech *On the*

¹ *Demosthenes und seine Zeit*, Vol. III, Suppl. IV (1st ed.), § 3 (a full discussion of the question).

² *Die Δημογραφία des Demosthenes* (München, 1860).

Chersonese can be eliminated from that speech without injury to the thought, leaving a clear speech on the subject of Diopeithes and his force in the *Chersonese*. He concludes that the original speech *On the Chersonese*, as delivered from the bema, but not published by Demosthenes himself, did not contain the common matter, but that this was added later, when and by whom he does not suggest. Spengel's theory so far as regards the original form of the speech *On the Chersonese* will be defended in this paper.

Blass, with his unsurpassed knowledge of the style of Demosthenes, declared³ that in his opinion the *Fourth Philippic* is the work of a "redactor," who, not long after the death of Demosthenes, having access to unpublished material of his, found among these remains various papers of different dates and purposes, including a first draft of material which Demosthenes had prepared for his speech *On the Chersonese* and had used in that speech in a carefully revised form. This "redactor," attempting to compose a Philippic speech from genuine but fragmentary papers of Demosthenes, was betrayed into inconsistencies and anachronisms. Blass will not attempt to say how much of the *Fourth Philippic* may be of the redactor's own free composition, but he considers the materials to be chiefly Demosthenic. It is to be emphasized that Blass does not agree with other critics in thinking that the matter common to the two speeches is taken from the published speech *On the Chersonese* to be used in the *Fourth Philippic*. He holds that in the exact form in which it appears in the *Fourth Philippic* it was neither spoken nor published by Demosthenes.

The denial of the genuineness of the *Fourth Philippic* prevailed generally until, by the publication of the *Commentaries* of Didymus Χαλκέντερος (the prolific Alexandrian scholar of the time of Cicero) in the edition of Diels and Schubart (1904), new light was thrown on the question. While Didymus' notes on the *Fourth Philippic* were sadly mutilated, enough of the papyrus was recovered and deciphered to give statements from good sources which removed certain of the difficulties which critics had found in the speech. The whole question of genuineness needed to be reopened. This was done by Alfred Körte in an article in *Rheinisches Museum*, 1905, pages 388 ff. Körte reviews the arguments of earlier critics, uses the newly found evidence, and

³ Blass, *Die Attische Beredsamkeit*, III², 382 ff.

comes to the conclusion that the *Fourth Philippic* is genuine beyond question. However, it is not, he thinks, a "speech," but a political pamphlet cast in speech form and published by Demosthenes some weeks after the delivery of the speech *On the Chersonese*, which he thinks had not yet been published. Körte holds that from the speech *On the Chersonese* Demosthenes transfers, with some alterations, the long section which we find common to the two speeches. Körte does not say when he thinks the speech *On the Chersonese* was published.

Körte's position is open to fatal objections. If the speech *On the Chersonese* was published later by Demosthenes himself, we find him putting into circulation two "pamphlets" containing a great block of common matter, a mistake which would be a joy to his critics; we know how severe they were. If he did not himself publish the speech *On the Chersonese*, it will have been published after his death. But it is impossible to believe that Demosthenes would have published the *Fourth Philippic*, loosely constructed, labored in argument, and marred by attack on an opponent by name, such as we find in no other published political speech of his, while leaving unpublished his logical, vigorous, stylistically perfect speech *On the Chersonese*.

After Körte, the next to attack the problem of the two speeches was Paul Wendland in an article in *Göttingische gelehrte Anzeigen*, 1906, pages 356 ff., a year after Körte's article. Wendland accepts Körte's demonstration of the genuineness of the *Fourth Philippic* and is inclined to regard it as a political pamphlet, but one which gives a better idea of what an actual political speech of Demosthenes really was than is given by his other published political speeches (or pamphlets). Wendland does not find it difficult to believe that Demosthenes himself put both speeches into circulation.

Ten years after Wendland's article the question was discussed by Engelbert Drerup, the ablest critic of the works of Demosthenes since Friedrich Blass, in his little volume, *Aus einer alten Advokatenrepublik* (Paderborn, 1916). Drerup's book bristles with hostile shafts against the policies of Demosthenes and his partisans, and draws so many gleeful parallels between their words and works and those of the leaders of the contemporary "entente" that we are tempted to translate his title "From an Ancient Shyster-Republic." Drerup accepts the *Fourth Philippic* as a genuine speech of Demosthenes (not a "pam-

phlet"—Drerup opposes the pamphlet theory of Demosthenes' political speeches). Drerup cannot believe that Demosthenes can have *published* two speeches containing so much identical matter. He assumes that the common block was delivered as a part of the speech *On the Chersonese* and transferred from that by Demosthenes in composing the *Fourth Philippic*. He holds that both speeches were delivered by Demosthenes from the bema, and thinks that the populace assembled there, the great majority of whom had no literary appreciation, would have felt nothing strange in the long repetition. Drerup thinks that the speech *On the Chersonese* was published by Demosthenes, but that the *Fourth Philippic* was published only after his death.

The objection to Drerup's theory is obvious: Granted that not many of Demosthenes' hearers would have recognized the long passage in the *Fourth Philippic* as something which they had heard some weeks before in the speech *On the Chersonese*, there were men in the ecclesia, able critics and with good memory, bitterly hostile to the speaker, who would have liked nothing better than the opportunity of convicting him then and there of such paucity of thought and such a cheap piece of oratory. It is difficult to believe that Demosthenes was so simple-minded as to give them the opportunity, even if one could believe that he was too busy or too lazy to compose new material for his new speech.

Convinced, as I am, by the arguments of Körte and others that the *Fourth Philippic* is a genuine speech of Demosthenes, and unable to accept any of the solutions which have been reviewed, I propose a different solution of the problem.⁴

I state my theory in four hypotheses:

1. Early in the spring of 341 B.C. Demosthenes delivered from the bema a comparatively short speech on affairs in the Chersonese but did not at the time publish it. This speech contained none of the matter which we find common to our version of the speech and to the *Fourth Philippic*. (Here I adopt Spengel's suggestion.)

2. Before June of 341, while discussion was still going on as to the affairs in the Chersonese and the policy of outright declaration of war

⁴ In a paper published in the *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, Vol. XLIII (1912), on the "Pamphlet Theory of Demosthenes' Political Speeches," I suggested a solution of the problem of the relation between the two speeches, viii and x, which further study has convinced me to be untenable.

with Philip, and when unexpected news had come which led Demosthenes to believe that Persian help would be given to Athens, Demosthenes composed the *Fourth Philippic* in the form in which we have it; but it was hastily composed and loosely constructed. Demosthenes delivered this speech at a meeting of the ecclesia (the exact proposition is not revealed in the speech). This speech Demosthenes himself never published.

3. Some time later, it may have been after Chaeronea, Demosthenes, wishing to put into permanent form (in addition to his great *Third Philippic*) a record of the motives which had led him to agitate for war with Philip, took his manuscript of the speech *On the Chersonese*, separated it into two parts comprising (roughly) the first three fourths and the last one fourth, and between these two blocks inserted the strongest parts of his (unpublished) *Fourth Philippic*, revising these parts in many details. This amalgamated speech he himself published. It is the speech *On the Chersonese* in the form in which it has come down to us.

4. After the death of Demosthenes the unpublished *Fourth Philippic* was found among his papers and, like the *Midiana*, was published by Demosthenes' literary executor.

It will be seen that by these propositions I avoid the difficulty—to me, the impossibility—of believing that within the space of a few weeks Demosthenes can have delivered two speeches containing such an extended block of common matter, or that he put into circulation two such speeches, or that he published the inferior *Fourth Philippic* but left unpublished the far superior speech *On the Chersonese*.

I proceed to discuss these propositions:

1. The original speech *On the Chersonese* as delivered from the bema was confined to the question of indorsing and reinforcing Diopeithes in view of Philip's alleged violation of the peace signed five years before. This speech consisted of §§ 1-37 and 68-77 of the speech which has come down to us. This gives a speech of 316 (Teubner) lines, a speech longer than any one of the *Olynthiacs*, the speech *On the Peace*, or the *Second Philippic*. The first paragraph of the second block (§ 68), introducing a personal defense, can be fitted without difficulty onto the last of the first block (§ 37). Had the speech come to us in this form, no reader would have felt any incompleteness or

inconsistency in it. Of course, it is possible that something of the original speech may have been dropped in the revision, but there is nothing to indicate this.

2. The date and circumstances of the composition of the *Fourth Philippic* have been fully discussed by Körte in the article to which I have referred; I see nothing to alter in his convincing argument.

3. The parts of the *Fourth Philippic* which I believe to have been composed for that speech and afterward revised by Demosthenes himself and inserted by him as a single block in the speech *On the Chersonese*, at the time of its publication, are taken from two widely separated parts of the *Fourth Philippic*. Neither part mentions Diopeithes; probably it had already been decided not to recall him; but reinforcements for his troops are still under discussion (x. 22 = viii. 47). In the first transferred block we find a more extended treatment of the aggressions of Philip and the declaration that Philip will not rest until he has destroyed Athens, the stronghold of democracy. True, resistance involves effort and expense, but this is not to be considered in view of the issues at stake.

This block, as a whole, carries the question beyond the immediate issue of Diopeithes and the Chersonese, and shows that Demosthenes is fully awake to the larger question.

The second block answers the charge of the peace advocates that certain persons are seeking to plunder the wealth of the city by fomenting war, and reviews Philip's deceptive acts in bringing other Greek states under his control. It closes with a scathing arraignment of Philip's partisans in Athens, with a bitterness paralleled only in the speech *On the Crown*.

Thus, by the addition of the two blocks taken from the *Fourth Philippic*, Demosthenes raises the speech *On the Chersonese* in its published form from its original plane of a temporary question to that of the fundamental policy of the city; and in so doing, he publishes, after the struggle is over, the justification of his own policies.⁵

I proceed to examine these two transferred blocks in detail, in order to test the hypothesis of their revision and transfer by Demosthenes himself.

⁵ In what follows I shall usually refer to the two speeches by their number in the Demosthenic corpus. The speech *On the Chersonese* is Speech viii, the *Fourth Philippic* is Speech x. Citations of the text are from the Teubner text of Fuhr, ed. major (1914).

Within the first transferred block we find significant omissions. In Speech x, paragraphs 12. 1 to 13. 4, we have ten lines repeated almost verbatim from the *Second Philippic*, §§ 17 f. Such a passage repeated from a speech delivered three years before would pass in oral delivery, but it would certainly be criticized in a published speech; it is therefore dropped in the transfer to the speech *On the Chersonese*. In x. 17. 3—x. 19. 5 Demosthenes answers those who reproach him for not venturing to move an outright declaration of war. But in the original Chersonese speech, §§ 68–72, he had already answered that objection in a much more elaborate defense. There is no occasion to repeat it here; he therefore omits this section of Speech x, replacing it with an emphatic period of nine lines (§ 46) giving summary advice as to war resources and including advice τοὺς συμμάχους ἀξιοῦν, a detail not included in Speech x (perhaps an unconscious reference in the revision to what was actually done *after* the spring of 341 B.C.). In x. 19. 5–22 Demosthenes specifies the measures which should be taken immediately: furnish all necessary help to those who are defending themselves in the Chersonese, raise funds, prepare a military force, triremes, horses, transports, whatever else is needed for war (§ 19); prepare a force and food supplies for it; and financial controllers to govern the expenditures (§ 22). In bringing these recommendations over to Speech viii, he condenses them from twenty-one lines to eleven; he adds one clause, τοὺς συμμάχους ἀξιοῦν (46. 4), to bring this advice into conformity with that which he had given at the close of the original Chersonese speech, when, in his summary of what was to be done (§ 76), he had said, πρέσβεις ἐκπέμπειν πανταχοῦ τοὺς διδάξοντας, νουτεήσοντας, πράξοντας.

Between the two blocks transferred from Speech x to Speech viii we find in Speech x a long section, §§ 28–54. Why was not this material carried over for publication in Speech viii? The first matter discussed in these paragraphs of Speech x is the question of finance. Precisely at that time Demosthenes was carried away by the confident expectation of financial help from Persia. News had come that Hermeias of Atarneus in Asia Minor, a close friend of Philip, had been seized by the satrap on the coast and sent to Susa, in the expectation that the Great King would readily find means to force him to reveal the plans of Philip, for there was a growing fear that Philip would

seize Byzantium and cross into Asia. Demosthenes, assuming that Hermeias would reveal Philip's designs, believed that Persian gold would soon be coming to Athens to subsidize war against Philip. This hope he elaborates in x. 31-34. But this hope was short lived, for later the news reached Athens that Hermeias had sacrificed his life rather than betray his friend. It needs no argument to show why in the revision Demosthenes did not publish the evidence of his own credulity.

In x. 35-45 Demosthenes goes on to discuss the question of war finance. Here he is on difficult ground; the rich fear the just and the unjust war demands on their property, and the poor fear the loss of their Festival Fund. In an extended and labored argument Demosthenes tries to reassure both. He was forced to take a position on the Festival Fund which was in direct contradiction to the position which he had taken in the *First* and the *Third Olynthiac*, and one which he was to abandon on the outbreak of the war. Nothing could be less desirable in the publication of extracts from Speech x than to include these futile assurances.

The remainder of this block of Speech x not transferred to Speech viii is a somewhat rambling reproach to the Athenians for surrendering the position bequeathed to them by their fathers as leaders and protectors of the other Greek states (§§ 46-54). It is not strongly rhetorical, and Speech viii would gain nothing by its transfer.

At the close of the second block of transferred material we see why Demosthenes stops at this point (x. 70. 5). In Speech x he begins here a vicious personal attack on an opponent, one Aristomedes, a man whose identity had given endless trouble to the critics until Didymus' notes made all clear; for we learn now that this Aristomedes was a notorious politician, known as *ὁ κλέπτης* and *ὁ χαλκοῦς*. Such a personal attack from the bema was quite in order, but it could not be transferred for a published speech; for in no published *public* speech of Demosthenes do we find an attack on an opponent by name. We find attacks constantly, but always on classes of opponents. It is not to be believed that in his oral speeches Demosthenes refrained from personal attacks; how virulent these could be we learn abundantly from his published speeches for the courts. But evidently he made it a rule to preserve the dignity of his published *political* speeches by eliminating everything of this sort. The omission here is another indi-

cation that it was Demosthenes himself who was selecting the material to be transferred from Speech x to viii.

The epilogue of Speech x grows out of the attack on Aristomedes, and is accordingly omitted.

I have discussed the two large blocks that are common to Speeches x and viii, and the larger omissions. We must now examine each block in detail, to see what changes were made within each block in preparation for publication in Speech viii.

x. 11 = viii. 38. The opening sentence is recast; Speech viii has the sharper, antithetic form, eliminating the parenthesis of Speech x. By replacing δὲ of x. 11. 1 by *τοίνυν*, the group of *breves* is eliminated,⁶ but in viii. 39 the insertion of the parenthetical *καὶ παύσασθε περὶ τοῦτου κατηγοροῦντες ἀλλήλων* introduces a new set of *breves*.

x. 11, οἱ πρὶν ἀκούσαι τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν πραγμάτων λόγους εὐθέως εἰώθασιν ἐρωτᾶν 'τί οὖν χρή ποιεῖν'; = viii. 38, οἱ τότε' ἐξελέγχειν τὸν παριόντ' οἴονται, ἐπειδὴν ἐρωτήσωσι, 'τί οὖν χρή ποιεῖν'; Here Speech viii shows a decided improvement in thought. Opponents do not, *before* they hear a speaker, challenge him to tell what is to be done; after they hear him, they try to confound him by asking the question.

x. 11, δεῖ δ' ὁμῶς εἰπεῖν ὃ τι χρή ποιεῖν = viii. 38, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον ἀκριβῶς ἐρώ. Here Speech viii gives the more precise expression, and adds the fine antithetic cola, *καὶ ὅπως ὥσπερ ἐρωτῶσι προθύμως, οὕτω καὶ ποιεῖν ἐβελήσουσι*.

x. 11. 7 ff.

- (1) τῇ πόλει Φίλιππος πολεμεῖ
- (2) καὶ τὴν εἰρήνην λέλυκεν
- (3) καὶ κακόνους μὲν ἐστι καὶ ἐχθρὸς ὅλη τῇ πόλει
- (4) καὶ τῷ τῆς πόλεως ἐδάφει,
- (5) προσθήσω δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει θεοῖς,
- (6) οἵπερ αὐτὸν ἐξολέσειαν,
- (7) οὐδενὶ μέντοι μᾶλλον ἢ τῇ πολιτείᾳ πολεμεῖ
- (8) οὐδ' ἐπιβουλεύει καὶ σκοπεῖ μᾶλλον οὐδὲν τῶν πάντων
- (9) ἢ πῶς ταύτην καταλύσει.
- (10) καὶ τοῦτ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης τρόπον τινὰ νῦν γ' ἂν ποιοῖ.

⁶ For a discussion of Demosthenes' avoidance of *breves*, a series of three or more successive short syllables, and types of *breves* which he admits freely, see Blass, *op. cit.*, pp. 105 ff.; also, the author's statistics for each of the speeches of the corpus, *Classical Philology*, XII (1917), 271 ff.

(Here follows in Speech x the extract from vi. 17 f.) Comparing these ten cola of Speech x with the corresponding passage in viii. 39 f., we find (1) and (2) repeated; then we have the insertion of the parenthetical *καὶ παύσασθε περὶ τούτου κατηγοροῦντες ἀλλήλων* (with *breves*); (3) and (4) follow unchanged, but in place of (5) and (6) we have five lines which declare Philip to be an enemy of all our citizens (*τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις*, where Speech x has *θεοῖς*), with a reminder of the fate which had befallen Philip's partisans in other cities. The passage as written in Speech x is certainly more rapid and vehement, and is well adapted to oral delivery; but a critic reading it would see that while (3), (4), and (5) form a fine climax—"Philip is an enemy to the whole city, to the very ground that the city stands on, and to the gods of the city themselves," to pass from this to the democratic constitution is a distinct anticlimax. It may be also that Demosthenes felt that *οὔπερ αὐτὸν ἐξολέσειαν* was too drastic an expression to be in good taste. While throughout the *Philippics* he treats Philip with suspicion and hostility, there is but one other passage which breathes personal hatred, ix. 31, where he calls Philip *ὀλέθρου Μακεδόνας*, *ὅθεν οὐδ' ἀνδράποδον σπουδαῖον οὐδὲν ἢν πρότερον πρίασθαι*. In treating this whole passage in Speech viii as, on the whole, superior to the version in Speech x, I do not forget that I am rejecting the authority of Lord Brougham, who says:⁷ "Having made Philip the enemy of the ground itself on which Athens was built, he sought about for some stronger description still of his implacable hatred, nor could find it on earth. He must therefore make the Macedonian's enmity war with heaven itself." The English orator evidently failed to see the anticlimax which follows.

After the passage in Speech x which is borrowed from vi. 17 f., the two speeches come together again; x. 13. 4 ff., *οἶδεν ἀκριβῶς . . .* = viii. 41. 2 ff. Changes in the following paragraphs are not numerous. x. 14 has the strong period *ἐστὲ γὰρ ὑμεῖς . . . δεινοί*. This in viii. 42 is somewhat improved by being broken into two parts by inserting *δεινοί* in line 4 and substituting *ἔτοιμοι* for *δεινοί* at the close. viii. 42. 7 inserts the emphatic *οὐδὲ πολλοῦ δεῖ*, not found in x. 14. viii. 43 adds two cola, good from the logical standpoint: *εἰ γὰρ μὴ*

⁷ *Dissertation on the Eloquence of the Ancients, Works*, Vol. VII (Edinburgh, 1872), p. 14.

τοῦτο πεισθήσεσθε ταῖς ψυχαῖς, οὐκ ἐβλήσεθ' ὑπὲρ τῶν πραγμάτων σπουδάζειν. In the same paragraph two other cola are added, reminding the hearers of the immediate subject under discussion, support to the settlers on the Chersonese: καὶ ὅπου τις ἐκείνων ἀμύνεται, ἐνταῦθ' ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν ἀμύνεται. x. 15. 7 f., Δρογγίλον καὶ Καβύλην καὶ Μάστειραν καὶ ἃ νῦν φασιν αὐτὸν ἔχειν = viii. 44. 3 f., Δρογγίλον καὶ Καβύλην καὶ Μάστειραν καὶ ἃ νῦν ἐξαιρεῖ καὶ κατασκευάζεται. When Speeches viii and x were delivered, Philip's conquests in Thrace were a matter of rumor only (ἃ νῦν φασιν); but when Speech viii was being revised for publication, they were well known as facts; Demosthenes shapes his final statement according to his later knowledge. x. 16. 1 ff. = viii. 45. 1 ff. Both speeches have τῶν δ' Ἀθηναίων λιμένων καὶ νεωρίων καὶ τριήρων, but after these words the two speeches show significant divergence. Speech x adds the words καὶ τόπου καὶ δόξης, followed by a long relative clause which badly interrupts the flow of thought. In place of this, Speech viii has καὶ τῶν ἔργων τῶν ἀργυρείων καὶ τοσούτων προσόδων, and then returns to the οὐκ ἐπιθυμεῖν of Speech x. The period is greatly improved by the change.

I have already discussed the omission of x. 17. 4—x. 22. 1. The two speeches resume the parallelism with x. 22. 1 = viii. 47. 1.

I confess that I see no good reason for omitting in viii. 47 the last three lines of x. 23, καὶ ἴσως ἂν, ἴσως, ὥσπερ νῦν ὑμεῖς πυνθάνεσθε τί ποιεῖ Φίλιππος καὶ ποῖ πορεύεται, οὕτως ἂν ἐκείνος φροντίσαι ποῖ ποθ' ἢ τῆς πόλεως ἀπῆρκε δύναμις καὶ ποῦ φανήσεται, words highly praised by Lord Brougham (*Chersonese Oration*, p. 92 n.). The passage has fine rhetorical force. It is true that the expression ἴσως ἂν, ἴσως had been used in iii. 33 and recurs in viii. 77, and that ποῖ πορεύεται Φίλιππος seems like an echo of ποῖ πάρεσι Φίλιππος of xix. 288, but the resemblance seems to be too slight to call for the omission of so strong a passage of Speech x.

With x. 55. 1 begins the second large block common to the two speeches: καὶ τὰ μὲν περὶ τᾶλλ' οὐκ ἄξιον ἐξετάσαι νῦν, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴν . . . cf. viii. 52. 1 ff., πάντα τοίνυν τᾶλλ' εἰπὼν ἂν ἡδέως καὶ δείξας ὃν τρόπον ὑμᾶς ἔνιοι καταπολιτεύονται, τὰ μὲν ἄλλ' ἔαςω· ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴν . . . Spengel (*Δημηγορίαι*, p. 101) calls attention to the fact that this opening is exactly fitted to the context in Speech x, where Demosthenes has been attacking Philip's partisans, whereas in Speech viii a

warning of the immediate danger from Philip has preceded these words; but Spengel seems not to have observed that in Speech viii the connection is made clear by the insertion of the words *καὶ δείξας ὃν τρόπον ὑμᾶς ἔνιοι καταπολιτεύονται*. These words take the place of the matter which preceded § 55 in Speech x, and so give perfect connection.

x. 55. 2 ff. is simplified and made more emphatic in viii. 52. 3 ff. Then in viii. 52 f. we have a strong addition in *καὶ τοιούτους λόγους . . . ὁ μισθὸς ὁ τούτων*. These lines really give in effect the thought of x. 54. 6-9.

After this recasting of the opening of x. 55, we have only small variations in viii. 54, 55, 56, although these are so numerous as to indicate careful revision of the language of Speech x.

viii. 57 gives in seven lines a clear and much more emphatic statement of what is contained in x. 58. 5-x. 60. 3 (fourteen lines), a revision which is wholly to the good except in viii. 57. 7, where the last colon of the paragraph, *καὶ περὶ τούτου ἡ διαδικασία αὕτη ἐστίν*, is difficult for one who defends the Demosthenic authorship. Here in seven words we have three instances of harsh hiatus and one group of *breves*. Perhaps Benseler and Voemel are justified in suspecting that the whole colon is a gloss. Some editors read *τούτων*, for which there is some manuscript support. Blass cures all the trouble by reading *τούτων* and bracketing *αὕτη ἐστίν*.

With x. 60. 3 = viii. 58. 1 the close parallelism is resumed, and it continues with only slight variations to the close of the common block. In viii. 58. 2 (= x. 60. 4) the insertion of *πω* seems to show that *in the revision* of the passage the writer unconsciously puts himself into a time later than the actual time of the speech. When Speeches viii and x were delivered, war had not yet been declared, but *πω* implies that it has been. In viii. 58. 5, *ἀνοητότατος πάντων ἂν εἴη τῶν ὄντων ἀνθρώπων* is decidedly more emphatic than *ἀνοητότατος πάντων ἂν εἴη* of x. 60. 7. The vague *οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλο γ' οὐδὲν ἐν* of x. 61. 8 is well replaced by the explicit, enlarged sentence of viii. 59. 7 f., *οὐ γὰρ ἄλλο γ' οὐδὲν ἐστὶ μεταξὺ τοῦ μήτ' ἀμύνεσθαι μήτ' ἄγειν ἡσυχίαν ἐᾶσθαι*, well interpreted by Lord Brougham, "Alternative there is none between that and resistance, which we will not make, and repose, which we cannot have." x. 62, 2, *καὶ τισι τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων* = viii. 60. 2, *καὶ*

τοῖς ἄλλοις. The brief expression in Speech viii is both broader and stronger. x. 62. 3, οὐ γὰρ ὑφ' αὐτῷ ποιήσασθαι τὴν πόλιν βούλεται Φίλιππος ὑμῶν, οὗ = viii. 60. 2, οὐ γὰρ ὑφ' αὐτῷ τὴν πόλιν ποιήσασθαι βούλεται Φίλιππος. It is a question whether the change in Speech viii is an improvement, but ὑμῶν and οὗ are in a strained position in Speech x. x. 62. 5. f., οὐτ' ἐθελήσετε, οὐτ', ἐὰν ἐθέλητε, ἐπιστήσεσθε = viii. 60. 4 f., οὐτ' ἐθελήσετε, οὐτ', ἂν ἐθελήσητε, ἐπιστήσεσθε. There is rhetorical gain in the coupling of the two words of almost identical form, ἐθελήσετε, ἐθελήσητε. In viii. 60. 6 the placing of αὐτῷ before παρασχεῖν breaks up the *breves* of x. 62. 7, πράγματα δὲ παρασχεῖν αὐτῷ. x. 63. 2 ff., τοὺς πεπρακότας αὐτοὺς ἐκείνῳ φανερώς ἀποτυμπανίσαι. Here, in viii. 61. 2 ff., φανερώς is well replaced by μισεῖν καί, for the traitors have not in all cases sold themselves φανερώς. In viii. 61. 5 the omission of ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη . . . ἐκείνων of x. 63. 5 f. distinctly enhances the rhetorical force. x. 65. 2 f., οἱ μὲν ἤδη πεπόνθασιν ἃ δὴ πεπόνθασιν, οἱ δ' ὅτι ἂν ποτε συμβῇ πείσονται = viii. 63. 3 ff. ἃ δὴ πάντες ἴσασιν of Speech viii is more explicit, and ὅτι ἂν is well replaced by ὅταν balancing the ἤδη preceding. What (ὅτι) the others will suffer is not in doubt, only the time when the inevitable suffering will overtake them. x. 66. 1 f., ἐκείνως τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ ὑμῖν τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον προσφέρεται: viii. 64. 4 f. is more explicit with καὶ οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὑμῖν προσφέρεται.

x. 67. 4, λέγειν ἐν Θετταλίᾳ μὴ σὺν εὖ πεπονθότος . . . = viii. 65. 4, λέγειν ἐν Θετταλίᾳ τὰ Φιλίππου μὴδὲν εὖ πεπονθότος. . . . In Speech viii the repetition of τὰ Φιλίππου (from l. 2) is good rhetorically; and the other change, μὴδὲν for μὴ σὺν, is good. x. 69. 4, καὶ ἔαν τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον φέρεσθαι = viii. 67. 2, καὶ ἔαν ταῦτα φέρεσθαι. Speech viii gives sharper emphasis, and there is a gain in expressing the subject of φέρεσθαι. x. 69. 6 f., τῇ μὲν κατὰ τὴν ἀγορὰν εὐετηρία λαμπροί = viii. 67. 4 f., τῇ τῶν ὠνίων ἀφθονία λαμπροί. Speech viii is more condensed, and it avoids the rather uncommon word εὐετηρία, which Demosthenes uses only in this passage in Speech x and in x. 49.

Spengel calls attention to the fact that the last five lines of this second block of common material, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον . . . ἀδικούντος, x. 70. 1-5, serve in Speech x as an admirable introduction to the attack on Aristomedes, which immediately follows in Speech x, but are without connection with what follows them in Speech viii.⁸

⁸ Spengel, *op. cit.*, p. 102. Weil and the Loeb editor indicate this connection by paragraph division in their printing of the text of x. 69, 70.

Forced therefore in Speech viii into connection with what precedes, they are unnecessary; and, in fact, they weaken its force. The powerful passage viii. 67 would be distinctly better if it ended with *καταγέλαστοι*. While the five lines are tolerable here, they were evidently composed for the very different connection in Speech x.

Our detailed examination of the two long blocks of material common to the *Fourth Philippic* and the speech *On the Chersonese* warrants the conclusion that both blocks were originally composed as a part of the *Fourth Philippic*, separated one from the other in that speech by a long section of other matter, and afterward revised and united by Demosthenes himself to be inserted in the original speech *On the Chersonese*. The revisions are nearly all for the better. The only instances where we could wish that no change had been made are in viii. 47, where a strong rhetorical sentence of x. 23 is dropped, and the closing lines of the second block, noted just above. As against these instances we have noted improvements so numerous as to justify the conclusion that in Speech viii we have a careful and successful revision by Demosthenes himself of the matter common to Speeches x and viii.

Hiatus.—Both speeches show the avoidance of objectionable hiatus customary with Demosthenes.⁹ In the two blocks common to Speeches x and viii five instances are found in both speeches: *μὴ ἀμύνεσθαι*, x. 26. 1 = viii. 49. 10; *ὅσῳ ἄν*, 26. 3 = 50. 2; *ποῖ ἀναδυνόμεθα*, 26. 5 = 50. 4; *μεγίστη ἀνάγκη ἢ*, 27. 5 = 51. 5; *καίτοι ἔγωγ'*, 57. 1 = 55. 1. (I do not include *ἡμετέρῃ ἄδει*, x. 66. 3 = viii. 64. 6, for there is a distinct rhetorical pause between the two words.)

The parts of Speech viii outside the common blocks are remarkably free from unjustifiable hiatus. Beside the doubtful case in viii. 57. 7, which I have already discussed, I find only *καθέμενοι οὕτως*, 30. 2, and *μὴ ὅσοις*, 76. 3.

The parts of Speech x outside the common blocks have a considerable number: 34. 6; 34. 7; 34. 9; 45. 8; 51. 9; 52. 3; 60. 9; 74. 4. This is not strange if Speech x is an unrevised first draft.

Breves.—Both speeches are well within Demosthenic practice in the avoidance of *breves*. In Speech viii as a whole, the rate of *breves* is somewhat less than that of the speech *On the Crown*; in Speech x it is

⁹ For types of hiatus which is only apparent, and for types which Demosthenes seems to have regarded either as unavoidable or as unobjectionable, see Blass, *op. cit.*, pp. 100 ff.

slightly higher. Common to Speeches x and viii are: *μὲν ἐπιθυμῶν*, x. 15. 9 = viii. 44. 5; *ὅτι ὅσῳ ἂν*, 26. 3 = 50. 2; *ποῖ ἀναδύμεθα*, 26. 5 = 50. 4;¹⁰ *Φωκέας ἀνέϊλεν*, 67. 8 = 65. 8; *ἄδει' ὑπέρ*, 66. 3 = 64. 6.

Speech x has three cases of *breves* which are eliminated in Speech viii by slight changes in phraseology: x. 11. 1, *δέ τινες* = viii. 38. 1, *εἰσι τοίνυν τινές*. x. 62. 7, *πράγματα δὲ παρασχέιν* = viii. 60. 6, *πράγματα δ' αὐτῷ παρασχέιν*. In x. 15. 7, *τί γὰρ ἄλλο τις εἴποι* = viii. 44. 3, *οὐ γὰρ ἄλλο τις ἂν εἴποι*. Speech viii eliminates one group of *breves* only to create another (but the manuscripts are divided here).

In the common blocks Speech viii has several groups of *breves* which are not found in Speech x: viii. 39. 4, *παύσασθε περί*, in a clause not found in Speech x. Cobet would read *παύσασθαι* (with MS A') . . . *κατηγοροῦντας*. viii. 44. 2, *ὅς ὑπολαμβάνει* (MS Σ only) = x. 15. 6, *ὥσθ' ὑπολαμβάνειν*. viii. 45. 3, *ταῦτα μὲν ἔασιν* = x. 16. 4, *ταῦτα μὲν ὑμᾶς ἔασιν*. In viii. 47. 8, MS Σ has *τότ' ἐθελήσθη* where the other manuscripts have *ταῦτ' ἐθελήσθη* with *καί* before *μένειν*, as in x. 23. 1 f. This reading of MS Σ is very doubtful, for it throws *ὥς ἀληθῶς ἄγειν εἰρήνην δικαίαν* back to the Athenians, whereas it is Philip who needs to be forced to keep the peace *ὥς ἀληθῶς*, an idea which pervades this speech. viii. 57. 5, *διαδικασία αὕτη* (in a clause not found in Speech x), has been discussed above.

In surveying the instances of *breves* in Speech viii (in the two long blocks common to Speeches viii and x), Speech viii shows less elimination of *breves* than might be expected on the theory that the revision was by Demosthenes himself. However, three groups of *breves* are removed; and, of those which remain, some rest on doubtful manuscript authority. At the most, the rate of *breves* in the passages of Speech viii under discussion is not greater than is found in some other parts of Demosthenes' admittedly genuine speeches; compare the six instances in twenty-three lines of viii. 70-73 and the five instances in sixteen lines of *De corona* 48 f.

¹⁰ There is some reason to think that Demosthenes sometimes purposely uses a weak rhythmical movement in describing "shilly-shally" conduct and its results. Cf. xviii. 63, *ταῦτα περιδεῖν γιγνόμενα*. v. 2, *ὅμεις δὲ μετὰ τὰ πράγματα*, where the strong conduct of others has just been described in a series of syllables predominantly long. viii. 11, *τηνκαῦτα θορυβοῦμεθα καὶ παρασκευάζομεθα*. viii. 17, *'Ἄλλὰ μὰ Δι' οὐκ ἔξει*. viii. 36, *οὐδὲν ἐκομίσασθε*. viii. 37, *οὐδ' ἂν δεκάκις ἀποθάνη, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον κινήσεσθε*. xviii. 296, *ἀνατετροφότες*. ix. 28, *διωρῶν γίμεθα κατὰ πόλεις*. ix. 73, *τὰ παρόντα περιορῶντας*. Cf. Blass, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

Reviewing our detailed examination of the two speeches, it appears that the hypothesis that Demosthenes himself made the revision of parts of Speech x for inclusion in a published version of Speech viii is justified. It is unlikely that an editor using Speech x for the enlargement of Speech viii would have been so skilful in omitting precisely those parts of Speech x which would detract from Demosthenes' reputation, or so thoroughgoing in his revision of the language in detail, and in improving it in almost all cases—a revision which is found in nearly every paragraph.

When is Demosthenes likely to have published the revised speech *On the Chersonese*? Assuming that the revised speech was published by Demosthenes as a justification of his activity in urging the break with Philip, we may well place it between the disaster of Chaeronea and the composition of the speech *On the Crown*. Between the time of the delivery of the original speech *On the Chersonese* (341) and Chaeronea (338) Demosthenes was in constant activity at home and abroad and was riding on the full tide of success. The splendid *Third Philippic* (341) had served as a comprehensive discussion of the situation and especially as a manifesto to other Greek states, if, as is likely, it was published immediately. But after the overwhelming disaster of 338, something of reaction against Demosthenes must have set in. While the people as a whole trusted him, there was a time when he said: *κατὰ τὴν ἡμέραν ἐκάστην ἐκρινόμεν ἐγώ* (xviii. 249). At such a time he may well have wished to put in permanent form and to publish the speech which, so far as we know, was the first in which he advocated the denunciation of the peace. The speech would hardly have been published after the *De corona* (330), for that speech gave the comprehensive and definitive defense of his policy.

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HORACE I. 14

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LONG tradition has accepted the dictum of Quintilian (viii. 6. 44) that this ode is an allegory and that the ship is the "Ship of State." Such eminent scholars, however, as Muretus and Bentley have been unable to concur with this conclusion and have taken the poem literally.

The steps in the argument that lead to the acceptance of Quintilian's allegorical explanation are, first, that the poem is an imitation of one by Alcaeus (frag. 18 [ed. Bergk]) and, second, that Alcaeus' poem is an allegorical picture of the state in distress. As to the first point, the Greek fragment describes a boat in the midst of a storm, beset by great waves on both sides; the mast seems to be in trouble and the sails are torn; the anchors are useless. In Horace's ode the boat is out of the storm close to the harbor. The storm has done its damage and, for the moment at least, the boat is riding safely. The mast is shattered and the sails are shredded; the oars are gone, the planking is going to pieces; the gods are swept overboard. There is nothing about anchors; and the interest shown by Horace is in keeping the boat from going back to sea, there to encounter, perhaps, another storm. The sails and the mast are the only parallels, and these are far from exact, the torn sails of the two poems showing the closest resemblance; in their case, however, Alcaeus is specific, repeating his detail of rents in the canvas, while Horace simply says that the sails are not intact.

We are not left wholly unacquainted with Horace's method of adapting a Greek original. The examples that we have, show that he followed his source more exactly than the foregoing would indicate.

- i. 12 Quem virum aut heroa lyra vel acri
Tibia sumis celebrare, Clio,
Quem deum?

Cf. Pindar *Olym.* 2:

Ἀναξίφορμυγες ὕμνοι,
τίνα θεόν, τίν' ἥρωα, τίνα δ' ἄνδρα
κελαδήσομεν;

i. 18 Nullam, Vare, sacra vite prius severis arborem.

Cf. Alcaeus, frag. 44:

Μηδὲν ἄλλο φυτεύσῃς πρότερον
δένδριον ἀμπέλω.

Cf. i. 23 with Anacreon, frag. 52, and i. 9 with Alcaeus, frag. 34.

It is well known that Alcaeus wrote of the sea and its hardships. Horace himself twice mentions this fact (i. 32 and ii. 13), but in each case he seems to think of Alcaeus as describing the real hardships of war and the sea. Which brings us to the second point. There is no reason to consider the poem of Alcaeus as allegorical except the statement that it is so, made by Heracleides of Pontus in the fourth century before Christ. Heracleides was writing on Allegory in Homer, searching for instances to illustrate his theme.

Since, then, in the generally accepted interpretation of i. 14, we have followed Heracleides and Quintilian, one writing at least three hundred years after the poet he criticized, the other a hundred, it seems worth while to analyze once again the lines as we have them. For, if this poem is such an allegory as Quintilian believed, it would seem to be not only unique in that respect among the odes but at the same time decidedly obscure.

Horace was not a sailor. The sea was, however, much in his thought, if only as a thing of terror. In half of the odes of Book i and in a large portion of those in Books ii and iii (Book iv is less nautical) he uses the sea either literally or in a figurative sense. As an actual ocean it appears most frequently. The merchant's daring is proved by his fearless braving of the sea;¹ the exploring colonists have invited heaven's wrath by venturing over the waves;² and in the poet's imagination the winds are ever at war with each other and the sea, which is their battleground, is an emblem of terror.³ Horace speaks of anger worse than the stormy waves of the Adriatic.⁴ Most frequently the sea is merely symbolic of danger and hardship.⁵ With this danger in mind he put his whole heart into the *propemptikon* to Vergil (i. 3) and wrote one other real and one virtual *propemptikon* (iii. 27 and i. 35).

¹ i. 1, 31, 35.

² *Ibid.*, 3.

³ *Ibid.* 9, 11, 28; ii. 16; iii. 1; etc.

⁴ i. 33, iii. 9.

⁵ i. 22, 32; ii. 6, 14; iii. 1; etc.

In the figurative sense, the sea plays its part, in the first place, as standing for the course of life on which the individual steers his bark.⁶ Horace warns his friend Licinius to steer a middle course. He himself, met by a thunderbolt from the blue, has to come about and set sail over the course he has come. He will not allow the faithless man to sail life's course as his companion. He is not wont, in time of storm and danger, to pray weakly to the gods. In the second place, there is the figure, not unrelated to the first, of the harbor of peace after the voyage, the refuge from trouble, the retreat of old age.⁷ In the third place, the figure of shipwrecked love occurs at least once in the odes.⁸

Of the "Ship of State" as a figure of speech, there is no instance except i. 14—if, indeed, that be one.

That the figure of the so-called "Ship of State" was familiar to ancient literature may be admitted at once. Aeschylus in the opening of the *Seven* makes use of it; and Sophocles, in the *Oedipus Tyrannus* (25). Plato's is the most familiar rendering (*Rep.* 488); and Theognis' (671 ff.), probably the earliest extant. It was a figure fairly popular with Cicero. In *Epist. ad fam.* i. 9. 21 he carries out elaborately the comparison of government with the art of steering. He uses the same figure in *Ad fam.* ix. 15 and xii. 25⁹ but comes nearest to Horace in *Ad Att.* vii. 13, when he says: "commissum quidem a nobis certe est sive a nostro duce, ut e portu sine gubernaculis egressi tempestati nos traderemus." Polybius (vi. 44) likened Athens to a ship without a pilot. If we could accept the speeches in Dio Cassius without question, we should have Maecenas, in his plea to Octavian, urging him not to leave the state like a ship in a storm without a pilot. In all of these instances, however, the emphasis is on the helmsman and on the guiding of the ship; and in each case the figure is made perfectly obvious and cannot be called in the full sense an allegory. It is usually quite definitely a simile. A few characteristics of i. 14 should be considered before investigating at length the figures of sea and storm and harbor.

There are some points of interest in the phrasing and wording of the ode. It is not impossible that the shattered mast and torn sails came

⁶ i. 34; ii. 10; iii. 2, 29.

⁸ i. 5.

⁷ ii. 16.

⁹ Cf. also *Plancus* 94 and *Piso* 20.

from Alcaeus, and the somewhat unusual *pressa* may have occurred to Horace because of a memory of Vergil's line in the *Georgics* (i. 103): "ceu pressae cum iam portum tetigere carinae." But chiefly to be noted is the influence of Catullus. Commentators have always drawn attention to the possible source of *Pontica pinus* (l. 11) in Catullus 4. 9: "Ponticum sinum/ubi iste post phasellus antea fuit/comata silva." That the next line of Horace's poem is *silvae filia nobilis* lends some probability to this derivation. Horace was familiar with this fourth poem of Catullus, which has reference to the Cyclades, employs the slightly unusual *nobilis*, and uses *aequor* for the sea. These indications might have little significance by themselves. Also, it must be admitted that the terminology of sailing, as known to the poets, would be limited, so that no great variety of usage should be expected. But in so short a poem it is significant that the following words, which, as a group, are certainly not commonplace, all occur in the sixty-fourth poem of Catullus, with which Horace was familiar: *fluctus*, *portum*, *remigio*, *malus*, *saucius*, *antemnae*, *funibus*, *carinae*, *aequor*, *lintea*, *pinus*, *navita*, *puppibus*. Finally, from another poem of Catullus, the second, with which Horace was familiar, may have come the two striking words *desiderium* and *nitentis*, Catullus using *tristis animi levare curas*, and Horace, *curaque non levis*, in close conjunction with these unusual expressions. These reminiscences indicate a poem carefully constructed, a somewhat artificial effort, to that extent like iii. 27. Horace was experimenting with words and phrases which he borrowed, and sought to use to better advantage than their original sponsor.

This fourteenth ode is one of a very few among the poems of Horace that would seem to have no personal address, either direct or indirect. Horace addressed a ship in i. 3; but it was distinctly the ship on which Vergil was sailing, and the poem was a *propemptikon* to Vergil. For the present I shall assume that this ode is not a *propemptikon*. Either Horace is doing one unusual thing, addressing a boat somewhat as he addressed the tree that did not fall on him,¹⁰ or he is doing another unusual thing and addressing some person (or, of course, it may be the state) under the figure of the ship. Disregarding for the moment

¹⁰ It is only fair to recall that his rescue from Philippi, his escape from the tree, and some equally dangerous episode by sea are recalled by him as a group in iii. 4. 26 ff.

the allegorical possibilities, the poems addressed to no person, either directly or by implication, pretty clearly reduce themselves to a very small group. We may surely eliminate i. 15 as a perfectly understandable situation that requires no personal address. The dramatic setting makes Nereus the speaker, addressing Paris. As noted, i. 3 is a typical *propemptikon*. The so-called "national odes," iii. 1-6, are addressed as a whole *virginibus puerisque*. Of the rest, iii. 9 is a dramatic idyl, entirely in dialogue; i. 32, addressed to his lyre, would seem to be introductory, perhaps a tentative preface to some collection; ii. 15, ii. 18, and iii. 24 are all conventional satiric attacks on the luxury of the day, the last two having the familiar indefinite second-person address. This leaves, with no person named or indicated and no earmarks of satire, i. 34: "Parcus deorum cultor et infrequens," a highly personal and perhaps allegorical poem; i. 16: "O matre pulchra filia pulchrior," either highly personal or allegorical; and the present poem, "O navis," which, if it be literal, has an address to an unidentified ship and, if not, has an enigmatic address dependent on the understanding of the allegory.

The odes beginning with "O" should be examined. Two are to goddesses (Venus and Fortuna: i. 30 and i. 35); one to his Bandusian spring (iii. 13); one to a jar of wine, though in reality to Messala Corvinus (iii. 21); one to Pompeius Varus (ii. 7); one to the fairer daughter of a mother fair (i. 16); and one to Ligurinus (iv. 10). Except for the last, there is something of unusual warmth or earnestness of emotion in all these. Perhaps the last should not be excepted. It is in a meter which Horace used three times only, and those three times to express fairly serious, if slightly platitudinous, truths. At any rate, the beginning of the poem with "O" was not a lazy device but rather an indication of a formal or earnest opening.

The poem i. 34, addressed to no obvious individual, is undoubtedly a preface to the thirty-fifth, the prayer to Fortuna; but it is also a very personal revelation. It should not be left without noting the figure in lines 3 ff.: "nunc retrorsum/vela dare atque iterare cursus/cogor relictos," life as a voyage during which Horace has been forced to double back on his course.

It is time to consider this figure of the voyage of life in relation to i. 14. In that poem the most essential single item is the harbor, *portus*.

The ship is urged, in view of its storm-tossed condition, to make without hesitation for this harbor and not to risk again the stormy sea. Now *portus*, from its literal meaning, acquired the general idea of a retreat or refuge. To Ovid (*H.* i. 110 and *Ex Ponto* ii. 8. 68) an individual could be *portus et ara*, the altar too being a spot of refuge. In *Tristia* v. 6. 1 ff. he uses *confugium* and *portus* in this sense. To Cicero the senate is *portus et refugium* for all the peoples of the Empire (*De off.* ii. 8. 26) and the Roman courts are *portus ac perfugium* for the persecuted (*Pro Sulla* 14. 41). But this is rather extreme. The sense is clear in Cicero, *Ad fam.* i. 9. 21, where the literal and figurative interpretations are, in the orator's habitual manner, indicated fully and beyond the chance of misunderstanding: "sed ut in navigando tempestati obsequi artis est, etiam si portum tenere non queas, etc." One of the most familiar instances is *Catalepton* 5. 8: "Nos ad beatos vela mittimus portus / magni petentes docta dicta Sironis / vitamque ab omni vindicabimus cura." To Seneca, *portus*, in the figurative sense, was not the peaceful retreat in life, but death, the harbor at the end of life's journey (*Ag.* 589; *H.O.* 1021; *H.F.* 1072). So Cicero had employed the figure (*T.D.* i. 44. 107). But Cicero also used it otherwise in *De oratore* i. 60. 255: "Equidem tantum absum ab ista sententia, ut non modo non arbitrer subsidium senectutis in eorum qui consultum veniant multitudine esse ponendum, sed tamquam portum aliquem expectem istam, quam tu times, solitudinem." And Statius (*Silvae* ii. 2) still used this other connotation in his poem to Pollius, which possibly echoes Horace: "et tua securos portus placidamque quietem / intravit non quassa rates. Sic perge nec umquam / emeritam in nostras puppem dimitte procellas." Horace had the hope of a quiet retirement too: "Sit meae sedes utinam senectae / sit modus lasso, maris et viarum / militiaeque" (ii. 16). An epigram of the *Anthology* (I. i. 440 [ed. Riese]), ascribed to Seneca, combines this idea with that of Statius and of Horace in i. 14: "Quam mihi displiceat vitae fortuna quietae; aut credat dubiis se mea puppis aquis."

Another turn is given sometimes to the figure. Philosophy may provide a port even before old age. Cicero (*Ad fam.* vii. 30. 2) uses the words: "se in philosophiae portum conferre"; and to Varro he writes (*Ad fam.* ix. 6. 4.): "Cum enim te semper magnum hominem duxi, tum quod his tempestatibus es prope unus solus in portu fructusque

doctrinae percipis eos qui maximi sunt." Compare *T.D.* v. 2. 5: "Cuius [i.e., *philosophiae*] in sinum cum a primis temporibus aetatis nostra voluntas studiumque nos compulisset, his gravissimis casibus in eundem portum, ex quo eramus egressi, magna iactati tempestate confugimus." Perhaps this particular figure originated with Epicurus, for Epictetus (frag. 544) says: 'Επίκουρος τ' ἀγαθὸν ἐν τῷ βαθυτάτῳ τῆς ἡσυχίας ὥσπερ ἐν . . . λιμένι τιθέμενος.

Turning to this Greek usage, which was familiar, of course, to Horace, we find both *λιμήν* and *ὄρμος* used in the same figurative way. *πολιὰ δέ*, says Herakleitus (*Hom. prob.* 61), καὶ γῆρας ἱεροὶ τῶν τελευταίων χρόνων λιμένες, ἀσφαλὲς ἀνθρώποις ὄρμισμα. Diogenes Laertius, in his life of Bion (4. 48), says of the philosopher: τὸ γῆρας ἔλεγεν ὄρμον εἶναι τῶν κακῶν· εἰς αὐτὸ γοῦν πάντα καταφεύγειν. Sophocles (*Ajax* 683) and Aeschylus (*Suppl.* 471) had used *λιμήν* as a refuge, just as an epigram in the *Palatine Anthology* (vii. 388) uses *ὄρμος*. Another epigram (*Epigr. Gr.* 67) has βίου πλεύσαντα πρὸς ὄρμον, while still another elaborates the theme (*Pal. Anth.* x. 65): πλοῦς σφαλερὸς τὸ ζῆν . . . ἀλλ' ἅμα πάντες εἰς ἓνα τὸν κατὰ γῆς ὄρμον ἀπερχόμεθα. Meleager (*Anth. Gr.* xii. 167) uses the figure in an amatory conceit:

χειμαίνει δ' ὁ βαρὺ πνεύσας πόθος· ἀλλὰ μ' ἐς ὄρμον
δέξαι τὸν ναῦταν Κυπρίδος ἐν πελάγει.

Compare also Propertius iii. 24. 14 ff.

But to return to the more immediate atmosphere in which Horace wrote. There is an indication, I think, in Terence that the phrase *in portu*, which Cicero used in connection with Varro, was colloquially familiar. In the *Andria* (iii. 1. 20 ff.), Terence makes the old man Simo say: "Hic me si imparatum in veris nuptiis / adortus esset, quos mihi ludos redderet. / Nunc huius periculo fit, ego in portu navigo." The *ludos* and the *in portu navigo* are significant. Cicero's use is less colloquial but altogether striking in his description of Scipio in *De off.* iii. 1. 2: "Ille enim requiescens a reipublicae pulcherrimis muneribus otium sibi sumebat aliquando et e coetu hominum frequentiaque interdum tamquam in portum se in solitudinem recipiebat."

One last quotation. In the seventh book of the *Aeneid* the aged Latinus is being pushed to enter into hostilities against the Trojans

and speaks with resentment to Turnus, who has disrupted his plans for a peaceful old age (598 ff.): "nam mihi parta quies, omnisque in limine portus / funere felici spoliis. Nec plura locutus / saepsit se tectis rerumque reliquit habenas."

I have not, up to this point, cited one particular parallel in Horace himself which editors have noted, for it seems to have still further implications and to be worthy of independent consideration. The seventh ode of Book ii presents Horace welcoming to Rome an old friend, Pompeius Varus, with whom he had fought at Philippi. From the storms of that period Horace says he was saved by Mercury, while Varus was dragged back into them after the battle:

Sed me per hostes Mercurius celer
Denso paventem sustulit aere;
Te rursus in bellum resorbens
Unda fretis tulit aestuosus.

Here are the two characters, the man in harbor and the man who sets sail again into the storm, together resembling the (literal) voyager of i. 1. 15-18, who is first one and then the other. The two passages taken together strongly suggest a parallel thought in i. 14.

This review of the general practices of Roman writers in the matter of sea figures, and of Horace in particular, makes the traditional "Ship of State" interpretation of i. 14 seem at least improbable. Acro and Porphyrio made Quintilian's criticism more precise but not more convincing. The figure was not sufficiently familiar to be used without some hint that it was a figure. In so far as it was at all familiar, it was concerned primarily with the pilot, who does not appear in this ode. There is more than a fanciful difficulty in trying to apply the figure of the "Ship of State" to the government as a whole, sailing out into the Sea of Civil Strife. A state does not choose between peace and civil war. The figure would have to apply to the citizens rather than to the state, and, furthermore, to the citizens not as a single body. The shattered state of the ship is too extreme for Horace to have publicly portrayed it after his position was well established, and he is hardly likely to have addressed the state before that. If we give up the position that he is addressing the whole body politic and take the *navis* to represent a party, the difficulties only multiply.

But the literal interpretation is almost as difficult. To make that tolerable we should have to be told at least whose boat it was or who was on board. There would have to be some address, by indirection at least, to give point to the obvious sincerity of feeling in the poem. Without this the poem is banal. Why was the ship previously a *tædium*? No reason appears. Why is it now a *cura non levis*? On the basis of a literal interpretation, the Cyclades are somewhat remote and purposeless.

Certain very real difficulties would be removed if we could accept the theory that the ode is a *propemptikon*, probably to Augustus. The address to the ship would then be quite natural. The depiction of dangers to be met is wholly appropriate. But other difficulties fully as great present themselves at once to militate against this interpretation.

Our information about the *propemptikon* comes from five or six examples in Roman literature and from the account of the genre in Menander (Spengel, *Rhetores Graeci*, III, 396 ff.). Hendrickson has discussed the type in connection with another ode (*Classical Journal*, III, 100 ff.). According to Menander, the *propemptikon* should be written for a dear one, either lover or friend, departing on a long trip. The central thought is that of grief caused by long separation. Menander would have the abandoned poet complain first against fate, which causes the separation, and then continue his lament as if with a view of dissuading the traveler. He will then say that, since he cannot dissuade his lover or friend from departing, he will perforce acquiesce in and try to further the plan. Specific instructions are added to be followed if the trip is by sea. The poet should in that case remind his friend of the gods of the sea—Proteus, Glaucus, Nereus, and Poseidon—possible protectors. The ship should be reminded of what it is carrying. In his suggestions the poet should include the hoped-for harbor. Then he will turn to prayer, asking the favor of the gods on his dear one's adventure.

In the present ode it is hard to find the remotest suggestion of the motif of separation. There is not even an implication of any particular person on the ship. The ship is not leaving, nor does it leave during the poem, as in *Od. i. 3*, *Epode 10*, Statius *Silvae iii. 2*, and probably in Horace *Od. i. 35* and *iii. 27*. The true *propemptikon* assumes that the

ship is under way and is not a real argument against the departure, but rather a protest. Horace does not acquiesce in the departure. He does not invoke the gods of the sea; he does not indicate the goal of the voyage. The single couplet at the end, including *vites* as the only expression of a prayer, if prayer it be, is scarcely adequate in view of Menander's instruction. Nor is this the easiest rendering of *vites*. To translate *vites*—May you escape safely!—is not wholly impossible; but it is less natural than to take it as meaning: "Do thou avoid by staying away from." Such is Horace's normal use of the verb. In iii. 30. 7 he says: "multaque pars mei / vitabit Libitinam," and in *Epod.* 2. 7: "forumque vitat et superba civium / potentiorum limina." So in *Odes* i. 17. 18: "hic in reducta valle Caniculae / vitabis aestus," and in i. 15. 16: "nequiquam thalamo gravis / hastas et calami spicula Cnosii / vitabis strepitumque et celerem sequi / Aiace." Compare, also, *Odes* i. 23. 1: "Vitas hinuleo me similis, Chloe." The closest approach to the other interpretation is *Epist.* ii. 2. 135: "posset qui rupem et puteum vitare patentem." But this parallel is in itself suggestive. If the meaning in i. 14 were the same, we should expect, not *vites aequora*, but *vites Cycladas*, or *vites cautes* ("escape the reefs"), whereas the natural meaning seems to be: avoid those waters altogether by not setting forth. Horace, then, offers either an inadequate prayer or none at all; certainly he does not pray for a happy voyage. Most striking detail of all, perhaps, is the fact that the ship is a virtual wreck, which in itself is enough to remove the poem from the category of the ordinary *propemptikon*. A suggestion of the technique of that genre there surely is, but this comes largely from the fact that Horace addresses a boat and thereby unfortunately suggests to the reader's mind his ode to Vergil. But if the boat were the boat of Augustus, how could Horace justify the picture of its complete distress or the unexplained loss of the gods or the use of *taedium*, incomprehensible under the circumstances?

Against discarding the theory of Quintilian, the argument is often advanced that he was presumably making use of old and established criticism which represented the interpretation that had come down from Horace's own day. It is hard to see anything more than an assertion, or at most a presumption, in such an argument. At least, by its side should be noted the possible implication to be drawn from Statius'

poem to Pollius (*Silvae* ii. 2). Pollius has retired to his seashore villa to enjoy his latter days. It is true that, in this poem to an Epicurean, Statius uses ideas and phrases that surely came from Lucretius; but the phrase, *tua non quassa rates securos portus placidamque quietem intravit*, in view of Statius' familiarity with Horace in general, not only recalls *ratis quassas* in *Odes* i. 1. 17 but is strikingly suggestive of the situation in i. 14. If that poem was in the later poet's mind, he surely was not interpreting it in the same sense as did Quintilian. Again, most critics who hold to Quintilian's statement that the poem is allegorical find no difficulty in disregarding his interpretation of the allegory. But, if the authority of tradition demands faith in one statement, why not in the other? I have already indicated that I find it hard to take the ode literally, but at the same time I find it just as hard to accept it as a *propemptikon* or as an ode to the "Ship of State."

If, then, we abandon these three interpretations, we come back to the fact that Horace's prevailing use of the sea in a figurative sense was as the symbol of the course of life, and in this sense he used it about himself. His eulogies of the life of peaceful simplicity are familiar. He had one bitter taste of the storm of civil strife; and, in at least one ode, without personal address, he recorded his emotions at a crisis in his own personal life (*Parcus deorum*), and on that occasion he used a figure taken from sailing. It is not inconceivable that, when he wrote i. 14, Horace was experiencing something of the emotions that were his when he wrote *Epode* 16. At that time, as the epode relates, a second generation is being harassed by the horrors of civil war. Horace, not yet under the benevolent censorship of Maecenas, is disgusted with his experiences in the army of Brutus and is still free to speak out about a semipolitical question in which his sympathies are with the lost cause; he sees, however, no use in battling further. Rather, he advises all that feel as he does to withdraw from the struggle, abandon the storm-tossed country, and sail away to the Isles of the Blessed, where the golden age still rules and where Jupiter has reserved a refuge: "*pii, secunda vate me datur fuga*." They are to sail away under the leadership of Horace as their divinely inspired poet. This refuge of the Blessed Isles is certainly no literal goal. All that Horace can see of hope in the future is refuge in the realms of poetry. There is plenty of feeling in the epode; but, with its fanciful conclusion and in spite of its

superficial address to his own generation, it can hardly be looked upon as a political pamphlet. The poet quite naturally is thinking—in large part, at least—of his own personal solution of an unhappy situation. Treated in a very different manner, i. 14 might be interpreted in much the same fashion. The disastrous venture with Brutus, which made on Horace a lasting impression, has convinced him of the wisdom of seeking the quiet life of the philosopher-poet. A new crisis causes him to warn himself of the dangerous folly of risking a second venture. He might have thought of Catullus' words, spoken under quite different circumstances: "at tu Catulle destinatus obdura."

With a personal interpretation of the ode, no difficulty is felt as a result of the absence of a name; the *navis* is Horace and his own life. The picture of disaster is hardly too extreme for the situation in which Horace found himself after Philippi. There would be no gods to rescue him a second time if he allowed himself to return to a desperate cause. And the wholly general, somewhat literary phrase, *nitentis Cycladas*, is appropriate to this situation.

The greatest difficulty in a personal interpretation of the ode lies in the sentence beginning *Quamvis Pontica pinus*. Surely Horace cannot be referring to his own pedigree, his stock and name. But this is not a necessary interpretation. His previous venture was in the defense of "republicanism," of what he and his party considered the noble old Roman state, as against the modern usurpers. If the boat represents himself, it is as a part of that larger entity; and the Pontic pine, the race, and the name are his as part of the old Roman stock which, fine as it is, cannot face another storm. The republicans were more and more, from the days of Philippi on, a group of regretful reactionaries. Immediately after the disaster, Horace's life must have been to him a *sollicitum taedium*; but it had ceased so to be, and he was developing that philosophy which enabled him to regain a contented and even happy mode of life in spite of a lingering impulse to "take arms against a sea of troubles."

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THE POET AND THE MUSES IN HOMER

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THE limpid flow of argument which makes Gilbert Murray's *Rise of the Greek Epic* so entrancing to the unsuspecting reader has its sources in all the bubbling fountains of the higher criticism, and the analytical studies which are not laid under contribution are few indeed. But the nucleus of Murray's theories, the idea of a "traditional book," handed down from father to son, by master to disciple, added to by each heritor, jealously guarded as a precious trade-secret, and conned over slyly in private before each public recitation, is peculiarly his own. So also, I believe, is the attempt to establish the use and existence of this traditional book from the poet's invocation of the Muse.¹ Such a line as *ἔσπετε νῦν μοι Μοῦσαι Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχουσαι*, we are told, is an indication that the poet is about to consult his book on matters for which he cannot trust his memory, facts, lists of things, "such subjects as the Catalogue of the Greek army." Says Murray:

One suspects that that consultation was often carried out by the bard retiring to some lonely place, or maybe barricading the door of his hut, bringing forth a precious roll, and laboriously spelling out the difficult letter-marks. *Γράμματα*, the Greeks called them, or 'scratches.'

This appealing picture of the bard looking in his book puts everything at once on a footing of pleasant intimacy, as if we were peering over the poet's shoulder and had a part in his painful efforts to decipher the mysterious "scratches" of his scroll. The friendly feeling engendered by this intimacy is tinged slightly with pity, with perhaps the touch of condescension reserved for those who have not our accomplishments, who read haltingly or speak our language imperfectly. Our poet, if we can trust Mr. Murray, is having rather a hard time "laboriously spelling out" his scratches, and we can read a whole volume of Edgar Wallace in an evening. Can we trust Mr. Murray? Is the scene that he has evoked, with its flavor of intimacy, a true

¹ Gilbert Murray, *The Rise of the Greek Epic* (4th ed.; Oxford, 1934), pp. 96 f.

re-creation of the past? Shall we allow it to invest the *Iliad*, for us, as it invests it for Mr. Murray, with "that touch of the infinite, that strictly incomparable quality which results when a beautiful object is confessedly imperfect and inevitably suggests a beauty beyond itself?"² Or must we subject it to pedantic analysis, and perhaps discard it, and with it the pleasurable emotions it evokes, as vain imagining?

Murray gives abundant instances of "traditional books," from *Whitaker's Almanack* and the *Statesman's Yearbook* back through *Hamlet* and the *Song of Roland* to the Hebrew scriptures (pp. 100-119). But analogies must be used with caution; if they are not to land us in a vicious circle, their pertinence must be established by valid evidence; without such evidence their multiplication does not avail. It may be granted at once that there have been books which have been handed down, altered, added to, consulted—consulted perhaps even in the furtive manner Murray so circumstantially depicts—and that his list could be considerably extended without much difficulty. All this is very interesting, but it does not prove that the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, in the formative stages, were written books, or that the bard pieced them together by cutting the hide with a knife and sewing in new strips, or that he conned them over secretly before his recitations, any more than the existence of long poems not committed to writing proves the contrary. The only portion of Murray's argument which can be admitted as evidence is his citation from the poems of invoca-

² *Ibid.*, p. 315. Murray's imaginative reconstruction induces a state of mind which finds expression, in chap. iv, in his tone of easy condescension toward the bard (pp. 96-99), and, in chap. xii, in the mild tolerance with which he views the imperfections of the *Iliad* (pp. 315 f.), as he yearns toward the "real poem" which is "somehow more perfect and beautiful than this version that we happen to have," and contrasts "the full thing that was meant" with the best that Cynaethus could do. Cynaethus, it should be kept in mind, is the authentic historical figure, known to us from a scholion on Pindar *Nem.* ii, who takes the place in Murray's theory of the unsubstantial, mythical Homer, of whom we know nothing, "except indeed that he did not, in any complete sense, write the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*" (p. 238). So the imaginings of chap. iv lead directly to the sentimental transcendentalism of the final conclusion, in which we cannot see the text that lies before us because our eyes are raised in mystic adoration to an ineffable *Iliad* of *Iliads*, accessible only to those nobler souls of the Phaedrus who soar above the phenomenal universe into the realm of the ideas. The general effect of Murray's theories is summed up, not unfairly, by Nilsson as follows: "He is very critical, and thinks that the *Iliad* has many characteristics of a bad poem and that its subject is second-rate, but that in spite of this it is a good poem, which he admires profoundly" (*Homer and Mycenae* [London, 1933], p. 24).

tions to the Muses, and the worth of this evidence can be tested only by critical examination of the passages and their contexts. We have to determine whether they do or do not suggest that the bard is about to consult his book on matters for which he cannot trust his memory. Here is a definite question relating to a text that lies before us, and we should be able to give a definite answer.

The evidence that Murray actually presents from the Homeric text is limited to the statement (p. 96) that Homer, like Hesiod, consults the Muses "for such subjects as the Catalogue of the Greek army (cf. *a* 7, B 486, 761, cf. M 176)." To ask what are the Homeric passages that prompt the use of the plural would perhaps be an impertinent quibble. So would it be to remark that on the basis of Murray's theory of the Catalogue (pp. 179 f.) we might connect the invocation with the poet's knife and his rhapsodic needle (p. 99); it may indicate that he is about to sew into his book a goodly chunk sliced from some other poem, say the *Cypria*. However, seriously, what Murray means is that we have here a long catalogue of diverse facts on which the poet consults the Muses and that the Muses represent his book. *A priori*, and for this particular passage, the explanation is tenable, though it is not the only tenable explanation. We may admit also that the absence of the invocation at the start of the Trojan catalogue is not inconsistent with Murray's theory, since the second catalogue is short, simple, and consequently easy to remember.

The invocation of B 761 comes at the end of the Catalogue, where the account of the last contingent and its leader is followed by the lines

οὔτοι ἄρ' ἡγεμόνες Δαναῶν καὶ κοίρανοι ἦσαν·
 τίς τ' ἄρ' τῶν ὄχ' ἄριστος ἔην, σὺ μοι ἔννεπε Μοῦσα,
 αὐτῶν ἥδ' ἱππῶν, οἳ ἄμ' Ἀτρεΐδῃσιν ἔποντο.

What follows is so brief, so like material found everywhere in the poems, that it is hard to see why the poet should signal for a consultation at this point. We cannot give the passage much weight as evidence for Murray's theory, unless we regard it as virtually repeating the earlier invocation, so that the poet begins and ends the Catalogue with the Muses—perhaps 761 marks a last sly glance at his book as he puts it away.

The citation of M 176 seems to be included because Murray thinks that *θεὸν ὥς* implies the Muses. There is really nothing to distinguish this from other instances of aposiopesis except that it involves the contrast between human limitations and divine power elaborated in B 485 ff.³

There is left the reference to *a* 7, which I think must be a misprint for *a* 1.⁴ If it has any bearing upon Murray's theory, this would be to indicate a preliminary look in the book each time the poem was begun anew, for obviously the opening lines are no more difficult to remember than are other parts.

Only these passages are cited, and no reference is made to three other instances of the formal invocation of the Muses (Λ 218, Ξ 508, Π 112). In Λ 218 the goddesses are called upon to say who first of the foemen faced Agamemnon's spear after the Trojans rallied at the call of Hector. The champion they are bidden name proves to be Iphidamas, and the passage which ensues is a typical account of his slaying and that of his brother Coön, who meanwhile has wounded Agamemnon in the forearm. Three formulaic lines suffice to relate the subsequent feats of Agamemnon, who presently is forced by the pain of his stiffening wound to retire to the camp. Here is nothing which would impose a greater strain on the memory than any other passage of equal length from the scenes of battle. And when the entire context is read, the rout of the Trojans and the pursuit up to the Scaean gate, the hurried dispatch of Iris with instructions to Hector, the rallying of the Trojans, the final attack by Agamemnon, his wounding and retreat, it appears that the invocation may be intended to mark the introduction of a crucial moment, the last phase of the Achaean offensive and the retreat of Agamemnon, which is the first major turning-point of the battle. After this there are intervals when *κατὰ ἴσα μάχην ἐτάνυσσε Κρονίων* (Λ 336), or when the Achaeans for a time take the offensive, but on the whole they are being driven

³ Instead of the familiar *πάντα μὲν (πάσας δ', πάντας δ') οὐκ ἂν ἐγὼ μυθήσομαι* (δ 240; λ 328, 517), we have *ἀργαλέον δέ με ταῦτα θεὸν ὥς πάντ' ἀγορεύσαι*, an idea which is elaborated in B 485 ff. to emphasize the vast numbers of the Achaeans. It is impossible to say whether the poet is thinking primarily of the Muses in M 176 or only of the gods in general.

⁴ L. 7 speaks only of the fate of Odysseus' comrades, destroyed by their own folly. Murray's reference to B 486 also seems to be an error for 484.

steadily back until finally the Trojans are at the ships and the fortunes of the Danaans at the lowest ebb.

In this fighting backward and forward, between Agamemnon's withdrawal and the final assault on the ships, there is once a notable turn in the tide of battle, when, for a moment, the Achaeans are on the point of turning defeat into victory. Zeus is slumbering in the arms of Hera. Poseidon is at the head of the Argive host, and Hector has been carried unconscious from the field; the grisly challenge of Penelaus as he brandishes the severed head of Ilioneus upon his spear strikes terror into the Trojans and they flee in panic rout. Precisely at this point, again the poet calls upon the Muses to say who first of the Achaeans won bloody spoils when the rout began (Ξ 508). Here are, to be sure, six lines made up mostly of names, the names of the slayers and the slain, but we can scarcely believe the bard had to look in his book for these when he so often negotiates similar passages, sometimes longer and with more unfamiliar names, by sheer force of memory.⁶ And here again we are in very much the same situation as in Λ . This is the climax of the offensive led by Poseidon; Zeus is about to awake, the tide of battle is to turn, and the Achaeans will never dare to rally until the last desperate stand at the ships.

The third, and last, of these invocations is familiar to all. In Π 112 the poet calls upon the Muses to say how first the flame was flung into the ships of the Achaeans:

ἔσπετε νῦν μοι Μοῦσαι 'Ολύμπια δώματ' ἔχουσαι
 δῖπῳ δὴ πρῶτον πῦρ ἔμπεσε νηυσὶν Ἀχαιῶν.

Here is nothing that even the liveliest imagination could construe as a tax upon the memory. But here again is a crucial point—the crucial point, on which the whole *Iliad* turns. This is the climax of the Trojan offensive. Ajax has reached the limit of his endurance, πάντῃ δὲ κακὸν κακῶ ἑσθήρικτο, and the poet calls upon the Muses at the instant Hector's sword shears off the point of Ajax's spear. Ajax knows that the gods are against him, and he gives up the fight. The Achaeans are lost, save for the help of Achilles. That help is to be

⁶ E.g., O 328–42, E 703–10, Θ 273–77, Λ 299–303, and Π 692–97. The poet does not call upon the Muses for the names of the Nereids (Σ 39–49) or for the rivers of the Troad (M 19–22).

given, through Patroclus, and once again the tide of battle is to turn—this time decisively.

To sum up, the invocation to the Muses, aside from the first lines of the *Iliad* and of the *Odyssey*, is found once at the start of the Catalogue and once at its close; in three instances, which Murray ignores, it coincides with three crucial moments in the long-drawn-out battle of Λ - Σ , the three most critical turns of fortune between the arming of Agamemnon and the death of Patroclus. Murray's method is now clear. He has merely set down a few instances which seem to him to support his a priori notion that the appeal to the Muses means a consultation of the "traditional book." In one of these only, B 484, does the matter which follows the invocation accord with his theory. Against this are three instances which cannot be explained on his theory, in which the apostrophe to the Muses seems to mark the appearance of crucial and intensely dramatic moments in the action.⁶ On the basis of the actual Homeric usage, we must conclude that Murray has presented no valid proof of his theory, since there are other reasonable explanations for B 484,⁷ and that the weight of evidence is decidedly against him.

⁶ According to T. D. Seymour, *Life in the Homeric Age* (New York, 1907), p. 415, the poet appeals to the Muses "at times at the beginning of a new narrative." This, in my opinion, can be only formally true of the instances we are considering, and it leaves us still faced by the question why the poet should begin anew midway in scenes of intense action. The position of II 112 is particularly striking; it comes just twelve lines after a natural division, the important change of scene from Patroclus and Achilles to the battle at the ships; it is put in the very midst of the brief passage which describes the final struggle of Ajax against Hector, at the critical moment when Hector's sword shears off the head of his opponent's spear. H. Fränkel has discussed A 218 apropos of pauses in epic recitation, in his review of Murray's third edition (*Gnomon*, III [1927], 8). Fränkel believes that the singer actually paused at this point; but he understands fully what a pause here would mean ("solche Pausen ohne Abschluss innerhalb eines zusammenhängenden Einzelvortrags"). If actually there was a pause, it was clearly intended, at least in part, to whet the appetites of the hearers; as Fränkel says, the poet "ja doch seinen Hörern den Stachel in der Seele lassen wollte." We have still to ask why, among the many pauses that must have intervened (Fränkel, *loc. cit.*), these few, and they only, are marked by the invocation of the Muses. Leaf (notes *ad loc.*) understands correctly the functions of the line but will not allow that the crisis is sufficiently important to justify its use in Ξ 508, where he regards the passage it introduces (ll. 508-22) as a "later addition."

⁷ The view that the invocation is intended to arouse the interest of the listeners in a notable passage about to be sung is entirely tenable here, especially when we consider that the invocation is but one element in an elaborate preparation for the Catalogue (B 441-93). Like the similes, it hyperbolizes the vast numbers of the host.

Now it is clear that this formula was originally a genuine invocation. When the singer invoked the Muses, addressing to them an imperative, he desired them to do something. If we wish to know what that something was, it will be well to consider what the Muses actually do for bards in the poems. Since the bards apparently did not go to war, our material will be found mainly in the *Odyssey*.

The general answer to our question is given by Odysseus when he says (θ 479-81) that singers have their meed of honor with all men upon the earth for that the Muse teacheth them lays and loveth the race of singers. He goes on, addressing himself to the bard:

Δημόδοκ', ἔξοχα δὴ σε βροτῶν αἰνίζομ' ἀπάντων·
ἦ σέ γε Μοῦσ' ἐδίδαξε, Διὸς πάις, ἦ σέ γ' Ἀπόλλων [487 f.].

The evidence, and the result, of this divine teaching he finds in the fact that Demodocus sings *λίην κατὰ κόσμον* the fate of the Achaeans, all that they did and suffered and all their toils, even as if he had himself been present or had heard from another's lips, and will presumably be able to sing the lay of the Trojan horse. If he can in truth sing this tale, Odysseus will tell mankind that the god hath given him without stint the divine gift of song. Here we have the general notion of the bard's qualifications, their source and character. He not only knows the events that enter into his lays but he can sing them in such wise as to seem an eyewitness of their occurrence, and this surely implies the powers of spirited and graphic expression that we associate with the inspiration of genius. He is expected also to sing at a moment's notice any lay for which one of his hearers may ask. Mr. Murray may be able to reconcile all this with the notion of a bard dependent on an esoteric written text. I cannot.

Next we learn how the divine teaching revealed itself on a particular occasion. Odysseus spake, and the bard, starting up, *θεοῦ ἄρχετο, φαῖνε δ' αἰοδῆν* (499), taking up the tale at the point where the Achaeans had set fire to the camp and sailed away. In my opinion, *θεοῦ ἄρχετο* are to be taken together of an invocation addressed to a god, perhaps Apollo, but more likely the Muse, upon whom Demodocus calls for poetic inspiration adequate to his theme.⁸

⁸ In a note on this line, on p. 205 of this issue, I have given my reasons for rejecting the alternative interpretation (*δρμηθεῖς θεοῦ* = *ἐκ θεοῦ ἐμπνευσθεῖς*) reported in the scholia and adopted in all the editions and special lexica. While Apollo, or some other

What is so fully and so dramatically expressed in this scene is implied in the briefer passage in which Demodocus first appears (θ 62 ff.). A herald brings in the revered singer, whom the Muse loveth above other men, and hath given him both good and ill—she hath blinded his eyes but hath given him the sweet gift of song. And when the time for song is come, the Muse then moves the singer to sing the glories of men, a lay whose present fame reacheth to the broad heaven, of the strife of Odysseus and Peleus' son Achilles. This scene accords perfectly with the other, and supplements it. But it is very hard to see how it can be explained on Murray's theory—a blind bard privily consulting his book as he sits amid the feasters puts something of a strain upon even the most fecund imagination.

We have learned what the Muses do for their faithful servitors—they inspire them in the fullest sense of the word,⁹ not alone with memory of events in their proper sequence but with all those powers that our word "inspiration" connotes today; not alone with fitting words but with apposite epic formulas, with whole lines or groups of lines, with all the rich adornment of the grand epic style; not alone with sweet harmonies and gracious melodies¹⁰ but with the power of spirited and moving narration and graphic description. What the Muses do to those who displease them, to their unfaithful servitors, we learn from B 594 ff. In Dorium the Muses met Thamyris the Thracian, as he came from Oechalia, from the home of Eurytus the Oechalian, and they made an end of his singing. For he had boasted that he would prove the better were it that the Muses themselves

god, may be referred to, the simplest and most natural explanation is an invocation to the Muse such as is found in A 1, α 1, and often in the hymns. The orthodox interpretation usually takes *θεοῦ* here to mean the Muse; cf. H. Düntzer, *Die Homerischen Fragen* (Leipzig, 1874), p. 159. No difficulty is involved in the use of the masculine, since the feminine is metrically impossible; *θεός* is epicene in such expressions as *ἐπεὶ θεοῦ ἔκλυεν αὐδὴν* (O 270, β 297); *οὗτοι δὲ θεοῦ* (β 372, ο 531), etc., and *θεοῦ ἄρχετο* also may be a familiar formula that could not easily be accommodated to the use of the feminine noun.

⁹ This idea of the relation in which the Muses stood to the poet continued to be the distinctive Hellenic concept, unparalleled in other religions or mythologies; cf. H. Kees (*Real. Encyc.* XVI. 1, 681, s.v. "Musai"): "Die M., die dem Dichter und Sänger inspirierend, belehrend und hilfreich zur Seite geht, wirklich Erlebtes, Überliefertes und Ersonnenes gestalten hilft, die mit ihm lacht und weint. . . ."

¹⁰ Simple as the music of the Homeric singer may have been, the effect upon the hearer must have been comparable to that of modern music upon modern audiences.

should sing, daughters of aegis-bearing Zeus. And they, anangered, wrought his undoing, and took from him the divine power of song and made him to forget the playing of the lyre. They may have taken away his book but the poet says nothing of it.

On earth, among mortal men, the Muses sing with the voices of their inspired servitors, the bards, but on Olympus the gods listen to their very selves, as they sing responsively, uttering their sweet voices while Apollo plays the lyre (A 603 f.). When they sing the dirge at the mourning for Achilles, all the nine of them,¹¹ and their piercing song of lamentation moves all to tears, it is heaven's ultimate tribute to the greatest of all heroes (ω 60-62).

When Mr. Murray makes the sweet goddesses of song into a patched and thumbworn roll covered with "strange scratches," he is asking them to sell their birthright for a mess of pothooks—for are not the Muses very daughters of Memory? Or, if this way of putting it smacks too much of levity, should not his recollection of the passages we have been recalling have withheld him from his pedestrian interpretation? Since he holds that both poems were finally "worked up," or "put together," in their present shape by the same individual, the rhapsode Cynaethus, at about the same time, he may not fairly reject the evidence of the *Odyssey*.¹² But even if we grant him this, for the sake of argument, and leave out of account the scenes in which the relations of the Muses with the bards are described, even so, his position is not much better. A consideration of all the evidence in the *Iliad* alone must have led him to doubt his interpretation of his chosen passages. And if this interpretation be discarded, the link is broken between his examples of "traditional books" and the *Iliad*; they be-

¹¹ The belief that this allusion to "nine" Muses exposes ω as late and "Hesiodic" rests on the assumption that the number 9 was assigned to the Muses after the genuine "early" or "Homeric" portions of the poems were composed and was an invention of the Hesiodic school. That, of course, is possible, but there is not a vestige of proof. It is equally possible that Homer thought of the Muses as nine but did not feel obliged to specify their number every time he spoke of them. If the presence of the number here proves ω to be Hesiodic, its absence in B 594-600 should prove that the Catalogue is Homeric. The formula $\epsilon\nu\epsilon\iota\alpha \pi\acute{\alpha}\sigma\alpha\iota$ ($\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\epsilon\varsigma$ H 161, θ 258) would have been awkward in B 594 and impossible in A 604, and there is no conceivable reason why the number should have been given in either place; in ω 60 the formula is metrically convenient and really adds to the effect. In general, what is essential in a theogony may be incidental in a heroic poem.

¹² *Op. cit.*, p. 308.

come merely potential analogies, valueless until some connection shall be established by other, better arguments. Evidence for his hypothesis that the *Iliad* is a "traditional book" of the sort he describes is still to be sought.

To habitual readers of Homer, who have unconsciously assimilated the Homeric conception of oral poetry and song, in all its parts the gift and inspiration of the Muses, the matter will seem quite obvious, unworthy to be labored at so great length. But I believe this review of the evidence is justified. The whole theory that underlies *The Rise of the Greek Epic* hinges on our understanding of the invocations to the Muses. And this is a book which has profoundly influenced many who cannot read Homer, to say nothing of those Hellenists who have accepted its speculations uncritically. What is perhaps most important is that the lively portrayal of the poor bard "laboriously spelling out the difficult letter-marks," "these strange scratches," in anxious privacy before his recitations, though it be only Mr. Murray's imagining, gives us a wrong approach. It engenders, even in him who can read no Greek, that sense of pitying condescension which is the most vicious of all points of view for the critic of literature, especially literature that has stood pre-eminent in its kind since the dawn of our civilization.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

ON THE FRIENDSHIP OF LUCRETIVS WITH MEMMIUS

WALTER ALLEN, JR.

THE technical meaning of the word *amicitia* in the Roman Empire as a euphemistic designation of a dependent relationship between a man and his superior is widely known and needs little further discussion. Probably the best single treatment of it at the present day is in the latest edition of Friedlaender's *Sittengeschichte Roms*.¹ Mommsen in 1870 contributed an article to *Hermes* (IV, 120-31) on "Die Comites Augusti der früheren Kaiserzeit," in which he also discusses, in addition to the *comites Augusti*, the meaning of *cohors amicorum* in Imperial times. But it has scarcely been recognized that this meaning has its origins in the second century before Christ, and has, moreover, considerable bearing on the terms used to express the relationship between literary men and their patrons.

It is not new to suggest that the term has this meaning—it was suggested some time ago by Marx in regard to Memmius and Lucretius; but most scholars have declined to accept his interpretation, and there has been some acrimonious language on both sides. Briefly, Marx held that Lucretius addressed Memmius in humble language, that he was trying to gain Memmius as a patron, that in the language of the time *amicus* was a euphemism for "client," such as is evidenced by the famous passages in Horace where he describes his first meetings with Maecenas. As late as 1930 Professor Tenney Frank said at the conclusion of an article bearing on the subject ("On the Name *Lucretius Carus*," *Studies in Honor of Hermann Collitz* [Baltimore, 1930], pp. 63-66):

It must be because of the Marxian hypothesis that several scholars, especially countrymen of Marx, have assumed that Lucretius was of humble origin and immediately tried to prove that he was unusually deferential in his address to Memmius. Sellar and Munro, to be sure, felt differently, and Merrill well says "Such expressions as *volgus abhorret*, and *impia pectora volgi*

¹Tenth ed., I, 74-86; Vol. IV, Anhang VII.

show the intellectual aristocrat; but the austere sermon at the opening of the second book on the variety of political ambition is evidence of a freedom of criticism and a liberty of thought and expression which could hardly be found in a person of low social standing at the time." Once we are rid of the prejudices created by the conjectures of Marx I think that no reader of Lucretius will fail to see that the poet speaks like a free citizen conscious of an honorable position in society and that he addresses Memmius as an equal.

The passage to which Professor Frank refers is, I believe, in W. Y. Sellar, *The Roman Poets of the Republic* (1889), pages 287 ff.:

The Gentile name Lucretius was one eminently Roman, nor is there ground for believing that, like the equally ancient and noble name borne by the other great poet of the age, it had become common in other parts of Italy. The name suggests the inference that Lucretius was descended from one of the most ancient patrician houses of Rome, but one, as is pointed out by Mr. Munro, more famous in the legendary than in the later annals of the Republic. . . . As the position indicated by the whole tone of the poem is that of a man living in easy circumstances, and of one, who, though repelled by it, was yet familiar with the life of pleasure and luxury, he must have belonged either to a senatorian family, or to one of the richer equestrian families, the members of which, if not engaged in financial and commercial affairs, often lived the life of country gentlemen on their estates and employed their leisure in the cultivation of literature. The tone of the dedication to Memmius, a member of a noble plebeian house, and of the occasional addresses to him in the body of the poem, is not that of a client to a patron, but of an equal to an equal:—

Sed tua me virtus tamen et sperata voluptas
Suavis amicitiae. . . .

While Lucretius pays the tribute of admiration to the literary accomplishment of his friend, and to the active part which he played in politics, he yet addresses him with the authority of a master. In a society constituted as that of Rome was in the last age of the Republic this tone could only be assumed to a member of the governing class by a social equal. Memmius combined the pursuits of a politician, a man of letters, and a man of pleasure; and in none of these capacities does he seem to have been worthy of the affection and admiration of Lucretius. But as he filled the office of Praetor in the year 58 B.C. it may be inferred that he and the poet were about the same age, and thus the original bond between them may probably have been that of early education and literary sympathies. That Memmius retained a taste for poetry amid the pursuits and pleasures of his profligate career is shown by the fact that he was the author of a volume of amatory poems, and also by his taking with him, in the year 57 B.C., the poets Helvius Cinna and Catullus, on his staff to Bithynia.

The passages from H. A. J. Munro preserve the same tenor (ed. 1893; II, 2); after admitting that nothing is known of Lucretius' family, he goes on:

But Prof. Sellar well remarks that literary distinction at this time was almost confined to the higher classes; and we need not infer from the rarity of the cognomen that he did not belong to an old family. . . . Lucretius therefore may well have belonged to the high patrician gens of the Lucretii Tri-
cipitini whose glories were chiefly linked with the early history of the commonwealth and were doubtless in great measure legendary, but not the less valued perhaps on that account.

Merrill's comments, of which we have had a sample above, run on in the same vein.

None of these scholars has assembled the evidence for the implications of the single word *amicitia* as it is used to define the specific relationship between the two men. Meager though it is, this evidence is yet sufficient to substantiate Marx's position.

We can begin with a quotation from Seneca:² "Apud nos primi omnium Gracchus et mox Livius Drusus instituerunt segregare turbam suam et alios in secretum recipere, alios cum pluribus, alios universos. Habuerunt itaque isti amicos primos, habuerunt secundos, numquam veros." The passage implies that there had existed before the Gracchi persons who were called *amici*, that these persons occupied a subordinate position in relation to some great man, and that this relationship varied in degree of intimacy and dependency. Two passages from Velleius Paterculus, also cited by Oehler, gain added significance when considered in the light of the Seneca quotation:

ii. 7. 3 Crudelesque mox quaestiones in amicos clientesque Gracchorum habitae sunt.

Ibid. 4 Eadem Rupilius Popiliusque, qui consules asperime in Tiberi Gracchi amicos saevierant, postea iudiciorum publicorum merito oppressit invidia.

The term has a broad meaning—these people are not paid retainers or clients, they are a step higher in the social system, but not on the same level with the great men; one would say that they are more likely of plebeian birth, and perhaps to some degree financially dependent upon the nobles, although of this we lack confirmation.

² *De beneficiis* vi. 34. 2. This passage is originally cited by Oehler in his Pauly-Wissowa article on *amicus*, and is almost his entire comment on its meaning in Republican times.

Gelzer (*Die Nobilität der röm. Republik* [1912], p. 86, n. 5) points out that Seneca connects this division of friends with the Hellenistic imperial courts.³ The Greek influence on the Gracchi is well known. Their mother, Cornelia, was the daughter of the elder Scipio Africanus and mother-in-law of Scipio Aemilianus. She was interested in Greek learning and had her sons taught by the most prominent Greeks of the day, Diophanes of Mitylene and Blossius of Cumae. Plutarch (*C. Gracchus* 19) speaks of Cornelia's interest in Greek letters and the fact that she was on terms of guest-friendship with the eastern kings.

Gelzer also remarks (p. 84) that the elder Africanus had "friends" with him on the Spanish campaign (Polybius xi. 33. 8) and that the younger Africanus took five hundred friends and clients with him to Numantia in 134 B.C. (p. 85): *καὶ πελάτας ἐκ Ῥώμης καὶ φίλους πεντακοσίους, οὓς ἐς Ἰλην καταλέξας ἐκάλει φίλων Ἰλην* (Appian *Hisp.* 84). This is the prototype of the *cohors amicorum* of which Mommsen speaks.

Since there is the likelihood of the term's having a Greek origin, we have now arrived at the probable source of the usage in the Scipionic circle, with its contemporary aristocratic taste for things Greek. Searching for evidence at this early date, one comes upon an important passage in Terence (*Heauton Tim.* 22-26):

Tum quod malivulus vetus poeta dictitat,
repente ad studium hunc se adplicasse musicum,
amicum ingenio fretum, haud natura sua:
arbitrium vostrum, vostra existumatio
valebit.

The identity of these *amici* is usually believed to be defined by Suetonius' *Vita Terenti* (p. 30, Reifferscheid): "Non obscura fama est adiutum Terentium in scriptis a Laelio et Scipione, eamque ipse auxit numquam nisi leviter refutare conatus." This identification has, however, been doubted on fairly reasonable grounds by Santra (Funaioli, *Gram. Rom. Frag.*, p. 387, frag. 13). Whoever the *amici* may be, the passage displays the technical meaning of the term and the fact that it applies equally well to both parties to the relationship.

With the aid of Cicero we can even look back a little earlier than

³ Cf. Arnaldo Momigliano, "Honorati amici," pp. 136-41, in *Athenaeum: studi periodici di letteratura e storia dell' Antichità*, Vol. XI (1933). Momigliano reviews the bibliography bearing on the Hellenistic types of *φίλοι*; cf. W. W. Tarn, *Hellenistic Civilisation*, London (1930), pp. 54 f.

Terence, although the word here is *comes*, which is only a rough approximation of *amicus* (*Pro Archia* 27): "Decimus quidem Brutus, summus vir et imperator, Acci, amicissimi sui, carminibus templorum ac monumentorum aditus exornavit suorum. Iam vero ille, qui cum Aetolis Ennio comite bellavit, Fulvius non dubitavit Martis manubias Musis consecrare." Here we see an early example of taking a poet to the wars as a companion, a custom we shall have to discuss later in regard to Catullus. Before we close this part of the discussion, it is well to note a passage from Tacitus (*Annales* vi. 29) quoted by Mommsen in the article already referred to (p. 128, n. 2): "Sed Caesar missis ad senatum litteris disseruit morem fuisse maioribus, quotiens dirimerent amicitias, interdicere domo, eumque finem gratiae ponere."

Now it appears that we have established the fact that *amicus* was a quasi-technical term long before Lucretius' day, a term used to describe a specific relationship which could vary in degree of intimacy and financial dependency. It is probably true that it was first used of military connections, then of political partisans, and finally of literary men. But the expression was loose enough so that it could embrace all of these without difficulty, and the manner of its transference from one sphere to another is shown by two passages from Cicero. The first is the passage from the *Pro Archia* mentioned above, in which Ennius was spoken of as a *comes*, a word which could be equal to *amicus*, although *amicus* could not always be equal to *comes*. The second passage is from the *Tusculan Disputations* i. 2. 3: "... honorem tamen huic generi [of poets] non fuisse declarat oratio Catonis, in qua obiecit ut probum M. Nobiliori, quod is in provinciam poetas duxisset; duxerat autem consul ille in Aetoliam, ut scimus, Ennium." So a term which was applied to the members of an unofficial military staff could be applied to a poet if the poet went on the expedition. At this point we may remember the familiar remark of Caesar at the time of the panic fear of the Gauls (*B.G.* i. 39): "Hic [*i.e.*, timor] primum ortus est a tribunis militum, praefectis, reliquisque qui ex urbe amicitiae causa Caesarem secuti non magnum in re militari usum habebant; etc."

The next passage of interest is in Catullus' twenty-eighth poem. In it he addresses the *Pisonis comites*, who have profited as little from their provincial jaunt as he did with Memmius in Bithynia. In the middle of the poem he apostrophizes Memmius in filthy language in order to give vent to his own feelings on the matter, and then in line

13 he says: "Pete nobiles amicos," recommending it as a maxim to ambitious young men and feeling anger at his own failure while trying to follow it. There is no doubt in our minds as to the social status of the young men who sought these *amici*. They were no persons of low degree, like Terence or Ennius. They were young Romans of sufficiently good birth to regard such a venture as the beginning of the political career which lay open to them. At the time, however, they were subordinate to the provincial officer, and their financial and official advancement was dependent upon his favor. In addition, their position on his staff was not really officially recognized by the state,⁴ but was tolerated as a good way to initiate young men into governmental business. Consequently, if a man chose not to favor the members of his staff, they had no redress. Catullus' advice, therefore, and probably the advice which had been given to him, is to select carefully the person under whom one serves in order to be sure of reward. Thus again we see that *amicus* is used to denote a relationship in which one person is dependent upon another.

If we proceed to Horace next, we find more examples than we need. He also furnishes the opportunity to point out that *amicus* does not always indicate such a relationship and that we must be wary in trying to distinguish this meaning from the others. The best examples come from *Epist.* i. 18, which is really a lecture on court etiquette. This letter was written in 20 B.C., some thirty-five years after Lucretius' death; and we have to take into account that under the influence of the principate this institution of *amicitia* would tend to become stylized and formalized. But if we remember this, the Horatian passages are of great value. In his introduction to this epistle Professor Morris, with his usual good judgment, clearly recognizes that Horace is talking about a formal relationship similar to the one which existed between himself and Maecenas. The tone of the poem is set by the first four lines, and the subordinate and dependent position of Lollius is stressed:

Si bene te novi, metues, liberrime Lolli,
 scurrantis speciem praeberere, professus amicum.
 Vt matrona meretrici dispar erit atque
 discolor, infido scurrae distabit amicus.

⁴ Cf. Oehler in Pauly-Wissowa, s.v. *cohors amicorum*.

The possibility that an *amicus* could be confused with a *scurra* and the fact that they are distinguished only by their conduct clarify two points: that an *amicus* can be a person of very low rank, and that he is not infrequently completely dependent upon his *amicus*. Then Horace warns Lollius against being rustic in his effort to avoid fawning. He goes on to say what kind of friend is preferred by a *dives amicus*—which is apparently the most desirable kind—and continues with the imaginary speech of this *dives amicus* to his *amicus* (vss. 28-31):

"Meae (contendere noli)
stultitiam patiuntur opes; tibi parvula res est:
arta decet sanum comitem toga; desine mecum
certare."

Then he advises Lollius on the manner of conciliating a rich friend (vss. 44-45):

tu cede potentis amici
lenibus imperiis,

and he speaks of the *venerandi limen amici* (vs. 73). Then, very casually, he slightly changes the meaning of the word in the verse (101) where he says *quid te tibi reddat amicum*; and in verse 106 he addresses Lollius as *amice* in the exact sense of our "friend." In less able hands than Horace's we should long since have damned the poem as servile.

Since we have dealt with this poem at some length, it will be sufficient quickly to review some of the other pertinent passages. In *Serm.* ii. 1. 61 f. is

maiorum ne quis amicus
frigore te feriat,

which should be compared with *Epist.* i. 17. 1-2:

Quamvis, Scaeva, satis per te tibi consulis, et scis
quo tandem pacto deceat maioribus uti,

and with the passage in Persius i. 108-9:

vide sis, ne maiorum tibi forte
limina frigescant.

In *Epist.* i. 1. 101 ff. he speaks of the duties of the patron *amicus* to the client *amicus* and has the familiar lines (104-5):

et prave sectum stomacheris ob unguem
de te pendentis, te respicientis amici.

Here are several other familiar passages which have bearing on the point:

- Epod.* i. 1 ff. Ibis Liburnis inter alta navium,
 amice, propugnacula,
 paratus omne Caesaris periculum
 subire, Maecenas, tuo.
- Carm.* ii. 18. 11 ff. nihil supra
 deos laceo nec potentem amicum
 largiora flagito,
- Serm.* i. 4. 96 ff. "Me Capitolinus convictore usus amicoque
 a puero est, causaque mea permulta rogatus
 fecit."
- Epist.* i. 9. 5 munere cum fungi propioris censet amici.

The letter from which the last quotation comes was written perhaps in 20 B.C. in order to recommend one Septimius to Tiberius as worthy of *amicitia*. Horace spends most of the time explaining to Tiberius how reluctant he was to write this letter, and then concludes with these lines, in which he uses *amicus* in its ordinary meaning (of the friendly relation between himself and Septimius):

Quodsi
 depositum laudas ob amici iussa pudorem,
 scribe tui gregis hunc et fortem crede bonumque.

But the use of *grex* in the last line shows that Septimius was seeking a formal and well-recognized position in Tiberius' household.

The most familiar passages, of course, are these:

- Serm.* i. 6. 61 f. iubesque
 esse in amicorum numero.
- Ibid.* ii. 6. 40 ff. Septinus octavo propior iam fugerit annus
 ex quo Maecenas me coepit habere suorum
 in numero,

with which it is advantageous to compare two quotations made by Gelzer (p. 55, nn. 1 and 5), which show how standardized had become all the terminology relating to the situation:

- Caes. *B.C.* iii. 57 . . . quem ab illo traditum initio et commendatum in suorum necessariorum numero habere instituerat.
- Cic. *Ad fam.* viii. 9. 4 M. Feridium . . . tibi commendo et te rogo ut eum in tuorum numero habeas.

There is an interesting passage in Suetonius' life of Vergil, in which *amicus* is apparently used in the meaning we are considering (p. 57,

Reifferscheid): "Possedit prope centies sestertium ex liberalitatibus amicorum habuitque domum Romae Esquilii iuxta hortos Maecenatis, quamquam secessu Campaniae Siciliaeque plurimum uteretur." We can even get some help from Plutarch, who apparently transferred the terminology which was originally Greek back into its own language. In the first passage he is speaking of some Alexander, probably Polyhistor:

Plut. *Crass.* 3. 4 Μόνος γοῦν ἀεὶ τῶν φίλων αὐτῷ συναποδημῶν στέγαστρον ἐλάμβανεν εἰς τὴν ὁδὸν καὶ τοῦτ' ἐπαγελθὼν ἀπαιτεῖτο.

Plut. *Brut.* 2. 2 Καὶ διετέλει θαυμάζων μὲν Ἀντίοχον τὸν Ἀσκαλωνίτην, φίλον δὲ καὶ συμβιωτὴν τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ πεποιημένος Ἀριστον,

.....

These are practically all the passages we have to work with in determining the Republican use of *amicus*. Lucretius uses *amicitia* in the following passage to describe his relationship to Memmius, and it is our problem to determine what he means by it:

i. 140 ff. Sed tua me virtus tamen et sperata voluptas
 suavis amicitiae quemvis efferre laborem
 suadet et inducit noctes vigilare serenas, etc.

It is to explain this *amicitia* that we have adduced all the examples cited above. From Lucretius himself we receive no aid in understanding the passage; our knowledge of his life is of no assistance. Hence the only means we have of discovering his meaning is that of comparison with all similar Republican usages. Since we know so little about Lucretius, any additional scrap we can glean is valuable.

Marx's article of 1899 (*Neue Jahrbücher*, III, 532-48: "Der Dichter Lucretius") must really be the starting-point of the discussion. He suggested that Lucretius addressed Memmius with slavish fawning because he wished to become his client. Mommsen (*Hist. of Rome*, Eng. tr. of 1900, V, p. 473) simply stated that Lucretius had belonged to the best circles of Roman society. The persons who followed Marx were Mewaldt in the article on Lucretius in Pauly-Wissowa, Schanz-Hosius (I, 273 [1927]), and Kroll in his revision of Teuffel-Schwabe (I, 473).

Carlo Pascal (*Rivista di filol.*, XXX [1902], 552 ff.) saw in *amicitia* a specific expression of Epicureanism, i.e., that by it Lucretius meant that he hoped to win Memmius to his creed and the fellowship of

Epicureans. I am very much afraid that his idea resembles that of Munro's note on *amicitiae* in i. 141, where he says that Lucretius meant it "with reference probably to the great importance Epicurus attached to the cultivation of suitable friendships." Merrill's note on *amicitiae* has the same trend:

Doubtless there was some thought of Epicurus' precept *Κίριαί Δόξαι* 27 (DL. 10, 148) *Ἦ σοφία παρασκευάζεται εἰς τὴν τοῦ ὄλου βίου μακαριότητα, πολὺ μέγιστόν ἐστιν ἡ τῆς φιλίας κτήσις*: Cic. *Fin.* I, 65, "de qua Epicurus quidem ita dicit, omnium rerum quas ad beate vivendum sapientia comparaverit nihil esse maius amicitia, nihil uberius, nihil iucundius."

The word may very well have had a little of this connotation for Lucretius as he wrote it, but the close resemblance of the passage in which he uses it to other passages in Latin authors indicates that the main meaning he had in mind must have been of the same sort as we find in the Latin authors. Lucretius was a Roman poet writing Roman poetry, which is presumptive evidence that his words have a Roman meaning. If we assume that Lucretius had only the Greek connotation of the word in mind, we must believe that he was trying to convert Memmius to his philosophy. This entire idea of Lucretius' trying to win Memmius to Epicureanism is unsound because it presupposes that Memmius was not already an Epicurean. When I take up Cicero's letter, I shall try to demonstrate that he was.

Johannes Tolkiehn (*Wochenschrift für klassische Philologie*, XXI [1904], 362-66: "Lukrez und Memmius") opposed Marx's suggestion of clientship but produced no cogent arguments. Merrill in his edition upheld the idea that Lucretius was an equal of Memmius, and he has been followed by Professor Frank. Ernout, in the Budé edition of 1920 (p. xi), closely followed the Munro-Sellar-Merrill tradition.

From the quotations cited above it is clear that at the time of the Scipionic circle the term *amicus* came into general use among the philhellenic nobles of Rome. The name gained wide use and seems at an early date to have been applied to persons who were not low enough in the social scale to be called "clients"—and it must be remembered that at this time the clients were still self-respecting citizens—and yet were not high enough to be on the plane of social parity with the persons to whom they were attached. It was thus a delicate phrase particularly applicable to literary relationships. There was also an element of financial dependency about which we are not fully in-

formed, but which apparently varied from complete financial dependence to the hope of gain felt by the staff of a provincial governor. We can clearly see the fact of subordination. Hence we may conclude that Lucretius wished to become an *amicus* of Memmius because he says simply that he so hoped (*sperata*); and we must believe that he would occupy the dependent position in this relationship because he is the one who seeks it and because he dedicates a poem to gain it.

We may here recall these lines from Horace's first epode (vss. 23-24):

Libenter hoc et omne militabitur
bellum in tuae spem gratiae, etc.,

with which we may compare the slavish address which Horace mocks in *Serm.* ii. 5. 32-33:

"Quinte," puta, aut "Publi," (gaudent praenomine molles
auriculae) "tibi me virtus tua fecit amicum; etc."

These two passages suggest conventionalized appeal to patrons. In the epode Horace goes on, in a manner that seems standardized, to say that he wishes to accompany Maecenas only in the hope of *gratia*, not through any desire of pecuniary gain. This epode was written probably about 31 B.C., at least six or seven years after Horace had become a member of Maecenas' circle. The rest of the poem, outside of these two lines, clearly shows that Horace had already received many gifts from Maecenas. Lucretius' verses, however, would seem to indicate that he had, as yet, not been favored in any way and was only hoping for clientship. But the phraseology of the two poets under these corresponding conditions remains strikingly similar.

So we must conclude that Lucretius may have had the social rank either of a Terence or of a Catullus or that he may have held some intermediate rank, but we certainly have no means of defining it more closely than that. In the article already mentioned, Professor Frank demonstrated epigraphically that there is no reason for believing Lucretius a freedman or a Celt. If he were of the rank of Catullus, we should expect to have more copious contemporary references to him. Hence, it is not unfair to suppose that he was a poor plebeian of good stock in search of a patron.

It is easy to understand why Lucretius addressed himself to

Memmius. Lucretius was looking for a patron, a man of importance with literary inclinations and a taste for philosophy. Memmius met these requirements. He came from one of the most prominent families in Rome, as is shown by the fact that the name is one of those mentioned by Vergil in the fifth book of the *Aeneid*. At the time when Lucretius decided to dedicate the poem to him, he had become praetor of Bithynia and was about to set out for that province. Dr. Frank has neatly suggested from the mutual borrowings of Catullus and Lucretius (*Class. Phil.*, XXVIII [1933], 249-56) that the latter gave Books i-iv to Memmius to read on his journey to Bithynia, and that Catullus had access to them at that time. Catullus probably did not live to see Books v and vi in published form.

It has distressed many people that Lucretius dedicated his poem to a man of such worthless character as Memmius. Lucretius was not looking for a fine character—he was looking for a patron. In the words of Catullus: *Pete nobiles amicos*. In addition, in 57-56 B.C. Memmius had not yet experienced the disgrace which we always associate with him, the election scandal of 54 B.C., which, however, is not sufficient to shock anyone who is well informed about the political morals of the Ciceronian times.

Memmius himself had literary ability of a not very high order, and he wrote some poems of the neoteric and erotic variety; also, he was an orator of sorts. When he went to Bithynia, Catullus and Helvius Cinna accompanied him. At an earlier period of his life he had shown considerable interest in the Epicurean philosophy, as Cicero points out, and perhaps he and his intimates in his youth had formed a sort of Epicurean group. It is worth while to quote the pertinent portions of Cicero's letter (*Ad fam.* xiii. 1, July, 51):

(2) Sed et initio Romae, cum te quoque [Memmium] et tuos omnes observabat [Patro Epicurius], me coluit in primis, et nuper, cum ea quae voluit de suis commodis et praemiis consecutus est, me habuit suorum defensorum et amicorum fere principem: et iam a Phaedro, qui nobis, cum pueri essemus, ante quam Philonem cognovimus, valde ut philosophus, postea tamen ut vir bonus et suavis et officiosus probabatur, traditus mihi commendatusque est. (3) Is igitur Patro, cum ad me Romam litteras misisset, uti te sibi placarem peteremque, ut nescio quid illud Epicuri parietinarum sibi concederes, nihil scripsi ad te ob eam rem, quod aedificationis tuae consilium commendatione mea nolebam impediri. . . . (4) Quod si ita est et si iam tua plane nihil interest, velim, si qua offensiuncula facta est animi tui perversitate

aliquorum—novi enim gentem illam—, des te ad lenitatem vel propter summam tuam humanitatem vel etiam honoris mei causa. Equidem, si quid ipse sentiam quaeris, nec cur ille tanto opere contendat video, nec cur tu repugnes, nisi tamen multo minus tibi concedi potest quam illi laborare sine causa.

From these words we can see what Cicero thought was the duty of one *amicus* to another, and that both he and Memmius had displayed a real interest in the philosophy, Memmius to a greater extent than Cicero. Perhaps it is through this early connection that Memmius came into the possession of the Garden School, which was supposed to pass from one leader of the sect to another as a sort of perpetual trust. Understanding of this section of Cicero's letter demonstrates the folly of thinking that Lucretius was trying to convert Memmius to the philosophy. He was already practically an Epicurean.

It is noteworthy that in this letter, as in so many others, Cicero feels his position as a *novus homo* and that he represents himself as taking over the standards of the old nobility. So his attitude represents not his own ideas on the extent to which a noble would accept this philosophy but the ideas of Memmius and his equals. It is also clear that Cicero had himself shown some interest in Epicureanism—not deep, but enough to make him the *amicus* of one of the leaders of the Garden in Athens. Hence, it becomes easier to see how the poem may have come into his hands. Just as Lucretius addressed himself to Memmius because he was an important Roman with an interest in Epicureanism, so some literary executor may have sent the poem to Cicero because he was the most important literary man of the time and because he had shown an interest in the philosophy.

Perhaps someone may wonder why it is that we find elaborate reference to Memmius only in the first book. For we should expect, even though Lucretius never lived to finish them properly, that he would have indicated in the later books where he meant to mention Memmius. One need only remember that Memmius had disappointed Catullus and that Lucretius probably experienced the same misfortune. He gave Memmius the first four books to take with him on the trip to Bithynia. Everyone agrees that the mention of Memmius' name appears hasty and that Lucretius may have had only time to insert mention of him in the Introduction to Book i, the sugared passage a little farther in the same book, and bare mention of his name

a few other times in Book i (411, 1052). In the last five books Memmius is addressed only seven times, twice in Book ii (143, 182) and five times in Book v (8, 93, 164, 867, 1282). Six of these seven times he is addressed solely as *Memmi*; once (v. 8) as *inclyte Memmi*. If Lucretius had finished four books before Memmius had set out for Bithynia, he probably was working on Book v at the time he left.

But Memmius had a tendency to be self-seeking and cantankerous, and did not intend to enrich the literary men of Rome. In short, Lucretius never finished dedicating his poem to Memmius because he did not receive the benefits he had hoped for from Memmius after he had presented him with the first four books.

We can obtain a better notion of Memmius' character if we study the letter (*Ad fam.* xiii. 3) Cicero wrote him perhaps in 51 B.C., recommending an A. Fufius, a man otherwise unknown to us, as *humanitate tuaque amicitia dignissimum*. Cicero was particularly anxious that Memmius should continue to treat Fufius as well as he had treated him when Cicero was present. Apparently Memmius was not above large promises which he had no intention of fulfilling.

By reference to the scholia of Porphyrio, who wrote toward the end of the second century of our era, it is even possible to see why the term *amicus* (as defined) disappeared. On *Epode* i. 1 he says: "Non videtur verecundiae Horati convenire, ut amicum se Maecenatis dicat, cum clientem debeat dicere." Compare with this what he says on *Ode* ii. 2. 1: "Hac ode Sallustium Crispum adloquitur equitem Romanum Augusti amicum, qua liberalitatem et magnificentiam animi eius describit." By the end of the second century the word *amicus* had become associated with persons of high degree and described the relationship to the emperor or to some personage of the court. Hence, in the eyes of the people of that time, it was improper for a freedman's son to use it in addressing his patron. We can remember the bitter complaints of Martial and Juvenal about the low esteem in which literary men were held, and see that they were classed with the pauperized clients of that period. We may well suppose that *amicus* was used less and less of literary men after Augustus assumed the principate, because with him the institution of *amicitia* began to regain its early political significance, as he and the members of his

court used the term in regard to persons who were nearly their equals and so forced all persons dependent upon them into clientage.

In other passages Porphyrio's feelings are not outraged at Horace's lack of sensibility, but they are worth quoting as showing his attitude toward the quotations we have been discussing:

Epist. i. 17. 1 Ad Scaevam haec scribitur, in qua dum arte obsequendi amicis maioribus ratio monstratur, Horatius satyrico charactere adstruit nihil aerumnosius et molestius observantia in potiore libero homini. 2 maioribus uti. Id est: amicis. Sed in consuetudine maiores dicimus. [Cf. Juvenal i. 33: magni delator amici; iii. 57: et a magno semper timearis amico.]

Serm. i. 6. 60 Plerique gravis iudicii viri ideo non temere in amicitiam recipiunt, ne facile dimittant.

Carm. ii. 18. 12 Nec potentem amicum l.f.s.b.u.S. Hoc est: nec amplius a Maecenate opto, qui me satis beatum facit donando me uno fundo Sabino, qua possessione contentus satis beatum me iudico.

It can be seen that through these quotations runs a note strange to the sort of thing we have been dealing with in Republican times. We have followed the term *amicus* from its birth to its death—and it must have died in the first century of our era, since in the second Porphyrio has to strain in order to understand Horace. This fact explains the comparative rarity of the word in this sense, since it flourished especially in the period whose literature has suffered such great losses.

To summarize: the word *amicus* has a Hellenistic origin and was first used in a military sense by the Romans, apparently in the time of the Scipios. We find evidence of it particularly in Terence, Catullus, Cicero, and Horace. When we find it in Lucretius, it is not unfair to assume that he meant it in the Roman sense. In that case he must have been looking to Memmius for patronage, that is, for material and social advantages; and Memmius was the logical person for him to appeal to, since he had family and position, some literary ability, and a tendency toward Epicureanism, of which he had given proof even as a young man. In addition, Memmius seems to have affected the role of literary patron, and he had a circle of authors who looked to him for support in a greater or less degree. Since Memmius was not inclined to be generous, Lucretius, like Catullus, ceased to regard him as a potential patron, and, if he had lived, would perhaps have changed the dedication of his poem.

PASSIVE VERBA SENTIENDI ET DICENDI WITH
DECLARATIVE INFINITIVE

W. H. KIRK

THE rules for the construction of these verbs in Latin are, I think, nowhere stated quite fully and precisely, nor are the examples anywhere so arranged as to illustrate perfectly the rules and the exceptions. Having collected instances in literature from the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* to Suetonius, I shall try to set forth the matter for this period more completely and clearly than has yet been done. I deal only with cases where the infinitive depends directly on the *verbum sentiendi et dicendi*, omitting the many in which an accusative and infinitive stands in apposition with a neuter pronoun and the few in which it is appositive to the adverb *sic*. Omitted also are cases in which the complement is a participle or gerundive, this in agreement with Sommer (*Lateinische Schulgrammatik*, p. 138, n. 137): "So ist auch in Caesar *hoc concedendum non putabat* nicht *esse* 'weggelassen,' sondern *concedendum* genügt als zweites Objekt zu *putabat*. . . . Entsprechend *oppugnata Caesaris domus nuntiabatur*." When the *verbum sentiendi et dicendi* is in the infinitive, and when a neuter noun or pronoun may be subject of either verb, the construction cannot always be determined with certainty; generally I have classified these cases as I thought they should be regarded, occasionally I treat them as doubtful. I have, of course, aimed at completeness, except in giving figures for the personal use in the more voluminous authors; even these, however, are near enough to the truth to serve for comparison. In quoting the works of Cicero and Caesar and the *Naturalis historia*, I omit the author's name; "Plin." denotes the younger Pliny.

I take up, first, the formations from the present stem, which must be kept strictly apart from the periphrastic, since the two are governed by different rules. And I begin with a rule stated by Kühner-Stegmann (*Lateinische Grammatik*, II, Part I, 710): "Schliessen sich an den nom. c. inf. noch weitere Aussagesätze an, so geht die Konstruktion in den bequemerem acc. c. inf. über." Examples: *Inv. i.* 108, *De*

or. ii. 299, *Tusc.* v. 22, *Div.* ii. 50, *CM* 63, *B. Afr.* xxviii. 4, *Vitruv.* viii. 3. 16, *Livy* v. 41. 9, *NH* ii. 149, vii. 187, xx. 152, xxviii. 93, xxxiv. 37, *Ascon.* p. 31 K-S., *Suet. Oth.* 7; doubtful *NH* iv. 79. The principle is illustrated also by *Varr. LL* v. 46, "ab eis dictus vicus Tuscus et . . . ibi Vortumnus stare"; *Livy* iv. 60. 1, xxii. 54. 9, nominative with participle followed by accusative with infinitive, and *NH* vii. 33, "reperitur . . . quinos quater enixa maioremque partem . . . vixisse." Exceptions: *NH* xvii. 50, xxxiv. 60, with different subjects, and xxxv. 65, *Plin. Ep.* ii. 11. 23, with *ipse* referring to the first subject; in *Ascon. loc. cit.*, editors create an exception.

A more important rule is that by which the verb is impersonal if dependent on an auxiliary. It is not necessary to give examples of this very common usage; I cite only the few exceptions: *Inv.* i. 85, *Fal.* 32, *Nep.* xviii. 4. 2 (*v.l. posset*), *Val. M.* iii. 2. 24, *NH* ii. 166, *Quintil.* vii. 2. 34. From *Inv.* i. 85 Kühner-Stegmann cites only *dici possit*; I incline to take also *poterit ostendi* as personal on account of the absence of a subject accusative. For the same reason and for concinnity with *potest videri* immediately following, I would also so take *potest dici* *Sen. D.* v. 14. 5; the omission of an indefinite subject in *Sen. B.* iii. 7. 7 seems different.

Important, too, is the rule, most fully stated by Sommer (*op. cit.*, § 233 n.), that these verbs are usually impersonal, "wenn bei ihnen noch ein erweiternder Satzteil steht." This, which I shall call the "adjunct," is often an adverb, twice a locative, with certain verbs a dative, often an ablative with or without a preposition, occasionally an accusative with preposition. Of the case adjuncts, only the dative has been sufficiently recognized; to show the variety and extent of the others, I shall cite them or indicate their presence by a star. Often there are two modifiers, adverb and case; these instances I list as examples of the use of the cases, ignoring the adverb. Exceptions to the rule: *Inv.* ii. 75 *ab defensore*, ii. 137 *quibus ex locis*, *Quinct.* 68 *qua re*, 88 *in tali iudicio*, *Clu.* 47, *ND* i. 106 *ex quo*, *Rep.* ii. 38, *Fam.* *i. 5a. 1, v. 9. 2, *BG* viii. 1. 1, *BC* i. 14. 2, iii. 36. 3, iii. 109. 1, **B. Afr.* 1. 4, *Varr. LL* ix. 73, *Vitruv.* *ii. 6. 3, ii. 8. 12 *falsa opinione*, *viii. 4. 2, *Livy* xxi. 8. 3, xxii. 51. 4, *NH* *vii. 213, *xxv. 5, **Quintil.* iv. 1. 7, *Frontin. Aq.* 73 *in commentariis*, *Tac. A.* i. 61 *semiruto vallo humili fossa*, *Suet.* **Ner.* 45, *Vesp.* 14. Under this head I would put

also *Inv.* i. 81 because of the unemphatic position of *in reprehensione* (cf. *Frontin. loc. cit.*), *Clu.* 64 because there is no pronominal subject for the infinitive, and *Leg.* i. 32 because of the order of the words.

Examples of this rule follow, together with examples of, or figures for, the personal construction and examples of the impersonal without adjunct, arranged under seven verbs, which exhibit these three uses more or less frequently, and under four heads: A, personal; B, impersonal (a) without adjunct, (b) with adjunct other than dative, (c) with dative. Square brackets mark passages where a dependent impersonal infinitive makes the governing verb necessarily impersonal. Figures after A and B show the number of occurrences noted.

Nuntiari and compounds.—A 10: *Acad.* ii. 146, *BG* viii. 1. 1, *BC* i. 14. 1, i. 73. 2, iii. 36. 3, iii. 109. 1, *B. Afr.* 1. 4, 20. 2, *Livy* iv. 21. 5, *Suet. Ner.* 45; B 45: (a) *Verr.* vi. 87, *B. Afr.* 5 (v. 1. *nuntiabantur*), *Livy* [iv. 58. 3], v. 8. 10, ix. 4. 6, x. 1. 4, x. 3. 2, xxvi. 23. 1, *Curt.* iii. 5. 10, iv. 16. 8, x. 8. 11, *Tac. A.* i. 36, *H.* iii. 79; (b) **B. Hisp.* 2. 1, *Liv.* iv. 53. 3, vi. 27. 10, xxii. 3. 12, **NH* xvi. 10, **Suet. Aug.* 94 (and cf. *Ulp. Dig.* iii. 3. 40. 2: "si in hoc iudicio rem meam esse pronuntietur"); (c) *Ad Her.* iv. 65, *Verr.* i. 21, iii. 100, iii. 149, *Leg. agr.* ii. 11, *Rab. P.* 18, *Mil.* 48, *Fam.* xv. 1. 1, *Q. fr.* i. 2. 6, *Att.* ix. 3. 1, xii. 13. 2, *BG* [i. 10. 1], vi. 4. 1 [vii. 61. 3], *BC* i. 18. 1, i. 51. 1, *B. Al.* 54. 1, *B. Afr.* 12. 1, *Livy* xxi. 36. 3, xxix. 1. 5, xxxvii. 33. 1, *Curt.* viii. 14. 1, *Sen. Apoc.* 5, *Tac. H.* i. 40, iii. 38, *Suet. Cal.* 45. Doubtful *Sen. B.* iv. 35. 2. In *Curt.* iii. 8. 7, iii. 12. 7, vii. 8. 8 editors vary between *nuntiare* and *nuntiari*; though the active is best supported by manuscripts, the passive, after *iubeo* without accusative of person, is certainly right; cf. *Att. loc. cit.*, *Suet. Cal.* 45 *dici*, *Livy* v. 32. 6, xxxiii. 48. 3, and *Meusel* on *BG* v. 33. 3, *Krit. Anhang*.

Intellegi.—A 17: *Inv.* i. 65, ii. 30, ii. 158, ii. 177, *De or.* iii. 110, *Clu.* 64, *Tusc.* iv. 13, *ND* i. 106, *Fat.* 32, *Leg.* i. 32, *NH* ii. 66, ix. 150, xvii. 239, xxv. 5, xxxv. 98, *Plin. P.* 65, *Tac. A.* i. 61. Here I incline to put also the infinitive in *Ph.* vii. 19. B. 37: (a) *Ad Her.* i. 14, *S. Rosc.* 25, *De or.* ii. 145, *Brut.* 161 [*Fin.* iii. 62], *Tusc.* iv. 24, *ND* i. 45, *BG* vi. 12. 7, *Sen. D.* vii. 8. 3, *Ep.* 58. 2, *NH* xvii. 128, *Quintil.* i. 1. 11; (b) with adverbs, *Ad Her.* iv. 60, *Top.* 49, *Acad.* ii. 76, *Fin.* iii. 65 [*ND* ii. 133]; with *ex quo*, *Fin.* i. 48, iii. 58, iii. 59, *ND* ii. 79, ii. 150, *Div.* i. 70, ii. 97, *CM* 16, *Off.* i. 13, i. 106, iii. 72; *quibus rebus* *Fin.* i. 49, *Off.* i. 155; *qua re*, *S. Rosc.* 94, *Fin.* v. 29, *Sall. Iug.* i. 101. 1;

ablatives, *BC* i. 41. 5, *NH* ii. 177, xxx. 43, *Tac. H.* iv. 34. Incidentally, it may be said that in juristic writings (*Institutes* of Gaius and *Digest*) the verb is fairly common and, so far as I have seen, always personal.

Credi.—A 104: *NH* 30, *Tac.* 23, *Quintil.* 15 (including xi. 1. 64), *Suet.* 10, *Val. M.* 8, *Plin.* 6, *Sall.* 2 (on *Catil.* 15. 2 see *Thes. LL* III 916, 51), *Livy* 2, *Mela* 2, *Sen. Ph.* 2, *Sen. Rh.* 1, *Curt.* 1, *Colum.* 1, *Frontin.* 1. B 14: (a) *NH* ix. 28, *Tac. A.* ii. 69, xiv. 48, *H. i.* 90, also *H. i.* 50 if *exercitum* is the true reading; (b) *Livy* viii. 26. 7, *xl. 29. 8, *NH* viii. 83, x. 40, xi. 267, xviii. 168, xxviii. 117, *Tac. A.* ii. 40 *Romae*; (c) *Vitruv.* iii. pr. 1, *NH* vii. 74. Doubtful infinitives *NH* ii. 1, ii. 26.

Dici.—A 457: *Cic.* 147, *NH* 75, *Livy* 55, *Quintil.* 39, *Varr.* 38, *Sen. Ph.* 19, *Vitruv.* 17, *Suet.* 16, *Corp. Caes.* 11, *Plin.* 8, *Tac.* 8, *Curt.* 6, *Ad Her.* 4, *Sen. Rh.* 4 (including *exc. contr.* 10. 3), *Ascon.* 3, *Cels.* 3, *Colum.* 2, *Vell.* 1, *Petron.* 1. Among the Livian examples are included i. 51. 4 and 5, where I see no reason for taking the infinitive as impersonal, as is done in *Thes. LL*, V, 985, 47, and xlii. 53. 4 in spite of *iam*; with the close connection of the two verbs it seems difficult to say that the adverb belongs more to one than to the other, and the position of *Romanos* suggests that it is felt as subject of *dici*. B 24: (a) *Ad Her.* iv. 59, *Pis.* 68, *Nep.* iv. 5. 3, *NH* xxviii. 86, xxviii. 201, *Quintil.* v. 13. 24; (b) *Leg. agr.* ii. 42, *Fin.* iii. 60 *non sine causa*, *Parad.* 9, **Nep.* viii. 2. 3, *Sall. H.* i. 16, *Val. M.* vi. 8. 6, *Quintil.* i. 6. 27, *iii. 6. 92, v. 7. 33, vii. 2. 44, *xii. 1. 4, *Tac. A.* i. 10; (c) *Verr.* v. 38, *De or.* i. 24, *Livy* v. 32. 6, xxxiii. 48. 3, *Val. M.* iii. 7. 4, *Frontin. Strat.* iii. 5. 3. Under (b) I would put *Varr. RR* ii. 1. 27; the position of *aliquotiens* may have led to the verb's being made impersonal; the adverb belongs properly to the infinitive, but that may be said also of *semel unquam* *NH* ii. 100. I hesitate to cite under (a) *dicatur* in the otherwise corrupt text of *Livy* xxiv. 45. 5.

Tradi.—A 76: *NH* 55, *Cic.* 10, *Val. M.* 3, *Mela* 3, *Quintil.* 3, *Colum.* 1, *Suet.* 1. B 12: (a) *Livy* i. 55. 3, *Sen. Contr.* x. 5. 27, *NH* xi. 197, xxx. 65, xxxiv. 6, xxxv. 162, *Quintil.* xi. 2. 50; (b) *Livy* v. 33. 2 *fama*, *Mela* iii. 56 *fabulis*, *Ascon.*, p. 2 K-S. *in annalibus*, *Tac. A.* iv. 57; (c) *Livy* v. 21. 16. *Kempf*, *Val. M.* vi. 9. 6, puts *Marius* for *Marium* of manuscripts, on the ground that elsewhere *Valerius* uses such verbs only personally; and to this the two cases of *dicitur* cited above, constitute, of course, no exception.

Prodi.—A 13, all in *NH*. B 14: (a) *NH* vi. 7, vi. 60, viii. 164, viii.

229, xi. 69, xi. 184; (b) *NH* ii. 100, vi. 198; (c) *Livy* viii. 6. 1, xxiv. 43. 7, *Sen. D.* v. 11. 4, *NH* ii. 203, *Tac. A.* iii. 65, *G.* 8.

Demonstrari.—A 13, all in *Inv.*; *Ad Her.* ii. 7 Friedrich brackets *demonstrabitur fuisse*. B 5: (a) *Varr. LL* v. 2; (b) *Ad Her.* ii. 13 a nobis, *Inv.* ii. 36 *per quam*, ii. 82, **Verr.* vi. 155.

The following list shows an infrequent impersonal use of verbs, of which some have the personal use in more or less abundance, while with others it is rare or lacking; where it seems to be rare in classical prose, I cite references; for instances in poetry and late Latin see Kühner-Stegmann and the *Thesaurus*.

B (a).—*defenditur De or.* ii. 110 (A: *Inv.* ii. 98), *fertur NH* ii. 235, *memoratur Mela* iii. 100, *narratur NH* xxxv. 121, *notatur NH* x. 30, *ponitur Sen. Contr.* i. 2. 14, *scitur Livy* xlii. 26. 5, *Quintil.* vi. 1. 31, vii. 3. 7, *videtur Tusc.* v. 12, *Varr. LL* vi. 89, *Vitruv.* ii. 3. 4; (b) *adicitur Quintil.* iii. 5. 16, *auditur *Att.* vi. 1. 21, *NH* xvi. 202, *cernitur *BC* i. 64. 1, *cognoscitur *Inv.* i. 66, *Vitruv.* *viii. 2. 7, *ix. 1. 7, **Plin. P.* 75, (A: *Clu.* 47, *Fam.* i. 5a. 1), *noscitur *Tac. H.* iii. 21, *colligitur *Cels.* vii. 26. 2, p. 310, 13 D., *Mela* iii. 97, **Sen. Ep.* 85. 17, *Plin. Ep.* iii. 16. 13, **Tac. D.* 33, *confirmatur Quintil.* ii. 17. 41, *declaratur Tusc.* iii. 64, **Quintil.* viii. pr. 15, *defenditur Top.* 96, *existimatur NH* xxxiii. 151, *fertur Livy* ii. 54. 10, *indicatur* NH* xii. 100, (A: *Mil.* 64), *invenitur NH* *vii. 60, *vii. 186, *x. 50, *xii. 7, *xiii. 21 (A: *Verr.* v. 3, *Clu.* 180, *Off.* iii. 19, *Vitruv.* vii. pr. 18, vii. 8. 2), *reperitur *Caecin.* 100, **NH* ii. 240, *xi. 253, *xxxiii. 18, *iudicatur *Vitruv.* viii. pr. 4, **NH* xvii. 199, *narratur Tac. G.* 33, *observatur NH* vii. 73, *ostenditur [*Inv.* ii. 134], *perspicitur *Leg.* i. 34, *ponitur *Quintil.* iv. 2. 92 (A: *Frontin. Aq.* 73), *probatur *Sen. D.* viii. 5. 5, *Plin. P.* 31 (A: *Vitruv.* ix. 8. 7, *Plin. Ep.* ii. 11. 23), *scribitur *Varr. Men.* 575 (A: *Tusc.* i. 114, *ND* ii. 124, *Div.* i. 52, *Varr. RR* ii. 4. 18), *significatur *Att.* vii. 12. 1, **BG* iv. 3. 1, **Val. M.* ii. 2. 7, **Tac. A.* xiii. 15 (A: with participle *Suet. Aug.* 50), *spectatur *NH* x. 193; (c) *additur Livy* iv. 29. 8 (see *Thes. L. L.*, I, 589, 83), *Tac. A.* xvi. 17, *adicitur Livy* xlii. 42. 1, *Val. M.* v. 1. ext. 2, *adfirmatur Plin. Ep.* x. 114. 3 (A: *NH* xxxvii. 147, cf. xxiii. 110), *scribitur Fam.* xi. 2. 1.

Videtur I put under (a); it is possible that *ideo*, though belonging to the infinitive, may have influenced *Vitruvius*; but in the other passages the dative, common with personal *videri*, can have had no influence. *Defenditur, De Or.* l. c. under (a) on the assumption that

an ablative absolute, being equivalent to a clause, cannot function as an ablatival adjunct. *Scribitur* in Varr. *LL* v. 42 I would put under A, keeping the *Saturnia* of the manuscripts (see Spengel's note).

Adfertur did not fit in with my arrangement of the matter; I give instances noted but do not think them exhaustive: *B. Al.* 57. 5, *Livy* iv. 55. 1, v. 1. 8, *Tac. A.* i. 33, iv. 25, vi. 50, xiv. 7.

The impersonal neuter prevails so greatly in the periphrastic that for most of the verbs offering exceptions it seems necessary to list only these, expressed by nominative masculine singular. Participles in apposition are omitted.

Adnotatus *Tac. A.* xiii. 35, *animadversus* Varr. *RR* iii. 16. 30, *cognitus* Val. M. ix. 12. ext. 7, *Tac. H.* iv. 40, *compertus* Sall. *H.* ii. 92, *Livy* xxvii. 1. 14, *creditus* *Livy* xxix. 32. 9, xxx. 2. 9, Val. M. ix. 15. ext. 1, *Quintil.* iii. 1. 11, x. 1. 125, xii. 7. 3, *Tac. A.* vi. 50, xiv. 65, *H.* i. 78, *credendus* Val. M. i. 8. ext. 12, *defendendus* *B. Al.* 7.2, *defendendum* *Caec.* 64, *demonstrandus* *Inv.* ii. 24, *dictus* *Top.* 93, *Or.* 29, *Cacl.* 23, *Scaur.* 11, *Rep.* ii. 49, *Q. fr.* i. 2. 9, fr. Muell., IV, 3, p. 322, *Vitruv.* ix. 8. 2, *Mela* iii. 101, *Sen. Ep.* 104. 28, *NH* xxxiii. 156, *Quintil.* x. 1. 112, *Suet. Ter.* 2, *existimatus* *Verr.* vi. 3, *Fam.* ix. 21. 3, Varr. *RR* ii. 5. 3, Val. M. iv. 7. 1, *Ascon.*, p. 16, doubtful *Verr.* ii. 70 (personal, Merguet, *Lexicon zu den Reden*), *existimatum* *NH* iii. 94, vi. 81, *existimandus* *Inv.* i. 7, *Or.* 28, *Verr.* iv. 214, *Dom.* 93, *ND* iii. 28, *Div.* ii. 108, Val. M. i. 1. 8, doubtful *Verr.* iv. 147 (impersonal, Merguet), *existimandum* *De Or.* i. 62 [fr. Muell., IV, Part 3, 325], *iudicatus* *Ad Her.* i. 23, *Inv.* ii. 149, *Brut.* 189, *Chu.* 125, *Sull.* 73 bis, *Dom.* 101, *Har. resp.* 14, *Att.* i. 13. 6, fr. Muell., IV, Part 3, 231, *iudicatum* [*Brut.* 224], *Chu.* 102, *Dom.* 50 [*Att.* i. 1. 1], fr. Muell., IV, Part 3, 273, Val. M. viii. 1. absol. 13, *nuntiatus* *Plin. Ep.* iii. 7. 1, *perspectus* *Fam.* i. 7. 3, *proditus* *NH* ii. 180, *putatum* *Mur.* 36 (personal? cf. *Top.* 93), *putandus* *De Or.* i. 196 (and here I would put *Fin.* v. 42, regarding *nihil* as subject of *putandum*, not of *fieri*, as Merguet, *Lexicon zu den philosophischen Werken*, takes it), *putandum* *ND* ii. 154, *traditus* Val. M. viii. 9. ext. 1. I will not cite *ND* ii. 6, *visi sunt*, "were seen," as an exception; in view of the normally personal *visus* "seemed," it is rather the impersonal neuter in *NH* x. 84, xxxiii. 90 (*visum*, xvii. 53, seems to be personal) that, like that in *Brut.* 14, appears exceptional.

THE MISSING FOLIOS OF THE PARIS
FLORILEGIUM 15155

DOROTHY M. ROBATHAN

IT IS common knowledge that the splendid library which once belonged to Queen Christina of Sweden has long since been dispersed and that most of the rare manuscripts which once adorned it are now scattered among the University Library at Leiden, the Vatican Library, and the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris. It is, therefore, not surprising to find that the missing folios of an incomplete manuscript in the Bibliothèque Nationale have recently come to light among the codices of the Reginensis Collection in the Vatican.

The incomplete condition of Paris 15155, a thirteenth-century florilegium, has been lamented by scholars who have realized, from its Table of Contents, that it once contained excerpts which they might have found of value.¹ It is, therefore, a satisfaction to report that the missing folios of this Paris manuscript may now be studied in a Vatican codex, where they have apparently been hiding for years. This long period of oblivion may be explained by the fact that there was no mention of this manuscript in the handwritten catalogue of the Reginensis Collection. Only in 1934 was the entry made by Mgr. S. le Grelle on the back flyleaf of the inventory, where it is numbered 2120. In the spring of 1936 I examined the manuscript and made the following observations, which indicate clearly its connection with Paris 15155.

Vat. Reg. lat. 2120 is a composite manuscript, a detailed description of which is given below. The part which concerns us (fols. 11-35) is a parchment codex, written in the thirteenth century, with some interlinear and marginal corrections and variants in a contemporaneous hand. A study of the numbering and arrangement of the folios both confirms the theory that this manuscript was once a part of Paris 15155 and also tells us something of its history after it became

¹ Cf. F. Novati, "Un Poème inconnu de Gautier de Chatillon," *Mélanges Paul Fabre* (1907), p. 268; B. L. Ullman, "Tibullus in the Mediaeval Florilegia," *Classical Philology*, XXIII (1928), 170, n. 1.

separated from that manuscript. That the first ten folios, containing the *De agricultura* of Palladius, were once part of a different manuscript from the rest is quite evident. Throughout the florilegium codex there are three series of numberings, the most recent of which runs from 11 to 35 and binds it with the Palladius which precedes. Two of the folios (13 and 24) are smaller in size than the others and have been bound so that the top margin is not even with those of the other folios. These two folios contain twenty, instead of thirty, lines of text. This modern numbering we shall use for the practical purpose of referring to the contents of the folios; but it is of less interest than the other two series, which throw some light on the history of the manuscript. The oldest numbering (from the fourteenth to the fifteenth century) runs from folio 28 through folio 38 and corresponds with the modern series folios 11-22.² The present folio 23, however, was originally folio 111, and the rest of the folios continue in order through folio 122. Thus we have no need of the sixteenth-century note found at the bottom of folio 22v to inform us *desunt multa*.

A study of the gatherings also confirms the evidence of the original numbering. The first gathering (fols. 11-22v) is numbered iii, while on folio 23 is the number x (both by the first hand). Thus, gatherings iv-ix are lost. Let us see how this fits in with Paris 15155. There, too, we find that the gatherings are numbered and that numbers iii, x, and xi are missing. The gap in foliation is from folio 27 to folio 39, while from that point on through folio 110 the material is intact. Folios 111-22 are in Reg. 2120, while folios 123-36 are not found in either codex. The Paris manuscript begins again with folio 137 and goes through folio 145v, which, as the Table of Contents shows, was the end of the manuscript. Thus, it is clear from both the gathering numbers and the earlier folio numbers that Reg. 2120 was once part of Paris 15155. In addition, the script is identical. The following, then, is the reconstruction of the manuscript as it was in the St. Victor library (756): folios 1-27: Paris 15155; folios 28-38: Reg. 2120; folios 39-110: Paris 15155; folios 111-22: Reg. 2120; folios 123-36: missing; folios 137-76: Paris 15155.

² I am indebted to Professor B. L. Ullman for the information that this hand, which also numbered the folios in Paris 15155, is found in many other St. Victor manuscripts. (Paris 15155 was formerly St. Victor 756). To the same source I owe all subsequent reports on the Paris manuscript in this article.

The intermediate series of numbers (sixteenth to seventeenth century) is of interest in helping us to trace the history of Reg. 2120 after it became detached from what is now Paris 15155. This numbering does not occur in Paris 15155. The older folio numbering, beginning with 28, was crossed out and a new series started with 54, running through 78. The first small folio inserted between folios 29-30 of the earlier series, and unnumbered by that hand, was at first also overlooked by the hand that put in this series. When the writer reached folio 62, however, he discovered his mistake, went back and inserted 56 on the small folio, and changed all the intervening numbers. When he came to the other small folio (24) also not included in the original series, he did not make the same error of omission, but numbered it 67. Thus, it is clear that at one time our florilegium, instead of being bound alone with Palladius' *Agricultura* (of which the ten folios were once numbered 44-53), was once part of a composite manuscript, in which there were forty-three folios preceding Palladius and perhaps others following the florilegium. A modern note on the paper flyleaf refers us to item 1732 in the catalogue of Montfaucon, published in 1739.³ Here we find listed the very authors found in our florilegium, preceded by Palladius. However, there was in Codex 1732 in the year 1739 a fairly long array of other authors, as Montfaucon's entry shows:

1732. Albini Magistri carmina. Martialis Carmina quaedam. Maximus Victorius de re Grammatica. Sergius de arte Grammatica. Bedae Orthographia. Cassiodorus de anima. Ovidii liber Tristium. Glossae Veteris et Novi Testamenti. Johannis cuiusdam carmina ad Carolum Calvum. Cicero de Senectute. Palladius de Agricultura. Excerpta varia ex Tibullo, Boetio, Anticlaudianus, Sedulio, Matthaeo Vindocinensi, Ovidio et Horatio. Vibius Sequester de fluminibus. Sententiarum excerpta varia.

A search for manuscripts still in the Reginensis Collection of the Vatican which contain the authors listed by Montfaucon revealed the fact that in Codex 1561, containing Vibius Sequester, etc., folios 1v-22 were originally numbered 79-100, thus continuing the numbering of our present manuscript. Likewise, Reg. 1587 contains (on eighty folios) the authors enumerated by Montfaucon as preceding the excerpts, with the exception of Cassiodorus' *De anima* and Ovid's *Tristia*, which

³ *Bibliotheca bibliothecarum manuscriptorum nova* (Paris, 1739), I, 53.

are still to be accounted for.⁴ None of these authors, however, can be assigned to the first forty-three folios of Reg. 2120. The reconstruction of Montfaucon's MS 1732 as it was in the year 1739 is: Reg. 1587, folios 1-50; Cassiodorus and Ovid missing; Reg. 1587, folios 51-80; Reg. 2120; Reg. 1561.

Since Reg. 1587 consists of eighty folios, it is clear that the intermediate series of numbers in Reg. 2120, which begins with 44, cannot have belonged to the composite codex as it was in Montfaucon's time. The makeup of the manuscript with the intermediate numbering was: folios 1-43: missing; folios 44-78: Reg. 2120; folios 79-100: Reg. 1561. Whether this belongs to an earlier period, when still another manuscript of forty-three folios, instead of Reg. 1587, was bound with our manuscript, or whether it was put in later, after Reg. 1587 became separated from it, it is impossible to determine. The former seems more likely.

To return to the verse selections in Reg. 2120. Mention has been made of two short folios (13 and 24), containing *Eutheticus* and *De vetula*. A study of the gatherings shows that they were inserted as extras in their respective places. As has been stated, they each contain ten fewer lines of text than the folios of normal size. There is no sign, however, that the margins have been cut to any extent, and the author's name in one case and the title in the other have been placed squarely in the center of the upper margin. Moreover, the Table of Contents in the Paris manuscript indicates that *Eutheticus* comes between Boethius and Anti-Claudianus, which is its position at present, and that the *De vetula* is in its proper place. One wonders whether the pseudo-Ovidian *De vetula*, which was written by Richard de Fournival in the thirteenth century, came to the notice of the compiler too late to be included with the earlier material. The same might be true of the selections on the other small folio, which are taken from the *Entheticus de dogmate philosophorum* of John of Salisbury.⁵ The verses included here, according to Migne's numbering, are as follows: 7-8, 59-60, 71, 108, 228, 245, 277-78, 308, 378, 871-72, 1116, 1174, 1270, 1283-84.

⁴ We note that Montfaucon's manuscript number 1732 appears on fol. 1 of Reg. 1587.

⁵ This work is published by Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, Vol. 199, cols. 965 ff. For the form *Eutheticus* instead of *Entheticus* cf. *ibid.*, p. xiv.

The contents of the missing folios of Paris 15155 have been judged, from the index which precedes the text, to be as follows: Tibullus, *Orestes*, Boethius, *Eutheticus*, Anticlaudianus, Architrenius, Homer (*Ilias Latina*), Sedulius, Propertius, *Ars metrica*, Dares, Ovid (*De nuce*, *Vet.*, *Pulex*, *Somnus*, *Ibis*), Virgil (*Buc.*, *Georg.*, *Aen.*), Horace (*A.P.*, *Serm.*, *Epod.*, *Carm.*), Juvenal, Persius, Lucan. As has been said, folios 122-36 are still missing, and thus we are not surprised to discover that the end of the selections from Horace (the *Odes* and perhaps some of the *Epodes*), as well as the Juvenal, Persius, and Lucan, are not found in Reg. 2120. Of the other works enumerated above, all are represented, with some additions that do not appear in the Table of Contents. Interspersed with the extracts from Tibullus (fols. 11-12v) are passages from the *Appendix Vergiliana*, i.e., *Culex*, *Copa*, *Moretum*, and from two so-called *Ausoniana*, i.e., *Rosetum* and *Vir bonus*. Quotations from the *Culex*, *Aetna*, and *Laus Pisonis* also occur in the midst of Ovid's *De med. fac. fem.* (fol. 23). Furthermore, directly following the *Ibis* (fol. 25), without any indication of its being taken from another source, is a long selection from the *Mathematicus* of Hildebert. This work is also found in a Berlin florilegium (Diez. B. 60), where it is entitled *De libro qui dicitur de patricida*.⁶ Another Berlin florilegium (theol. fol. 38) contains the anonymous selection entitled *Artis metricae* in Reg. 2120 and wrongly ascribed by a sixteenth-century hand to Matthew of Vendôme.⁷ This hand also wrongly attributes the lines from Ovid's *De med. fac. fem.* (fol. 23) to the *De ponto*, although the Table of Contents in Paris 15155 (fol. 1v) includes the former work. We may note, too, that the lines entitled "Yliados Frigii Daretis" (fol. 22v) come from the twelfth-century metrical *De bello Troiano*, composed by Josephus Iscanus.⁸

Before examining in more detail some of the authors represented in this florilegium, it might be well to give a brief description of the

⁶ The selections given in the Berlin manuscript are not the same as the excerpts in Reg. 2120. The work is published in Migne, *PL*, Vol. CLXXI, cols. 1365 ff.

⁷ The selection begins *Stulticie mater est dissuetudo noverca*. The last verse given is *Mens bona non monachum nigra cuculla facit*.

⁸ Cf. J. J. Jusserand, *De Josepho Exoniensi vel Iscano* (Paris, 1877). The *De bello Troiano* is published in the Delphin edition of Dictys and Dares (London, 1825), I, 364-576.

hands which are found in it. The thirteenth-century scribe who wrote the text has also put in some additions and corrections, sometimes using a lighter brown ink than usual, sometimes using black.⁹ A second hand, contemporaneous with the first, has also used two shades of ink, one brown and the other black, sometimes on the same folio.¹⁰ This second hand imitates its predecessor not only in employing two shades of ink but also in the use of the minuscule letters *a* and *b* to call attention to certain lines in the text. Sometimes these letters are in red, sometimes in black or brown. Their purpose is not always clear. On folio 33v, after the second line (Horace *Serm.* i. 2. 15), is a *b* by the first hand, filled in with red. Following line 9 on the same folio (*ibid.* 14) is an *a* with the same color scheme. These symbols apparently correct the inverted order of the lines. However, the order is irregular all through the selections from the *Satires*, and no attention is called to that fact as a general rule. On folio 34v are found the same symbols but in black and by the second hand. These note the fact that *Serm.* ii. 3. 249 precedes *ibid.* 247. And on folio 35 a verse which is added in the lower margin by the first hand is marked for insertion in its proper place by *a* and *b* put in by the second hand and filled in with red. Letters of the same sort are found on folio 21v, where they seem to call attention to lines which are not in the Propertius corpus, though found here with the selections from that author. The *a* with a red mark through it by the second hand comes at the end of an interlinear verse of unknown origin, and *b* stands after a couplet of obviously medieval origin.¹¹ Less clear is the purpose of a small *a* by the second hand on folio 33v between an initial *D* and the rest of the word *ives* (*Serm.* i. 2. 13), while the corresponding *b* occurs in the following line (*ibid.* 14) between the initial *Q* and *uantas*.

⁹ E.g., on fol. 11 the text is in brown, but the same hand has added a line in black ink; on fol. 12v the text is in very dark brown, except for three lines by the same hand, which are in light brown ink. In Paris 15155 this same fact may be observed in connection with the selections from Theodulus, which are written by the first hand but added in the margin (fol. 6). In the index of authors (fol. 1v) the word *Theoduli* is in blacker ink than the rest and was certainly added later.

¹⁰ E.g., on fol. 12 the interlinear addition from the *Rosetum* (vs. 49) is in lighter brown than the marginal additions from the *Appendix Vergiliana*, both of which are by the second hand.

¹¹ Cf. Propertius collation below.

A third hand, somewhat later in date, has inserted marginal captions and explanatory notes. A few words have been put in by a sixteenth-century scribe.¹²

Since this is the first florilegium yet reported which contains passages from Propertius,¹³ and since only one complete manuscript of that author antedating the fourteenth century is extant, let us turn first to these selections. The collation published below shows that there are very few deviations from the established text. Aside from the arbitrary variations at the beginning of lines such as we often find in these anthologies, the only individual readings unreported from any of the manuscripts are the following: ii. 1. 58, *habet*; ii. 19. 32, *iam*; ii. 34. 18, *possem*; iii. 5. 13, *umbras*. We note that the reading *habet* (ii. 1. 58) agrees with an emendation of Schrader, which Hosius adopts in his text without manuscript authority. The following collation is based on Hosius (Teubner, 3d ed. [1932]). I have omitted the numerous glosses by the second hand,¹⁴ as well as the marginal notes which the third hand has placed opposite the text to suggest the content.¹⁵

i. 2. 8; i. 5. 23 Non tibi; i. 6. 27 longineo p. amore in *ordinem corr. m²*; i. 7. 26; i. 9. 7; i. 9. 12 mensuetus; i. 12. 16 Nam nimis aspersis; i. 14. 8; ii. 1. 16; ii. 1. 43-44; ii. 1. 58 artificem] curatorem *sscr. in. ras. m²*; ii. 5. 16; ii. 13. 52; ii. 14. 18 (followed by a verse not from Propertius: "Est in amore modus non habuisse modum" *m²*); ii. 15. 30; ii. 16. 21; ii. 16. 36; ii. 18. 1; ii. 18. 38; ii. 19. 3; ii. 19. 32 ne] iam; ii. 22. 17; ii. 25. 22 Nulla—habet; ii. 25. 28; ii. 28. 58; ii. 32. 25; ii. 32. 55; ii. 33. 33 (followed by a couplet apparently medieval in origin: "Omnis amans cecus, non est amor equus, Nam deforme pecus iudicat esse decus"); ii. 33. 34; ii. 34. 3; ii. 34. 18 possem; iii. 1. 24; iii. 5. 13 Non ullas p. undas *m umbras m²*; iii. 6. 5; iii. 9. 4; iii. 13. 4; iii. 13. 49-50 (*expl. sequitur*); iv. 6. 51 Et atollit vires *in ras.*; iv. 7. 1; iv. 11. 2; iv. 11. 7 (*expl. superos*).

¹² This is found, e.g., in the words *Matthaei Vindocinensis* (fol. 22) and *De ponto* (fol. 23).

¹³ See Ullman, *loc. cit.* The suggestion that Albertus Stadensis may have used Paris 15155 or a similar florilegium is now shown to be untenable, inasmuch as the two lines from Tibullus which Albertus quotes are not found in Reg. 2120 and only one of the many imitations of Propertius which Hosius cites is included (ii. 15. 30).

¹⁴ E.g., i. 2. 8 *nudus sscr. manifestus*; ii. 25. 22 *pondus sscr. utilitatem*; ii. 34. 18 *Rivalem sscr. socium*.

¹⁵ Opposite i. 6. 27 *amor longinquus*; i. 13. 52 *amor venereus*; ii. 25. 28 *Nota fortunam magnam quod venit tarde*.

From Propertius it is natural to pass to his fellow-elegist, Tibullus, of whose text tradition in the medieval florilegia an intensive study has been made.¹⁶ A consideration of the Tibullus passages in this manuscript shows that, while it contains fewer verses than the longer florilegia, on the other hand, it has more selections than the shorter ones. For example, of the two manuscripts to which it is most closely related, Douai has only twenty-two verses from Tibullus, Bodleian has thirty-eight, while Reginensis has sixty-one. All of these verses are found in florilegia previously reported by Ullman, but there are four verses which do not occur in any of the shorter anthologies (i. 10. 33-34; iii. 4. 63; iii. 5. 15). This seems to indicate that Reg. forms a link between the two types of florilegia previously differentiated. With one exception (i. 9. 10, only in Bodl.), every line found in one or more of the manuscripts Bodl., Mun., Dou., Par., Harl., occurs also in Reg.

The following agreement in individual readings seems to connect Reg. more closely with Dou. than with any of the other florilegia: i. 6. 75; ii. 1. 13 (*Casta p. s. [only]*); iii. 3. 11 *grave p.*; iii. 3. 20-21 (begins *Falso*); iii. 4. 76 *dulci*. It also shows relationship with Dou.'s kinsman, Bodl., in the following readings: i. 5. 61 *semper*; i. 9. 3 *est* [om.]; iii. 6. 45 *Non*; and in having eight verses which do not occur in any of the other shorter florilegia (i. 3. 64; i. 5. 61-64; ii. 4. 29-30; ii. 6. 19). However, it has one verse which is found only in the Paris florilegium 13582 (i. 4. 77) and another only in Mun. (i. 6. 30), as well as a reading which is peculiar to Mun. (i. 1. 70 *venit*). In addition, a reading of Mun. agrees with the second hand in Reg. (i. 5. 70 *pars*). It is noticeable that verses which are found only in Berlin, Verona, and/or Leiden, do not occur in Reg.

Further relationship with Bodl. and Dou. is found in the order of the verses. These two manuscripts, following the longer florilegia, have iii. 4. 19 after iii. 4. 76, as does Reg. Like Dou. it has i. 5. 70 after i. 6. 75, with i. 8. 7-8 (found only in Dou. and Bodl. of the florilegia previously reported) intervening. In i. 5. 70 Reg. agrees with Mun. and Dou. in the wrong reading *sceleri* and in iii. 6. 45 it stands with Bodl. and with Scaliger's excerpt manuscript in reading *Non* for *Nec*.

¹⁶ By Ullman, *op. cit.*

A collation of the Tibullus passages with Ullman's text of the florilegia follows. As in the Propertius collation, I have omitted glosses and the marginal index.

Tib. Tibulli (corr. ex Tibullii); i. 2. 87-88 Mors; i. 1. 22 Digna est exigui hostia parva soli; i. 1. 34 (De—grege) post magno sup. lin. magna inseruit m²; i. 3. 64 Ludit et interdum prelia miscet amor; i. 4. 77 (Gloria—est); i. 5. 61 semper te semper adibit; i. 5. 62 fixus] semper; i. 5. 63-64; i. 4. 18; i. 8. 61-62 Quid prosunt artes miserum si spernit amantem, Surgit et ex ipso seva puella thoro; i. 6. 75; i. 1. 70 Iam venit in t.; i. 5. 58 Deficit iniusta lege relicta venus; i. 8. 7-8 Amor crudelius urit quos videt invitos procubuisse sibi; i. 5. 70 scelere sors, orbe] rota sscr. m² i. m. vel sic versatur celeri pars levis orbe rote m²; i. 8. 41-42 Heu sero revocatur amor seroque iuventus, Cum vetus infecit cana senecta caput seroque sscr. est m²; i. 9. 3 Ha] et in ras.; primo om.; iii. 1. 7; i. 9. 4 tamen] etiam; i. 9. 23 paranti] volenti; i. 9. 24, 27-28; i. 10. 33-34; ii. 1. 13 (Casta—superis); ii. 3. 35 Ferrea sed i. m. nihil; ii. 4. 29-30 (Vestis); ii. 6. 19-20; iii. 2. 6; i. 5. 60 Donis vincitur omnis amans; i. 6. 30 Contra quis gerat arma deos; i. 7. 41 Afflictis requiem baccus mortalibus affert (af in ras.); i. 8. 19 Cantus vicinis fruges deducit ab arvis (Cantus m Campus corr. m²); i. 8. 56 Ipse deus cupidis fallere sepe dedit; i. 9. 18 Sepe solent auro multa subesse mala; iii. 3. 11 grave pondus; iii. 3. 20 (Falso—amat); iii. 3. 21; iii. 4. 7 Sompnia fallaces ledunt temeraria mentes; iii. 4. 8; iii. 4. 76 V. dulci p.; iii. 4. 19; iii. 4. 63 (sine tit.); iii. 5. 12; iii. 5. 15; iii. 6. 33-36; iii. 6. 43-46 (45 Non nos).

As has been said, interspersed with the selections from Tibullus we find passages from the *Appendix Vergiliana* and the *Ausoniana*, all without ascription. The arrangement is as follows: In the margin of folio 12 opposite Tibullus iii. 4. 7—iii. 4. 63 are *Culex* 79-82. After Tibullus iii. 6. 46 in the text, as if part of that author, we find *Rosetum* 40, 43-46, 49-50 (49 is written in between lines). Then comes *Vir bonus* 1-2. In the right margin are *Copa* 37, *Vir bonus* 23-24 (*Cur—trahit*), *Moretum* 76, 74, 84.¹⁷

The same passage from the *Culex* (vss. 79-82) and other verses from the *Appendix Vergiliana* not included above occur in the midst of the Ovid selections (fols. 23-23v). Here, also, a jumbled arrangement is found, as may be seen from the order indicated: Ovid *De med. fac. fem.* 5-7, 8-10, 18-20, 23-24, 26, 31-34, 42-43, 45-50; *Culex*

¹⁷ The numbering of the verses is that of Vollmer (1930) for the *Appendix Vergiliana*; Ribbeck (1868) for the *Ausoniana*.

79-82, 294, 342, 414;¹⁸ *Aet.* 222; *Laus Pisonis* 259, 10-11, 117;¹⁹ *Aet.* 109; *De med. fac. fem.* 83-91. Since we are mentioning Ovid, we may note that the verses from the *Ibis* (fol. 25) are the same eight lines found also in a Berlin florilegium (Phillipps 1813). They are verses 113-17, 120, 123-24.

Of the other works included in this anthology, the only one of which it seems worth while to give a complete collation is the anonymous tragedy *Orestes*, sometimes ascribed to Dracontius. Inasmuch as the text is based on only two complete manuscripts, one of which antedates the fifteenth century, Vollmer²⁰ gives readings from four florilegia which contain some selections from this poem. Since Reg. differs in several instances from any of the readings given, the following collation with Vollmer's text may be of interest:

191 Mars, erit; 278 felices] mortales, numquam; 279 Sunt faciles] Et summis, deos; tamen ante] miserosque; 280 Et miseris in fine] Atque eis sine fine; 281; 331 Est aurum pulcrum; 332; 337 (Sordida—cupit); 452 Quod; didicere; 539 (*post versum* 337); 544 Nam] Hic, quem, vindicat; 671 quod; 903 pigebat; 904 (Cum—nefas); 927 (Quis—almos); 928 Incusare, permissa; 951 erit, in pugnīs.

The influence exerted by these medieval florilegia in the spread of classical culture is a subject that is just beginning to receive attention on the part of scholars. Doubtless further investigations will shed new light upon important phases of this problem which are as yet unstudied. That Vat. Reg. lat. 2120 will contribute materially to such a study is certain, since in some respects it differs from the other anthologies previously reported.

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¹⁸ We may note that *Culex* 81 has the form *agnovit*, whereas on fol. 12, where the same passage was added by the second hand, we find *agnosc(it)*. *Agnovit* is the usual florilegia reading, but the other form occurs in Harl. 2745.

¹⁹ Worthy of mention is the fact that *Laus Pisonis*, vs. 117, instead of the usual reading *ambit*, has the word *unit*, a reading not reported from any other florilegium. Cf. Ullman, *Classical Philology*, XXIV (1929), 109-32.

²⁰ *Poetae Latini minores*, Vol. V (Teubner, 1914).

RULER CULT IN SENECA

MARION ALTMAN

IN SENECA'S works there is a considerable amount of material from which it is possible to learn his true feelings about the ruler cult. Many times he is inconsistent; but when the passages are carefully studied, it is quite evident what his purpose was in using characteristic words and phrases.

We have, indeed, evidence enough that he was thoroughly familiar with the customs of his day in regard to emperor-worship. Two passages clearly indicate his familiarity with divine honors paid heroes, whose statues were erected and made objects of worship. He tells us that "the people erected statues in every street to Marius, whom they worshiped with frankincense and wine."¹ Marius was hailed as third founder of Rome, which entitled him to such honor; and, as Miss Taylor suggests, there is the possibility that his genius was worshiped.²

Seneca also mentions that Scipio was granted the honor of having his statue placed beside that of Jupiter; but because he scorned honors that rivaled those of the gods, he did not allow his statue to be set in the Capitol.³

In another passage an example of *proskynesis* is found. Seneca tells the story of a senator, Pompeius Pennus, who, after he had been released by Gaius Caesar, prostrated himself before the emperor just as the conquered prostrate themselves before the conquerors. Caligula, in turn, extended his left foot to be kissed. Seneca denies the fact he merely wanted to display his golden slippers studded with pearls, and says that "the man born for the purpose of changing manners of a free state into servitude found a way of thrusting liberty down even lower than the knees."⁴

¹ *De ira* iii. 18. 1.

² *Divinity of the Roman Emperor*, p. 49.

³ *De brevitate vitae* xvii. 6. For a more detailed study see Nock, "Συνναος Θεος," *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, XLI (1930), 1-62.

⁴ *De beneficiis* ii. 12. 1-2. Cf. Scott, "Dio Chrysostom and Juventius Celsus," *Class. Phil.*, XXIX (1934), 66, and J. Horst, *Proskynein* (Gütersloh, 1932).

Caligula is again mentioned in connection with the consecration of his sister Drusilla. Seneca says, "He was never quite sure whether he wished his sister to be lamented or worshiped, and during the whole time he was erecting temples and shrines to her, he would inflict most cruel punishment upon those who had not shown sufficient sorrow."⁵ He relates this story about Caligula and his behavior after his sister's death with utmost scorn.

There is an example of *laesa maiestas* in Seneca's works. It concerns a praetorian, Paulus, who, while dining on a festive occasion, was wearing a ring with a conspicuous stone on which the portrait of Tiberius was engraved in relief. Maro, "a notorious informer of that time," set a plot for him that the emperor's portrait come in contact with something foul and thereby cause him to be guilty of *laesa maiestas*. Fortunately, the praetorian's faithful slave had drawn the ring off and put it on his own hand, to save his master from being guilty of the offense.⁶ To some it was indeed a serious crime to befoul anything bearing the emperor's image.⁷

The satire on the deification of the emperor Claudius⁸ affords a hint of Seneca's true feeling about emperor-worship. While he has presented a very humorous representation of what happened in heaven, he has not failed to inject his own views, which are apparent in the controversy among the gods. The first to give his opinion as to whether Claudius should be permitted to enter their number is Jupiter. "Once," he said, "it was a great thing to be made a god; now you have made it a farce. Therefore, that you may not think I am speaking against one person instead of the general custom, I move that from this day no one of those who eat the fruits of the earth be made a

⁵ *De consolatione ad Polybium* xvii. 5.

⁶ *De beneficiis* iii. 26. 1-2. Cf. Rogers, *Criminal Trials and Criminal Legislation under Tiberius* (1935), p. 272.

⁷ See Scott, *Imperial Cult under the Flavians*, chap. ix, and Rogers, *op. cit.*, pp. 58 ff.

⁸ There has been much controversy concerning the title, which, I believe, Duff settles convincingly. The best manuscript has: "Divi Claudii incipit Apotheosis Annei Seneca per satiram," while Dio Cassius tells us that Seneca wrote a work called *Apocolocyntosis*. Duff says, "The MS. title is tautological, as it stands, for one does not deify a deified emperor; all, however, is intelligible if it is, as Bücheler guessed, a contamination of an original superscription 'Divi Claudii Apocolocyntosis' with a gloss, 'Apotheosis per satiram,' to explain the parody implicit in the rare word" (*Literary History of Rome in the Silver Age* [1927], p. 242).

god." The opposing view is given by Diespiter, whose only argument for making Claudius a god is that he is akin to the deified Augustus and Augusta. It is finally settled by Augustus, who says that no one will believe in the gods if they make such a man a god.⁹

With this evidence I am inclined to think that Seneca was opposed to the deification of any person who lacked the qualities of a Stoic sage. In no place does he condemn deification as such; in fact, it is very evident that he approved of the apotheosis of Augustus, for he says, "We believe him to be a god and not because we were bidden."¹⁰ Augustus was his idea of the perfect prince with all the qualities of a Stoic sage. Therefore, it seems that his satire was meant to be an attack not on the state religion but on the deification of unworthy emperors. The younger Pliny, in accord with his uncle,¹¹ was of the same opinion in regard to apotheosis for good rulers, for he says to Trajan, "How much more worthy of heaven will you sometime be, since you have added so many services to those on account of which we make him [Titus] a god!"¹² In contrast, as Scott points out, he does not approve the motives of former emperors who deified their predecessors;¹³ for example, Pliny says, "Tiberius deified Augustus in order to introduce the offense of *maiestas*; Nero did the same for Claudius, to laugh at him; Titus consecrated Vespasian, Domitian Titus, the former that he might seem to be the son of a god, the latter that he might seem to be the brother of a god."¹⁴

Just eight years earlier Seneca had overloaded his *Consolatio ad Polybium* with unlimited flattery of the emperor. In consoling Polybius on the death of a brother, he made use of an excellent opportunity to flatter the emperor and thereby obtain his recall from exile. In one place he says:

Nothing is sacred and inviolable to Fortune, who has dared to lead funerals from the households whence she was to seek gods—yet if she has not resolved utterly to destroy the human race, if she still looks with favor on the name of Roman, may we by public vows and prayers obtain from her this one conces-

⁹ *Apocolocyntosis* 9.

¹⁰ *De clementia* i. 10. 3. This may also be considered flattery paid Nero, who enjoyed being called a descendant of Augustus.

¹¹ Cf. Pliny *HN* ii. 16 and 18.

¹² *Paneg.* 35. 4.

¹³ "The Plinys on Emperor Worship," *TAPA*, LXIII (1932), 163 f.

¹⁴ *Paneg.* 11. 1.

sion, that this prince, who has been granted to the fallen estate of mankind, should be held as sacred by her as he is by all mortal men. Let her learn mercy from him, and to the kindest of all princes let her be kind.¹⁵

The flattery in another passage takes the form of a wish for long life and deification:

Lift yourself up, and every time that tears well up in your eyes, fix these upon Caesar; at the sight of the exceeding greatness and splendor of his divinity they will be dried; his brilliance will dazzle them so that they will be able to see nothing else and will keep them fastened on him. . . . Are not the very sight and merely the thought of Caesar in themselves the very greatest comfort to you? May the gods and goddesses lend him long to the earth! May he rival the achievements, may he surpass the years of the deified Augustus!—Late be the day and known only to our grandchildren on which his kindred claim him for the skies!¹⁶

Although it is rather difficult to understand Seneca's view of emperor-worship from the scattered passages where he specifically mentions it, his Stoic doctrine of the *θεῖος ἀνὴρ* is clear and predominant. He has so completely torn down the barrier between god and man that the transition is an easy matter. Virtue is the only means of destroying this barrier,¹⁷ and a virtuous man is the wise philosopher. In the *De constantia* he says, "It is impossible for anyone to injure or benefit a wise man since that which is divine does not need to be helped and cannot be hurt, and the wise man is the next door neighbor to the gods, and like the gods in everything except his mortality."¹⁸

What, then, makes a man wise and good? Seneca says it is the god that dwells within him.¹⁹ The ability to be unshaken in the midst of dangers is due to the fact that a divine power has descended upon him²⁰ who is upright, good, and great. A power like this may descend upon a knight, freedman's son, or slave, for, as he says, "One may leap to heaven from the very slums,²¹ because all men, if traced back to their original source, spring from the gods."²² This power cannot be

¹⁵ *De consolazione ad Polybium* xvi. 4. 6.

¹⁶ *Ibid.* xii. 3-5. Cf. also *ibid.* vii. 1 ff.; xiii. 1 ff.

¹⁷ *Epistle* xcii. 29.

¹⁸ viii. 2. Cf. *De consolazione ad Helviam* xi. 7; *De brevitae vitae* xv. 5.

¹⁹ *Epistle* xli. For a more complete discussion see H. Windisch, *Paulus und Christus*, p. 46.

²⁰ *De tranquillitate animi* ii. 3 and *Epistle* xli. 4.

²¹ *Epistle* xxxi. 11.

²² *Ibid.* xlv. 1.

snatched away, for it is the reason in the soul brought to perfection.²³ Seneca says:

It is no wonder that man goes to the gods. God comes into men. Divine seeds are scattered throughout our mortal bodies, and if a good husbandman receives them, they spring up in the likeness of their source and equal to those from whom they came.²⁴

Therefore, as a person is likely to admire a beautiful face and be struck almost dumb by its beauty, so should we admire and even worship a good man's soul . . . not in slaughtering fattened bulls or in hanging up offerings of gold or silver, or pouring coins into a temple treasury, but in a will that is reverent and upright.²⁵

In two passages Seneca is willing to say that a wise man is superior to the gods. He admits that "the gods will live longer, but a wise man's life spreads out to him over as large a surface as does all eternity to a god. There is one point in which the sage has an advantage over the god: a god is freed from terrors by the bounty of nature, the wise man by his own bounty."²⁶ Another advantage is that, while the wise man surveys and scorns all the possessions of others as calmly as does Jupiter, he is superior because, while Jupiter is unable to make use of them, the wise man does not wish to do so.²⁷

Seneca's treatment of Nero appears to be flattery, but in most respects it seems to be dictated by a fervent desire that the young ruler might merit such *blanditiae*. The emperor was only eighteen and had ruled slightly more than a year when his tutor addressed the *De clementia* to him. The fact that Nero was actually following the dictates of his Stoic teacher doubtless lent a degree of sincerity to his words:

This pronouncement, Caesar, you may boldly make, that whatever has passed into your trust and guardianship is still kept safe, that through you the state suffers no loss, either from violence or fraud. It is the rarest praise, hitherto denied to all other princes, that you have coveted for yourself—innocence of wrong. Nor has the effort been in vain, nor has the unparalleled goodness of yours found men ungrateful or grudging in their appraisal. Thanks are rendered; no human being has ever been so dear to another as you are to the people of Rome, whose great and lasting blessing you are.²⁸

In the *Apocolocyntosis* he has Lachesis, the disposer of lots, bestow many years on Nero²⁹ in the same way he had besought the gods for a

²³ *Ibid.* xli, 8.

²⁵ *Ibid.* cxv, 4 f.

²⁷ *Ibid.* lxxiii, 14.

²⁴ *Ibid.* lxxiii, 16.

²⁶ *Ibid.* liii, 11.

²⁸ i, 1, 5.

²⁹ *Apocol.* 4.

long life for Claudius.³⁰ He doubtless was more sincere when he wished Nero a long life, because he had hope of Nero's carrying out the Stoic doctrines he had instilled in him.

While the flattery in the *De clementia* is quite evident, it was probably not Seneca's purpose in writing the essay. He has, no doubt, wished to give the young ruler further instructions in managing the affairs of the state. He reminds Nero:

You are the soul of the state and the state your body.³¹ . . . A flood of light surrounds you; toward it everyone turns his eyes. Do you think you come forth? You really rise.³² You cannot speak but that all the nations of the earth hear your voice. You cannot be angry without causing everything to tremble.³³

And again:

The emperor is the bond by which the commonwealth is united, the breath of life which these many thousands draw, who in their own strength would be only a burden to themselves and the prey of others if the great mind of the empire should be withdrawn. It is, therefore, not strange that kings and princes and guardians are held more dear even than those bound to us by private ties.³⁴

In another passage Seneca explains to Nero what the title *pater patriae* means and denies that it is flattery. He says:

No one resorts to the exaction of punishment until he has exhausted all means of correction. This is the duty of a father, and it is also the duty of a prince whom not in empty flattery we have been led to call the "father of his country." For other designations have been granted merely by way of honor. Some we have styled "the great,"³⁵ "the fortunate,"³⁶ "Augustus,"³⁷ and we have heaped upon pretentious greatness all possible titles as a tribute to such men; but to the father of his country we have given the name in order that he may know he has been intrusted with a father's power, which is the most forbearing in its care for the interests of his children and which subordinates his own interests to theirs.³⁸

³⁰ *De consolatione ad Polybium* xii. 3-5.

³¹ I. v. 1.

³² *De clementia* i. 8. 5.

³³ The two verbs are *prodeo* and *orior*.

³⁴ *Ibid.* 4. 1 and 3.

³⁵ *Magnus*: for a discussion of this title see Sauter's *Der römische Kaiserkult bei Martial und Statius*.

³⁶ *Felix*: see Carcopino's *Sylla* (1931), p. 107.

³⁷ *Augustus*: see Scott's "Tiberius' Refusal of the Title 'Augustus,'" *Class. Phil.*, XXVII (1932), 46 ff., and Hirst's "Significance of Augustus as Applied to Hercules," *AJP*, XLVII (1926), 347-57.

³⁸ *De clementia* i. 14. 1-2. Also cf. Sauter, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

Seneca stresses the fact that to be a good ruler is to be second only to the gods. This, no doubt, is his true feeling about the emperor who has the qualities of a Stoic sage which he urges Nero to acquire. He tells the young prince that the state gazes on its ruler as men would gaze upon the immortal gods—with veneration and worship. "But tell me," he goes on, "he who bears himself in a godlike manner, who is beneficent and generous and uses his power for the better end, does he not hold a place second only to the gods?"³⁹ It is quite evident that he does not think that merely being the ruler gives one divinity even though the power to give and to take away life is a gift of the gods.⁴⁰

In addition to the passages concerning Nero which may be taken as pure flattery, there is evidence that Seneca did believe the emperor had supernatural power over the fortunes of others. In the *De consolatione ad Marciam* he says:

Why should I recall to you the bereavements of the Caesars, whom fortune seems to me at times deliberately to outrage in order that they may benefit the human race by showing that not even they who are said to be born from gods and to be destined to give birth to gods can have the same power over their own fortunes that they have over the fortunes of others.⁴¹

A consideration of all the passages which have characteristic words and phrases of emperor-worship leads me to the conclusion that the Stoic philosopher, although inconsistent in his attitude toward deification, had a very definite principle on which he based his judgment of a divine ruler. As has been pointed out, the emperor was not divine because of his position but had, as did all men, an opportunity to become godlike through virtue. The *θεῖος ἀνὴρ* was the man who believed and practiced the Stoic doctrine.⁴²

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³⁹ *De clementia* i. 19. 8.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.* 21. 2. Cf. *ibid.* 26. 5. "Haec divina potentia est gregatim ac publice servare."

⁴¹ On descent from the gods cf. Silius Italicus *Punica* iii. 625.

⁴² I am indebted to Professor K. Scott and to Professor R. S. Rogers for helpful suggestions and constructive criticism.

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS

OPMHΘEIS ΘEOT APXETO, ODYSSEY VIII. 499

The speech in which Odysseus warmly praises the artistry of Demodocus and asks him to sing the lay of the Trojan horse (θ 487-98) is followed by the line *ὥς φάθ', ὃ δ' ὀρμηθεὶς θεοῦ ἄρχετο, φαῖνε δ' αἰοδῆν*. The scholiasts and Eustathius report, somewhat confusedly it is true, alternative interpretations: *θεοῦ* is taken (1) with *ὀρμηθεὶς* to mean inspired or moved by the god or (2) with *ἄρχετο* of an invocation or proemium addressed to the god. The former is unanimously adopted by modern critics and commentators, so far as I have been able to find, with the exception of Bergk,¹ and is followed in all the translations I have seen except that of Mackail. Düntzer² scornfully dismisses Bergk's interpretation with the words, "selbst der Rhythmus des Verses soll verlangen, dass *θεοῦ* mit *ἄρχετο* verbunden werde, als ob der Rhythmus je gegen den Zusammenhang über die Art der Verbindung entscheiden könne." I cannot myself understand how a *Rhythmus* unconnected with the *Zusammenhang*, or contrariwise a *Zusammenhang* independent of the *Rhythmus*, can be brought into any intelligible relationship with the text. If the line was not orally composed, it was at least composed for oral recitation; in either case it had to be recited in such a way as to make its meaning clear to the audience. Now if *ὀρμηθεὶς θεοῦ* are so read as to make it clear that they are construed together in the sense "moved by the god," the result is to put the principal pause in the verse at the one point where it was not permitted, that is, diaeresis after the third foot, by which a line is divided into equal halves. But if *θεοῦ ἄρχετο* are read together, we have a typical Homeric line which is metrically without blemish.

No parallels are offered, by Düntzer or by the commentators, to the proposed construction of *ὀρμηθεὶς θεοῦ*. The reason, I think, is that they cannot be found; if the two words could be read together, the genitive would almost certainly be taken as objective (cf. Ξ 488, *ὠρμήθη δ' Ἀκάμαντος*, Φ 595, *ὠρμήσατ' Ἀγήνορος ἀντιθέοιο*) and the normal meaning would be "starting for," "making a dash at." That there is no intrinsic difficulty in the construction *θεοῦ ἄρχετο* Düntzer admits: "Dass *θεοῦ ἄρχετο* an sich heissen könne, er fing von Gott oder von einem Gotte an, wird niemand bezweifeln." A good parallel is I 97, *ἐν σοὶ μὲν λήξω, σέο δ' ἄρξομαι* (cf. φ 142, *ἀρξάμενοι τοῦ χώρου ὅθεν τέ περ οἶνοχοεῖν*). Finally, to take *θεοῦ* with *ὀρμηθεὶς* leaves us with the unparalleled expression *ἄρχετο φαῖνε δ' αἰοδῆν*, which adds poor composition to bad metric.

¹ *Griechische Literaturgeschichte* (Berlin, 1872), p. 434, n. 31.

² *Die homerischen Fragen* (Leipzig, 1874), p. 159.

Düntzer's assumption that the interpretation favored by Bergk necessarily implies a hymn or an elaborate proemium is quite unwarranted, since *θεοῦ ἀρχερό* may refer to the briefest of invocations. *Ὀρμηθεῖς* may mean no more than "started," or it may describe the abrupt physical movement so often made by a musician or singer at the moment he begins, to which the common Homeric use is well suited. Conceivably it might mean "stood up," though it is likely that the bard was seated while singing at a feast (cf. α 339). We may interpret, then: "So he spake, and the bard, starting, began with an invocation and unfolded his lay, taking up the tale, etc."

The notes on this passage in the various editions are illuminating in regard to the way in which comment may be handed down from one edition to another, and they suggest that none of the editors took the trouble to read the line aloud, for no one who will do so can be in any doubt regarding its construction. The appearance in the scholia of the orthodox interpretation accords with my previous observation³ that Homeric criticism was becoming a visual art even in the Alexandrian age.

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WAS CATULLUS PRESENT AT SESTIUS' DINNER?

Ellis, Bachrens-Schulze, Merrill, and Kroll are in substantial agreement that Catullus was not present at the dinner which is the occasion of the forty-fourth poem. But, since Professor Haerhoff, in *Classical Philology*, XXIX (1934), 255 f., has taken the opposite view, and certain details are not generally agreed upon, it may be worth while to re-examine the evidence.

Venter (8), standing as it often does for greediness, does not indicate that the poet actually ate; the point of the joke would be lost if overeating rather than the frigid oration made him sick. But if, as Haerhoff thinks, he was present, he must have eaten. Horace (*Ars poetica* 427 f.) warns against expecting honest criticism from a guest filled with your good cheer; the host would hardly have thrust the book tactlessly at him before feeding him.

It is not true, as Friedrich says, that *Dum sumptuosas appeto cenas* (9) can only be said by one not yet invited. For *appeto* need not mean to try to get an invitation but (see *Lex.*, s.v.) to have an appetite for, as here. In any case, *appeto* and, in the next line, *volo* practically rule out the interpretation that Catullus attended the dinner; he only anticipated it.

The *peccatum* (17) was not, as Karsten thought (*Mnem.*, XIX [1891], 227), yielding to a temptation to insincere flattery. Nor is his objection that otherwise there are two faults, gluttony and the reading, very serious; since gluttony was the motive of the real fault of reading (or flattery, as he takes it), which he promises not to repeat.

³ *Homeric Repetitions* ("Univ. Calif. Pub. Class. Phil.," Vol. XII, No. 1 [1933]), pp. 1 ff.

Accepting Friedrich's explanation of the textual difficulty of the last line—*legi* written *legeti*, copied as *leget* through confusion of *i* and *t*, then "corrected" to *legit*—rather than Baehrens' *fecit*, we still must account for *vocat*. Haarhoff is at some pains to justify this as a syncopated perfect. This is linguistically possible, though his other examples are all from Lucretius, who is archaistic where Catullus is colloquial. But it is neither necessary nor desirable. People tend, especially if irritated, to generalize on few instances or one (so Kroll). Compare, for instance, the retorts of Agamemnon and Achilles, studded with *ποτε*, *ὁππότε*, *πάντων*, *ὅς τις*, *ἦν ποτε*. Catullus has already pluralized Sestius' dinner in verse 9. To make *vocat* equal *vocavit* is to be too precise and lose the reckless petulance of generalization, as in the *vivis* at the end of the tenth poem, another joke at his own expense in which the poet generalizes on one instance.

There is still left the formal inaccuracy (which bothers Kroll) of saying, "Who invites me only after . . .," for "Who is ready to entertain me only after . . ." (as Friedrich takes it). In *Iliad* ix. 261 Odysseus says, "To you Agamemnon gives worthy gifts if you shall cease from anger." Three verses down this present is translated "has promised." Agamemnon and Sestius are ready to give or invite if the other will meet certain conditions. There may be some slight support for this present tense in the fact that *invitat*, which is often coupled with *vocat*, may mean "entertain" (as in Plautus *Rudens* 362) as well as "invite." The entertainment would be at least implied by the more restricted *vocat*.

Certain suggestions of editors and translators Haarhoff rightly rejects. That *malum librum* means any dull book rather than Sestius' oration; and particularly that Sestius specifically asked Catullus to read the speech before coming to dinner rather than that he knew it was the politic thing to be primed for a practically inevitable discussion of it. Friedrich says that the only circumstances which could have occasioned the poem were these: Sestius invited a friend of Catullus in the latter's presence, adding, "I'd invite you, too, but you never read my speeches." To which Catullus replied, "I read one once to get an invitation from you and the results were lamentable." This is elaborate and naïve invention.

Karsten is far too matter of fact for Catullus' extravagant humor when he objects that it was too much of a coincidence that the poet, since he could not really have been sickened by the oration, should have happened to be taken sick right after reading it. Still, says Karsten, he was consumptive and died of such a malady a few years later; so he could run away to the villa long enough to escape the oration with the meal and afterward offer a cough as an excuse, plausibly enough since he was known to be tubercular. This solemn explanation is almost as funny as the poem, from which it all but removes the jest. Karsten does add, however, that, detected in his deceit, he wrote this witty pretense by way of admitting it. But this reconstruction of the circumstances, like that of Friedrich, seems overelaborate for any data we have.

It is simpler to accept the testimony of the poem: that he did have a cold from which he recuperated in the country, that he had been invited by Sestius and read the dreary speech dutifully to avoid possible embarrassment at the meal, that he thought it a good joke on himself when the cold after all prevented his attendance, and that he invented only the frivolous supposed causation in the poem.

One may still wonder who were expected to read it. It is too good-natured to be one of his venomous attacks on someone who was to read it and suffer from it. Possibly it was only a pretended attack like the fourteenth to Calvus, and Sestius was to read and enjoy it. But if the testimony of Cicero, as quoted by the editors, is about the same Sestius, he does not seem affable enough for this, and we have no evidence in the self-revealing pages of Catullus of such an intimacy with him as would justify such a liberty. The probability is that it was meant to be read by Catullus' friends rather than by Sestius.

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NOTE ON P. RENDEL HARRIS 158

Professor J. E. Powell¹ has given us the following text of P. Rendel Harris 158, verso, lines 2-3: τὸν θεὸν τὸν φυλάσσοντα {ὅ} ἡμᾶς <ἐ>φρόντισεν ἐμοῦ ὅτι ἀποτε<τέ>νεκα εἰς τὴν πόλιν. οὐκ εὔρον τί ποιήσεν. . . . A brief discussion of line 2 has recently come from Professor G. Ghedini,² who rightly prefers ὑμᾶς to ἡμᾶς on the basis of the recto, line 3, τὸν θεὸν τὸν φυλάσσοντά σε, and rejects <ἐ>φρόντισεν for an imperative. On the latter point Ghedini is not entirely clear; he seems to suggest φρόντισε{ν} = φρόντισαι, but the active imperative φρόντισον is surely more natural. So far, at any rate, Ghedini and I are in substantial agreement, but I am unable to join him and Powell in their belief in the very strange ἀποτε<τέ>νεκα, a supposedly new perfect of ἀποτείνω. I suggest ἀπ' ὅτεν ἔκα, i.e., ἀφ' ὅτε ἦκα, and continue the sentence beyond πόλιν: "By the God who guards you, take thought for me since from the time that I came to the city I have not found anything to do." The same use of ἀφ' ὅτε may be observed in P. Michigan III, 203, 9, ἀφ' ὅτε ἦλ<λ>αγμαί εἰ[s] Ψέλκιν, and P. Oxyrhynchus III, 528, 9, ἀφ' ὅτε ἐλουσάμην μετ' ἐσοῦ. Since the papyrus is so defective in its orthography, I give a version of the sentence with corrected spelling: τὸν θεὸν τὸν φυλάσσοντα ὑμᾶς φρόντισον ἐμοῦ ὅτι ἀφ' ὅτε ἦκα εἰς τὴν πόλιν οὐκ εὔρον τι ποιῆσαι (or εὔρον τί ποιῆσαι).

HERBERT C. YOUTIE


UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

¹ J. Enoch Powell, *The Rendel Harris Papyri of Woodbrooke College, Birmingham*, ed. with translation and notes (Cambridge, 1936).

² Giuseppe Ghedini, "Note a tre lettere cristiane in P. Har.," *Aegyptus*, XVII (1937), 100.

A NEW SOURCE FOR THE TEXT OF
APOLLODORUS' *BIBLIOTHECA*

In a paper in *TAPA*, LXVI (1935), 296-313, I set forth the view that Laud. gr. 55 (O, fifteenth century) was copied from Paris. gr. 2722 (R, fourteenth century) and was in turn the archetype of all the other manuscripts (R^aX, sixteenth century). At that time one manuscript eluded my knowledge, as well as that of the editors of the text. A notebook of Politian's in Munich (Monac. gr. 182) contains excerpts entitled ἐκ τῆς ἀπολλοδώρου τοῦ ἀθηναίου βιβλιοθήκης and subscribed τέλος *Flor. in Pauli 7 Septembris 1482*. They occupy twenty-nine large pages (fols. 76^v-90^v), closely written in Greek and Latin promiscuously. They cover the same extent of text as O and its derivatives, beginning δ οἰρανὸς πρῶτος and ending *Theseus Sinon occidit*. But they were not taken from O or its derivatives; for they do not have the lacuna at page 65, 14 f. Wagner, where O omitted a whole line of R (M, fol. 81^v, "Ex Alceo et Astydamea pelopis vel ut quidam Laone Gunei vel ut alii"). They were, therefore, probably taken from R itself. This becomes important when we recall that R is now only partially preserved. Out of twenty-nine leaves only seventeen are extant. For the lost portions the future text may rely on M as well as O. M will be very difficult to use, however, since the writing is almost illegible and the text is excerpted and often paraphrased in Latin. Nevertheless M would sometimes change the reading. An example occurs in the third line from the beginning, where EM have κοῖον γύην, while OR^aX edd. have γύην κοῖον. The stemma shows the relation of the chief sources of the text.



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HOWALD SCHOLARSHIP

The Ohio State University has been enabled by the late Ferdinand Howald to offer the Elizabeth Clay Howald Scholarship, carrying a stipend of \$3,000. The scholarship is open to any person who has shown marked ability in some field of study and who has in progress promising research. The award for 1937 was made to Dr. K. M. Abbott, of the department of classical languages of the Ohio State University. Further details and application blanks for appointment as of March 1, 1939, will be received by writing to the Dean of the Graduate School, Ohio State University.

J. B. TITCHENER

BOOK REVIEWS

Greek Lyric Poetry from Alcman to Simonides. By C. M. BOWRA. New York: Oxford University Press, 1936. Pp. x+490. \$7.50.

This book, even if expensive, is one of the most fascinating, important, and learned that have appeared in recent years in the field of Greek literature. Papyri and inscriptions have increased our texts. Archeological, historical, and linguistic researches have raised many a new question in Greek lyric poetry, so that such a book is much needed. Perhaps more books and treatises on the subject have been printed than is indicated by the statement that "in the last fifty years no comprehensive book on the Greek lyric poets has been published." Farnell, *Greek Lyric Poetry* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1891); Smyth, *Greek Melic Poets* (London: MacMillan & Co., 1900); Wilamowitz, *Die Textgeschichte der griechischen Lyriker* (Berlin: Weidmann, 1901); Zambaldi, *Antologia della lirica greca* (Rome: Albrighi, 1912); Fraccaroli, *I Lirici greci* (Turin: Bocca, 1913); Bergk, *Poetae lyriici Graeci* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1914); Bethe, *Griechische Lyrik* (Berlin: Teubner, 1920); Edmonds, *Lyra Graeca* (London: Heinemann, 1922-27); Lavagnini, *I Lirici greci* (Turin: Paravia, 1923); Lavagnini, *Nuova antologia della lirica greca* (Turin: Paravia, 1931); but especially the long treatment in Schmid-Staehlin, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur* (Munich: Beck, 1929), include even Pindar and Bacchylides, whom Bowra omits, dealing with only seven of the canonical nine lyric poets.¹ Furthermore there are many books on the individual poets, such as my two books on Sappho (known to Diehl, *Anthologia lyrica Graeca* [Leipzig: Teubner, 1936], but not to Bowra)², in which some of Bowra's ideas have been anticipated.

After an introductory chapter Bowra reviews the seven lyric poets: Aleman, Stesichorus, Alcaeus, Sappho,³ Ibycus, Anacreon, and Simonides

¹ Professor Bowra writes me that he has now withdrawn the statement which I criticized in my book *Pindar* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1936), p. 24, that "the character Pindar's poems reveal is so simple, so childish, that a few lines tell everything."

² *Sappho and Her Influence*, in the series "Our Debt to Greece and Rome" (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1924), and Miller-Robinson, *The Songs of Sappho* (with Greek text, translation, and commentary; Lexington, Ky.: Maxwellton Co., 1925). Bowra's ideas also about the ape in Pindar (*Harvard Studies in Class. Phil.*, XLVIII [1937], 9 ff.) which he says "modern scholars have not noticed" were anticipated by McDermott in his Johns Hopkins dissertation and in *Trans. Amer. Phil. Assoc.*, LXVI (1935), 169 ff.

³ Bowra (p. 240) says that "here is some of the greatest poetry in the world." On p. 247 he calls Sappho "the most gifted woman who has ever written poetry."

both from a literary and from a historical point of view, with a detailed criticism of their fragments. Several new theses and some original hypotheses are presented, so that the book is original. Several emendations are incorporated in the Greek texts, which are always translated to show the meaning—a most excellent feature. Of course a really comprehensive study would have considered the tremendous influence of the *Anthologia lyrica* on later literature and given some literary parallels, as I have tried to do in the case of Sappho. But it must be said that Bowra combines a rare knowledge of literature, history, and archeology and makes his chapters the best which have ever been written on these lyric poets. There is also a much-needed chapter on Attic drinking-songs,⁴ on which Farnell also has a chapter. There are appendixes on "The Chronology of Sappho and Alcaeus," "The Song of Hybrias the Cretan," "Critical Notes," "The Popular Origins of Aeolic Metres," "Epistula Sapphus Phaoni," an Index of Greek Words, and a General Index. In the main Bowra has used the newest discoveries. He knows the epigrams found in the agora and accepts Oliver's attribution to Simonides and Aeschylus. He gives the Greek text on page 356,⁵ reading

ἀνδρῶν τῶνδ' ἀρετὴ [σχέσει κλέος ἀφθιτον] αἰεὶ,
[ἀντίον ἦοι] Περσῶν [ἐν Μαραθῶνι θάνον·]
ἔσχον γὰρ περὶ τῇ [ν βαρβαρόφθονον αὐτῇ]ν,
ἡλλά[δα μ]ὲ πᾶσαν δούλιο[ν] ἔμαρ ἰδέν[ν].

Bowra was unable to refer to the fact that perhaps part of Simonides' couplet (p. 336; repeated also p. 416) on Harmodius and Aristogeiton has also been discovered in the agora.⁶ I am also inclined to disagree with Bowra's translation of the first line of the popular Harmodius hymn, traditional as it is. How could the tyrannicides have hid their swords in a bough of myrtle (pp. 416 and 420)? They wore the myrtle on their heads as guests at a banquet singing scolia did, and the first line, ἐν μύρτου κλαδί τὸ ξίφος φορήσω, means, as Vollgraff in *Mnemosyne*, XLIX (1921), 246-50 (to which there is no reference), pointed out: "In a myrtle bough [i.e., wearing a wreath of myrtle leaves] I

⁴ In the *Classical Weekly*, X (1917), 138-42, I have considered the literary importance and influence of the Harmodius hymn.

⁵ Professor Bowra cites some of the literature, calling the epigraphist who does not accept Oliver's conclusions "Peck" instead of "Peck," but he might have added Kirchner, *Imagines inscriptionum Atticarum*, p. 12, No. 18, Pl. IX; Wilhelm, *Anzeiger Akad. Wien*, 1934, pp. 89-107; and Oliver, *Amer. Jour. Phil.*, LVI (1935), 193-201, which appeared some nine months before Bowra's book. In Aeschylus' defeated epigram Oliver and Meritt now read in l. 1: ἐν ἄρα τοῖσ' ἀδάμ[as ἐν στέθει θυμὸς] ἦοι αἰχμὴν. Bowra reads ἐν (misprint for ἐν) ἄρα τοῖσ' ἀδάμ[αστος ἐν φρεσὶ θυμὸς] (for θυμὸς), etc. Wilhelm reads the same but ἀδάμαντος for ἀδάμαστος. Hiller reads ἀδάμ[αντι πεφραγμένον ἔτορ]. A member of the Austrian Archaeological School in Athens has recently read a paper on this inscription and will soon publish his version.

⁶ Cf. *Ill. London News*, CLXXXIX (1936), 118; *Amer. Jour. Arch.*, XL (1936), 190. The fragment reads Ἀρμόδιος πατρίδα γέν' ἔθεν. Only the first word is preserved in Simonides, so that the authorship of Simonides is uncertain.

shall carry my sword." Bowra's knowledge of Greek vases seems to be limited to Beazley's *Attische Vasenmaler*, which he often cites, but it is not illustrated. So for the stamnos (p. 420) at Würzburg (not Wurzburg) a reference to Langlotz, *Wagner-Museum der Universität Würzburg, griechische Vasen* (Munich: Obernetter, 1932), Plates CLXXXII-CLXXXIII, where there are good illustrations, would be better. Moreover, there are many other vases which show the influence of the group.⁷

Another general criticism is that Greek texts are not always cited with the numbers in the Teubner text of Diehl. Those of Sappho and Alcaeus are cited with Lobel's numbering, though those of Aleman and Anacreon follow Diehl's numbers. Probably the last edition (1936) of Diehl's *Anthologia lyrica Graeca* appeared too late to be used, and this is to be regretted as Diehl's text differs very much from Bowra's. Here are a few details to be considered for a second edition which such a valuable book is certain to have. In the chapter on Aleman,⁸ where (pp. 37-39) a good Greek text and translation are given, I miss (p. 31) a reference to Miss Wilson's very important and detailed discussion of the text of Aleman's *Partheneion* in the *American Journal of Philology*, XXXIII (1912), 57-67. On page 34, line 4 from the bottom, read "Porphyryon" for "Porpyrion." On page 41, in the commentary on the word *ὀρθρία*⁹ or *ὀρθία* (l. 61 in Aleman's *Partheneion*), a reference to the long discussion by H. J. Rose in Dawkins' book, *The Sanctuary of Artemis Orthia* (pp. 400-406, where Aleman is cited), would be in order. The song is not sung "at night" but at dawn in honor of 'Αῶρις, "the Lady of the Dawn," who even appears on *lebetes gamikoi* representing the epaulia of the new bride. On page 51 *γρυπές* should be *γρύπες* (same mistake in Index). On page 95, note 2 (also p. 116, n. 1), there is a reference to Jacobsthal, *Aktaiens Tod*. There is no such book. (The reference must be to an article in the *Marburger Jahrbuch für Kunstwiss.*, Vol. V (1929), or to *Die melischen Reliefs*, pp. 31-32.) On page 99, with regard to the horse's name Cyllarus used by Stesichorus it is said that "the name is almost unknown" and "we do not know from where Stesichorus took it." Bowra himself on page 116 refers to the name on a famous vase of Execias (for which a reference to Furtwängler-Reichhold, *Griechische Vasenmalerei*, Pls. CXXXI-CXXXII, should be given). There he says that "its presence may well be due to the poet's popularization of it." Elsewhere (p. 108)¹⁰ Bowra says that "the painters drew on Stesichorus rather

⁷ Cf. Washburn, *Amer. Jour. Arch.*, XXII (1918), 146-53, where many examples are cited, and others could be added. Nothing is said by Bowra about the sculptures, tesserae, coins, and reliefs which represent Harmodius and Aristogeiton or about the tremendous influence of this scoliom on later literature (cf. my article cited in n. 4).

⁸ On Aleman cf. now Diehl, *Anthologia lyrica Graeca*, II (1935), 7-38.

⁹ Cf. also the Treaty of Philip with the Chalcidians, which I published in *Trans. Amer. Phil. Assoc.*, LXV (1934), 120-21.

¹⁰ H. R. W. Smith does not believe that Chalcidian vases were made in Magna Graecia, as is said (p. 108, n. 1), but rather in Caere in Etruria.

han Stesichorus on them." There is little evidence of this and the opposite might be true. In any case Cyllarus is not a rare name for a horse.¹¹ It is the name (written with koppa) of two horses on a Corinthian olpe published in *Ath. Mitt.*, IV (1879), Plate XVIII,¹² which must date between 575 and 550 B.C., and such a Corinthian name might have influenced Stesichorus instead of vice versa. On pages 109–10, for the chest of Cypselus we need a reference not only to Pausanias but to some reconstruction or discussion of all the problems, such as von Massow's article in *Ath. Mitt.*, XLI (1916), 1–117. On page 135,¹³ to support the idea that Stesichorus' lines on an eclipse come from a paean, it might have been mentioned that Pindar's ninth paean deals with an eclipse. On page 144,¹⁴ because the famous lines on a lonely night are a folksong is no argument that Sappho did not write them. The "weaving song" is also a folksong which Sappho is setting to new words and is surely by Sappho, since Horace imitated it in the twelfth ode of the third book. See my *Sappho and Her Influence*, pages 77–79. Burns did the same in *Auld Lang Syne*. Moreover, Ovid in his *Heroides* xv. 155–56 seems to refer to these lines as Sappho's when he wrote *Sappho desertos cantat amores | hactenus, ut media cetera nocte silent*. On page 146 read μέλναιμ' for μέλμναιμ'. On page 147, in Alcaeus (Diehl, *op. cit.*, fasc. 4, p. 116, No. 54, to which no reference is given) for "Ἀρηι Bowra makes good the substitution of ἄδην, but Diehl reads βέλεος, not βέλεος, and ἔργον, not τῶργον. On page 150, in fragment 6 (which is in *ibid.*, p. 119), Bowra reads λάχη, but translates as if he read λάβη. He keeps the manuscript τῶ and well reads τῶ πάροιθα μ[ώμω for τῶν πάροιθα μ[όχλων. On page 151 Bowra reads πέρ βίαν, but πρὸς βίαν is better in view of Sophocles, fragment 655, and Aristophanes' *Acharnians* 73. 'Ἐπεὶ δὴ is preferable to Bowra's ἐπείδη. On page 153, for βαρυδαίμονος it is better to read βορυδαίμονος. On page 154, perhaps Bowra's 'Ἀτρείδα[ν γένει is better than Diehl's γάμω. On page 156, note 3, Bowra reads ὄχθοις, Diehl ὄχθαις, and, p. 157, Bowra reads ἐνθα νόμος θάμ' ἐν νην, Diehl: ἐνθα νόμος θάμ' ἐν[εστ' ὀρ[ίνην. On page 162 Bowra emends δάμναις (still read by Diehl) to δάμναι. On page 163 Diehl's reading οὐδεν seems to be better than Lobel's οὐδ' ἐν adopted by Bowra. On page 164 Bowra, following Lobel, gives a very different text from Diehl, who rightly refuses to insert, as Lobel does, in Alcaeus' poem the lines of Sappho (Diehl, *op. cit.*, frag. 89, p. 55). On page 167 Diehl reads, following the manuscripts, καὶ δ' δ' ἄερρε κυλίχλαις μεγάλαις, αἶτα, ποικίλαις; but Bowra keeps Lobel's αἶψ' ἀπὸ πασσάλων, wrongly changing ἀπὸ to ἀπό. Diehl's λαθικάδεα is better than Bowra's λαθικάδεον. On page 168

¹¹ Cf. Vergil *Georg.* iii. 90; Statius *Theb.* vi. 327; *Silv.* i. 1. 54; Val. Flaccus i. 426; Martial iv. 25. 6; viii. 21. 5; viii. 28. 8; Claudian viii. 559; and Jeschonnek, *De nominibus quae Graeci pecudibus domesticis indiderunt* (1885), p. 48. The word is derived from κυλλός, as Jeschonnek said long before Bowra, and not from κέλλειν, as the *Etym. Mag.* and *CIG* 8157 say.

¹² Cf. also Payne, *Necrocorinthia*, p. 165, No. 37.

¹³ In n. 5 read *griechischen* for *griecischen*.

¹⁴ N. 2, for Σάφους read Σαφούς.

Bowra wrongly reads βά[ρυν ὥρισε | με]λαίνας χρόνος. Βά[ρυν should be βό[ρυν and so it is better to read βα[σίλευς διδοί | με]λαίνας χρόνος. Bowra's χρόνος, as his translation shows, is a mistake. On page 170 in the lines about graceful Menon (which remind me of the kalos name, Menon, in later times at Olynthus, *AJA*, XXXIX [1935], 222-24, and in Xen. *Anab.* ii. 6. 14),¹⁵ it is better to read ἐπ' ὄνασιν than ἐπόνασιν. On page 174 Bowra reads ἄγνα for the manuscripts' αἰγαῖς. ἄγναις is nearer to the manuscripts but is an unusual Lesbian form of the dative and ἄγναισι is unmetrical. On page 176, for the usual restoration ἰλλάω | θύ[μ]ωι Bowra ingeniously reads εὐμένε | θύ[μ]ωι. On page 178 Diehl restores δ' ὀνέτελλ'; Bowra, ἄ[νεβλαστ']. Bowra restores γύναικα; Diehl, πόθητον. Diehl reads ἀγαύω; Bowra, δ' ἔγεντο, arguing against Jurenka's δ' ἐμείχθη. On page 182, for περπέβεται read περβέβα[τ]αι. Bowra suggests γ[εώμορο]ι, which is much better than γεώτομοι. To support it I might cite the word γάμοροι in the Parian Marble.¹⁶ On page 183 there is no tau preserved and it is better to read for Bowra's γᾶς τ' ἀπὺ πειράτων, γᾶς ἀπὺ περ[ρ]άτων. For ποικιλόδειροι I prefer ποικιλόδερροι. On page 187, note 3, read, for *Jahrh.*, *Jahreshefte*. On page 191, for "fair swift sparrows" I prefer "birds of Aphrodite" or "doves"; cf. my discussion of στροῦθοι in Miller-Robinson, *Songs of Sappho*, page 93. Edmonds translates wrongly "swans." For golden cups compare such as that from Dendra (see Persson, *Royal Tombs at Dendra*, Pl. I). On page 202 the story of Phaon's love affair is not a "creation of the New Comedy," for the folklore story of Phaon occurs on fifth-century vases, and the story was even in a play of the Old Comedy, Plato's *Phaon* (cf. Robinson, *Sappho and Her Influence*, pp. 40-41 and 107-8). There is surely a kernel of truth in Sappho's love for Phaon, even if the legend of the Leucadian leap is later.¹⁷ On page 204, in the third stanza, Bowra reads ὡς τὸ πᾶν] σέβας Τροία[ς ὅ]λεσ[σαι]; but on page 448 he reads ὡς τὸ πρὶν] σέβας Τροία[ς ὅ]λεσ[θαι]. I prefer Diehl's reading κρίνεν ἄρ]ιστον [ὅς τὸ πᾶν] σέβας Τροία[ς ὅ]λεσ[εν]. For οὐδ' ἐν read οὐδεν. I should read μᾶλλον. Bowra well restores the fourth stanza, but on page 204 reads καρδίαν and, on page 449, καρδιάν. For a very different but possible restoration of this third stanza (adopted in Miller-Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. 235) compare Agar, *Classical Review*, XXVIII (1914), 189-90 (unknown even to Edmonds and Diehl). Agar also has a good restoration for the sixth stanza, omitted entirely by Bowra. On page 213 we have the text of the famous second ode, where I am glad to see that Bowra keeps the reading βρόχε' and does not read a proper name as Edmonds does (Βρόχε). Compare also Milne, who in *Symbolae Osloenses*, XIII (1934), 19-21, reads Βρόχυλα. I read¹⁸ βροχέως, με φώνας οὐδεν, Diehl reads βρόχε', ὡς με φώνας; but Bowra, φώναισ' οὐδ' ἐν. Bowra, quoting A. G. Page, restores (p. 447) φαίνου' ἀλαία. Long ago Paton¹⁹ suggested Ἀγαλλι and this reading is now accepted

¹⁵ cf. Robinson-Fluck, *Greek Love-Names*, pp. 60, 151.

¹⁶ *IG*, XII, 5, 444, l. 52.

¹⁷ Cf. Zielinski, *Ktito*, XXIII (1930), 1-19.

¹⁸ Miller-Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

¹⁹ *Class. Rev.*, XIV (1900), 223.

by Diehl. Bowra omits entirely the line ἀλλὰ πὰν τόλματον ἐπεὶ καὶ πένητα, which Milne says "has been suspected, without justification." Diehl reads ἐπεὶ κεν ἦι τὰ.²⁰ On page 218, for "echoes of the poem" on the symptoms of love compare Robinson, *Sappho and Her Influence*, *passim*. On page 230 Bowra reads ἐκλάθου[ο ταῖσι π[ά]ροιθ' ἀχέων | θύμον ἐδάμ]να and omits the last eight lines.²¹ The papyrus has τοῖσι and, if Bowra objects to τοῖσι, it is possible to read with Diehl ἐκλόιτ'] ὅτοισι π[ά]ροιθ' ἀχέων | τῶμον ἐδάμ]να. I read καὶ λόγοις] ὅτοισι πάροιθ' ἀχέων [ἄμμον ἐδάμ]να | [κῆρ], etc. On page 245, in translating γλυκύπικρον, why reverse the order and say "bitter sweet"? Swinburne, in *Tristram of Lyonesse*, can speak of "Sweet Love, that are so bitter," and Tennyson, in *Lancelot and Elaine*, has the same order. On pages 258-99, for Samian temples, statues, and other forms of art we need a reference at least to Buschor, *Ath. Mitt.*, XLV (1930), 1-94; to the whole volume, *ibid.*, LVIII (1933), 1-253, and to his book, *Altsamische Standbilder* (Berlin: Mann, 1934-35). For example, the statue of Aeaces to which Bowra refers (p. 260), with no citation of any publication, is there pictured on Plates CXLI-CXLIII. We now even know the name of an important early Samian sculptor, Geneleos (*ibid.*, p. 26). On page 283 the student of literature familiar with Schiller's *Die Kraniche des Ibykus* and with the proverbial "cranes of Ibycus"²² will be surprised to have the popular story dismissed so briefly with a bare reference to "the birds who saw the murder." On page 300, as there is no ὁ in the manuscript, πᾶσι κύκῃς is better than παῖς ὁ κύκῃς. On page 308, for the British Museum cylix representing Anacreon see *Jahreshefte Oest. Arch. Inst.*, III (1900), 89. For the lecythus of Gales representing Anacreon a reference is needed to some illustration such as that in Poulsen's "Iconographic Studies," *From the Collections of the Ny Carlsberg Glyptothek* (Copenhagen: Levin & Munksgaard, 1931), page 14, Figure 12, where, pages 1-15, Poulsen discusses the Copenhagen and other copies of the bronze statue of Anacreon which stood on the Acropolis, to which Bowra refers without citing any reference except an antiquated book of 1845 by Birch, *Observations on the Figures of Anacreon*. We miss a reference to Theocritus' epigram (16) which calls Anacreon "one of the greatest of the ancient song-writers," and to Athenaeus 429b who says that "the majority do not know that he was always sober when he wrote and never drank without compulsion." Surely a chapter on Anacreon should refer to the Anacreontics, those graceful trifles so well translated by Thomas Moore. On page 318 no reference is given for the Cean sixth-century kouros or the colossal lion. On page 328 it may be of interest to note that Landor wrongly assigns the lines of Simonides to Pindar when he has Aspasia say to Cleone (XXXVIII) that "the animals we call 'half-asses'—Pindar calls 'the daughters of the tempest-footed steeds.'"

²⁰ Cf. now Milne in *Hermes*, LXXI (1936), 126-28.

²¹ For my restored text cf. Miller-Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. 230.

²² Cf. Plutarch *De garrulitate* xiv.

On page 335 the vase of Duris with a representation of Memnon is not a plate but a cylix, and we need a reference to some illustration such as that in Pottier, *Vases antiques du Louvre: Album*, Plate CVIII. On page 354, for the Leningrad stamnos representing Danae see Beazley, *Attic Red-figured Vases in American Museums*, Figure 28, and for the Boston hydria compare *ibid.*, Figure 32. Compare also, for the story of Danae, Tillyard, *The Hope Vases*, Plate XXII, and page 81 for other references; also *Jahreshefte Oest. Arch. Inst.*, XII (1909), 165-71; Aurigemma, *Il R. Museo di Spina* (1935), page 68, Plate XXXIII (by the Eucharides painter). In the last line of page 354 read "vase" for "base." On page 357, line 3, read "Artaphernes" for "Artaphrenes." On page 362, for *πανδαῖσι* read *πανδ[α]μῶσι*. On page 366, instead of *CIG* 1446 refer to Tod and Wace, *Catalogue of the Sparta Museum*, page 81, No. 691, and to *IG*, V, 589, which, with many other inscriptions, shows that we should read *Καρτείου βουκέρα*, not *οἰκέρα* as Bowra does. On page 402, for the "vase of Exekias which shows the god in his vine-clad boat" no reference is given. See Furtwängler-Reichhold, *Griechische Vasenmalerei*, Plate XLII. The boat is not vine-clad. On page 435 *γεγονία* does not mean "born" but "flourished," as Rohde long ago proved.²³ So Sappho was born 635-630 B.C. and not 612-609 B.C., being "slightly younger than Alcaeus." On the spits dedicated by Rhodopis at Delphi compare my article in *Classical Philology*, XX (1925), 343-44. On page 464 it is not stated where the tombstone from Halone with the name Scamandronymus is published.

There are many more notes which I should like to make, but space fails me. Let me only say in conclusion that no one interested in Greek literature can afford to neglect this stimulating and learned book.

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Richard Porson: A Biographical Essay. By M. L. CLARKE. Cambridge: At the University Press; New York: Macmillan, 1937.

The memory of Richard Porson has in our day, so far as the generally literary public is concerned, faded out almost to the vanishing-point. To a few who are familiar with the gossip annals at the turn of the nineteenth century his name may be associated with a reputation for Greek scholarship, housed incongruously in a witty and eccentric slave to drink. Porson's friends and contemporaries were convinced, and justly so, that he was a consummate Greek scholar, certainly the greatest of his time, and it grieved them that he himself refused to justify their belief by producing monuments of erudition. "I can be known only by my notes, and I am quite satisfied if three hundred years hence it shall be said that one Porson did a good deal for the text of

²³ Cf. his article on *γέγονε* in *Rh. Mus.*, XXXIII, 161-220 [*Kleine Schriften*, I (1901), 172-76].

Euripides." Only a little more than one hundred of the three hundred years have elapsed, and it would doubtless surprise Porson himself to know that in the restricted circles of Greek scholarship his fame has increased rather than diminished, although the audience to which his studies could be known or make appeal is, at least relatively, far smaller. For in his day Greek scholarship still enjoyed recognition as a part of the general domain of letters, where now it has retreated to a small, though still not undistinguished, corner of scholastic activity.

It seems surprising that in that time of caste and privilege a shy, reticent young man, with rather less than no family connections, should have made his way from the humble status of a fellow of Trinity, at a stipend of seventy-five pounds, to a place in the best literary circles of his time. His position as a fellow leads one to think of him as a don busy with undergraduates in Cambridge; but, in fact, he seems never to have acted as a tutor, and he preferred lodgings in London to his rooms in Trinity. Here he moved in a gossipy set, whose life and interests are recorded in the characteristic *-ana* and *-iana* of that age. With the exception of Johnson (who died in 1784), Porson was known to and commented upon by nearly everyone who has left a record of that time, rich in celebrities. Mr. Clarke laments justly that the materials for his life are of this fragmentary and unauthentic kind. However, considering Porson's own unambitious and anonymous habit, it is remarkable that they are so abundant; and what such sources lack in precision they gain sometimes in characterizing anecdote, not unlike the gossipy biographers from whom Plutarch put together most of his lives.

But Porson's contemporary fame did not rest exclusively upon his scholarship. He was a character and a personality, which his time recognized, in spite of all that his habits did to forfeit such recognition. Amid all the eccentric and whimsical oddities of his life and demeanor there was an underlying simplicity and soundness, a shrewd practical wisdom, which saw through and demolished sham and ostentation in an age in which these abounded. He was fundamentally a plain man of the people, from whom he was sprung, and one can almost imagine that at times he felt an incongruity between his own tastes and character and the position to which his genius and his academic title had assigned him. He used frequently to regret that he had not gone to America in his youth and settled there. "What would you have done without books?" "I should have done without them," was his reply.

He does not appear ever to have been a prodigious student, and, so far as the record shows, his unique mastery of Greek was more a matter of swift intuition and of retentive memory than of laborious study. He did what he liked, and what he liked was the Greek drama, artistic calligraphy, the writing of satirical squibs on political, literary, and academic topics of the day—and convivial companionship and conversation. He was conscious of his power, and at times entertained large projects such as a complete Aeschylus or

Aristophanes, and actually embarked on a complete Euripides, of which the four plays upon which his fame chiefly rests were eventually published. But his mood was desultory and turned easily from a larger program to the interests of the moment. One must regret the dissipation of great abilities, and yet have a certain sympathy with a life lived day by day, not with reference to the ambitions of his friends nor the verdict of posterity. The wisdom which Menippus learned from Tiresias in the lower world was not far from Porson's creed and practice: ὁ τῶν ιδιωτῶν ἄριστος βίος καὶ σωφρονέστερος . . . ὡς τοῦτο μόνον ἐξ ἅπαντος θηράσῃ, ὅπως τὸ παρὸν εὖ θέμενος παραδράμῃς γελῶν τὰ πολλὰ καὶ περὶ μηδὲν ἐσπουδακώς. In a letter to Burney of 1789, Parr urges his correspondent to rouse Porson "to write some book, to fix upon some profession, to secure some independence. Dum quid sit dubitat, life runs away; and yet the rogue loves good port and good tobacco—good things, but better non deficiente crumena." When because of his unwillingness to take orders he was obliged to resign his fellowship, a group of admiring friends raised a sum of nearly two thousand pounds, which yielded him an annuity of one hundred. It was a remarkable recognition of his genius, and not less a testimony to personal regard, for a young man only a little past thirty, who as yet had written only a few reviews and the controversial letters to Travis, in the *Gentleman's Magazine*. Such a gift would, I imagine, be impossible in our day even for the greatest promise, and it reminds us that the age of patronage for literature and scholarship had not yet passed. We are prone to forget perhaps that under the anonymous cover of academic endowments it still persists.

If today the name of Porson is mentioned in academic circles it will first of all elicit the remark, "ah yes, the dipsomaniac, the fellow who would even drink ink"; or another will recall the epigram about "the Germans at Greek are sadly to seek—all save only Hermann, and Hermann's a German"; or perhaps the rhyme about getting "drunk with Brunck, or more drunken with Ruhnken." Finally some Greek student will make attempt to explain "Porson's Law" to the uninitiated. It is a meager outline, but it touches his most essential titles to memory—his scholarship, his whimsical humor, and the vice which submerged his genius and brought him to an untimely end. Of Porson's devotion to the bottle, or the tankard, which in our day would have made academic tenure or advancement impossible, there is much that can be said in extenuation. It was the habit of his time and environment, and with him it was only looked upon as extreme and sometimes as disagreeable. It loses something of its character as a vice when we know the company in which it was indulged—scholarly clerics, as Mr. Clarke says, public men, and literary figures, most of whom have some place in the record of the literary history of that time. Still, however much the habit may be condoned, it went far to reinforce a natural apathy and lack of ambition from which Porson only occasionally roused himself.

His unambitious reticence about his own work is perhaps without parallel in the history of scholarship. His corrections to the Glasgow *Aeschylus* were

anonymous, and their source could only be guessed from their excellence. His editions of Euripides until the last one, the *Medea*, came out without his name. The largest group of his corrections to Athenaeus and other writers were collected by devoted younger friends from loose jottings on bits of paper and from the margins of his books. The famous "Supplement" to the second edition of the *Hecuba* was written to vindicate his views of the Attic trimeter against the criticisms and errors of Herrmann, but with such simple objectivity that the name of Herrmann is not once mentioned. He disliked Herrmann and his youthful arrogance, but his feeling only emerged in the playful epigram alluded to above, which characteristically he attributes "to an Etonian, a friend of mine, in imitation of Phocylides' saw."¹

The asperities of scholars and editors toward others he disliked. In reviewing Brunck's Aristophanes, he censures the editor's abuse of meritorious predecessors: "If Mr. Brunck is better qualified than Kuster and Bergler to publish Aristophanes let him give God thanks and make no boast of it." He disliked the flattery and exaggerated estimates of his friends, and he rebuked Parr's voluble excess by asking "what right he had to tell the height of a man he cannot measure"? The writing of Greek and Latin verses he approved as a useful exercise, but their publication was a piece of foolish ostentation. Of Dawes he said that, having published in his youth some Greek verses, he afterward became sensible of his error and chose rather to read good Greek than to write bad. On the use of Latin in scholarship (which in his day was obligatory), he held that "our style should be the most unambitious, we should use the most obvious and simple diction; if we cannot present a resemblance let us not exhibit a caricature." Such principles he carried over to his English composition, which stands out in strong contrast to the pompous manner of the age which produced Johnson and Gibbon.

No better specimen of it can be adduced than his characterization of Gibbon's history (in the Preface to the *Letters to Travis*, pp. xxvii ff.), which is one piece of Porson's work which has maintained itself as a classic of English criticism, not less true in substance than it is vigorous and witty in form. Gibbon in a note to the third volume had stirred up the old controversy (which Erasmus by omission had started) about the authenticity of the verse in John's First Epistle (5:7) on "the three heavenly witnesses." He was attacked for his impiety by Archdeacon Travis in a series of *Letters to Edward Gibbon*. Porson, irritated by the unscholarly character of Travis' attack, proceeded to demolish it in a series of letters to the *Gentleman's Magazine*, which

¹ It is worth noting perhaps in this connection that Porson's original epigram touched German ignorance of meters rather than Greek in general, as his English version says: Νήϊδες ἐστὲ μέτρων, ὧ Τείτορες, οὐχ ὁ μὲν, ὅς δ' οὐ | πάντες πλὴν Ἑρμάννος ὁ δ' Ἑρμάννος σφόδρα Τείτωρ. Another delightful bit of fooling, directed against Herrmann and professing to supply him with an example of unrestricted tribrachs, is less well known and worth quoting: ὁ μετρικός, ὁ σοφὸς ἄτοπα γέγραφε περὶ μέτρων. | ὁ μετρικός ἄμετρος ὁ σοφὸς ἄσοφος ἐγένετο. Both of these skits were contained in a private letter which was published without Porson's knowledge (Watson, p. 259).

were published under the title of *Letters to Travis* in 1790. Gibbon in his *Memoirs* says of it: "I consider Mr. Porson's answer to Archdeacon Travis as the most acute and accurate piece of criticism which has appeared since the days of Bentley." This verdict from the great historian is the more noteworthy because, while vindicating the soundness of Gibbon's position, Porson did not hesitate to pass a general judgment on the unfairness of his attitude toward Christianity, "his rage for indecency," and the artificiality of his style: "he draws out the thread of his verbosity finer than the staple of his argument," and "sometimes in his attempt at elegance he loses sight of English and sometimes of sense."² But in spite of these strictures Gibbon was so much impressed that he invited Porson to call and expressed his indebtedness for the *Letters to Travis*, "though I must think that occasionally, while praising me, you have mingled a little acid with the sweet."

A fanciful picture of Porson as a judge of English poetry is given by Landor in his two Imaginary Conversations of Porson with Southey. They are Landor's vehicle for criticizing Wordsworth, but at the same time they are rich in apt and amusing observation on Porson himself. Landor, born in 1775, was not too young to have known Porson, and he had at all events a just appreciation of the keenness and simple directness of Porson's judgment, as well as of his wit and whimsies. Porson was a born wit and satirist, and with Horace he knew that laughter cuts deeper than vehemence or indignation. He used his gift more often for contemporary literary and political issues than for the criticism of classical studies, though here the examples are brilliant enough. The limits of Mr. Clarke's book do not permit him to be so abundant in illustration of this side of Porson's genius as one might wish, and he may too have felt restraint because of the uncertain authenticity of much that is attributed to him. Except in such a book as this few will have opportunity to read such delicious skits as his Greek and Latin versions of "Three Children Sliding on the Ice," aimed at the Ireland forgeries of Shakespeare; the "Imitations of Horace," with their amusing and vigorous thrusts at politics and religion, not to mention such longer pieces as "A New Catechism for the Swinish Multitude," or "The Salt-Box," a satire on the oral examinations of the time at the universities.

The subtitle of Mr. Clarke's little book, *A Biographical Essay*, might lead one to expect something more than the writer has offered. For the word "essay" seems to contain implications of a critical estimate which the work does not contain, and which indeed is disclaimed frankly in the Preface. Welcome as a sketch of Porson's life may be in view of the present inaccessibility of the almost forgotten life by J. S. Watson, of 1861 (which, however deserves more praise than is here awarded to it), yet far more welcome and important would be an estimate of the place of Porson in the history of

² A text which has been well annotated by Alice Meynell in "A Corrupt Following," in *Second Person Singular and Other Essays*.

English classical scholarship from Bentley to the great German revival at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Such a survey would, I believe, award to Porson a much greater significance than the meager influences which Mr. Clarke attributes to him in the closing pages of his book. Porson did not, of course, stand alone. For though he was in a peculiar degree self-taught, he selected his own teachers from among the best of his English predecessors, Bentley, Dawes, Tyrwhitt, and learned from them the habit of precise observation of metrical usage and verbal idiom, which has revolutionized the text of the Greek dramatists and made them intelligible and readable as they had never been before. Though Porson was no teacher and, strictly speaking, had no direct pupils, yet he established a well-defined English school—Dobree, Monk, Elmsley—which looked up to him as master and carried on his tradition for a considerable time after his death. It is to be hoped that Mr. Clarke will go on to some such study as this, for which the present work affords a good beginning. In the meantime it is perhaps not superfluous to call to the attention of a younger generation the generous and penetrating estimate of this period of English scholarship which Wilamowitz presented in the Introduction to the first edition of his *Herakles* (I, 227 ff.)—a book which has unfortunately become so rare as to belong almost in the category of collectors' items.

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Über die philosophische Bedeutung von Platons Mythen. By PAUL STÖCKLEIN. (*Philologus*, Supplementband XXX, Heft 3.) Leipzig, 1937. Pp. 58. Rm. 4.50.

No reader of Plato has ever failed to be impressed by the Platonic myths; no reader has failed to ask himself just what Plato meant by them. Are they a substitute for logic in regions that logic may not penetrate, or are they a poetic version of matters that logic can also deal with in its own way? Or are they a confession of impotence? The last hundred years have seen a rising tide of answers to these questions—a tide which has increased notably in recent years. No serious student of Plato now holds, with Hegel, Hirzel, Teichmüller, and Couturat, that the Platonic myths are of no philosophic significance. The tendency has been rather, with J. A. Stewart and V. Brochard, to regard the myths as expressions not, to be sure, of *ἐπιστήμη* but of *ὁρθὴ δόξα*. Stewart subtly analyzed the philosophical and psychological basis of the myths, partly in Kantian terminology, and illustrated them by comparison with other literature. Brochard, in a masterly little essay, argued that if Plato was to reckon both with Parmenides and with Heraclitus, both with being and with becoming, he must use the language both of logic and of myth; and "le mythe est l'expression de la probabilité" (p. 53). Karl Reinhardt's long and beautiful essay, like part of Stewart's book, attempts to dis-

cover what is significant in the several myths. Paul Friedländer's sympathetic study recognizes the various nuances of Plato's literary art and makes effective use of Dante's famous letter to Can Grande about the various modes of interpretation of his own masterpiece. But surely Friedländer overstates the case when he declares: "Nur wenn er uns zur Aktivität aufruft, hat der Mythos Wert" (p. 219). Percival Frutiger's searching work contains, along with much sound polemic against one-sided views, a new and valuable classification of the myths, discussions of their several sources and of Platonic style, and, what is of chief interest here, his own view of the philosophic value of the myths: namely, that they do not imply (as Teichmüller supposed) an abdication on the part of Plato's science, but rather that some of the myths (not all, as Zeller and Stewart would have it) imply a lacuna in the scientific understanding (pp. 218-20). These myths, at least, he regards as expressions of *ὁρθὴ δόξα*, the complement of *ἐπιστήμη*.¹

Unlike most of the writers just mentioned, Paul Stöcklein in his Würzburg dissertation severely limits his investigation to the philosophical significance of the myths. He holds that myth is justified for either of two reasons: because it sets forth what can never be reached by pure intellect (an *Überhaupt-nicht*) or because it deals with what is not yet, but may later be, so reached (a *Noch-nicht*). To the question why Plato's thought sometimes takes the form of myth he replies simply that the Platonic *Mythos* is *Vorstufe des Logos*—the first step toward science. All philosophical terminology (or indeed all language) is full of worn metaphors; the myth represents images in their pristine freshness and is a sign not of weakness but of strength.

Like Zeller,² Stöcklein believes that the myth does not express what the philosopher has already elsewhere expressed by dialectic, but anticipates what he cannot yet express conceptually. Except for a similar hint on the part of Schleiermacher,³ whose views of Platonic chronology are defective, Stöcklein's thesis appears to have had no precursor. Its validity rests on the possibility of tracing the development of at least some ideas from an earlier mythical treatment to a later abstract treatment; this in turn depends on some landmarks of Platonic chronology. And, finally, it rests on the assumption that myths have "meanings" which can be interpreted, not merely acted on, even if they are not, like allegories, to be unlocked by a special "key." It is difficult, to be sure, to distinguish in a myth between what is philosophically significant and what is mere poetic detail. Artistically, a myth is an end

¹ The chief works referred to in this paragraph are R. Hirzel, *Über das Rhetorische und seine Bedeutung bei Plato* (Leipzig, 1871); L. Couturat, *De Platoniciis mythis* (Paris, 1896); J. A. Stewart, *The Myths of Plato* (Oxford, 1905); V. Brochard, "Les Mythes dans la philosophie de Platon," in *Etudes de philosophie ancienne et de philosophie moderne* (Paris, 1912); K. Reinhardt, *Platons Mythen* (Bonn, 1927); P. Friedländer, "Mythos," in *Platon*, Vol. I (*Eidos, Paidia, Dialogos*: Berlin and Leipzig, 1928); P. Frutiger, *Les Mythes de Platon* (Paris, 1930).

² *Philosophie der Griechen*, II, Part I, 580.

³ *Platons Werke*, pp. 47 f.

in itself; philosophically, it should initiate a transition toward abstract thought. If it be urged that Plato sometimes follows a logical statement by a myth to the same effect (an important point), Stöcklein would admit the fact and explain it as sound pedagogy. He also observes that, though the psychology of the *Republic* is (probably) followed by the *Phaedrus* myth, the chief theme of the *Phaedrus* myth is not psychology but the idea of ἐρωτική μανία, which is rationally treated in the *Laws* and briefly also in the *Timaeus*.

The greater part of Stöcklein's work is devoted to an exposition of the progress from *Mythos* to *Logos* in Plato's treatment of several problems, all concerned with the ψυχή: immortality, rewards and punishments hereafter, moral freedom, divinity. This section is well worked out, as the following outline will indicate.

Socrates in the *Apology* regards the possibility of immortality as an open question. In the *Crito* there is a bit of myth in the speech of "The Laws" and their reference to Hades and judgment below (54b-e), but nothing dogmatic, nothing beyond popular belief. Toward the end of the *Gorgias*, however (a dialogue which Stöcklein, like Wilamowitz and others, believes to be the immediate record of Plato's new conviction, soon after the trial, that the soul of such a man as Socrates must be immortal), the veiled allusions of Calicles to the possible trial and death of the good man give the Platonic Socrates (the "most just man") his opportunity to set forth in a magnificent tale of judgment, rewards, and punishments hereafter his sanction for the paradoxical belief that justice in this life is to be preferred *quand même*. Unless there be hereafter a reversal of this world's injustices, the ordering of the κόσμος stands condemned. Noteworthy, too, in the *Gorgias* myth is not only the conception of the continuing life of the individual but his moral responsibility and therefore his moral freedom. So far, myth. The germs of dialectic enter with the ἀνάμνησις of the *Meno* (n.b. 86ab), and more particularly the *Phaedo*, whose ontological arguments justify the cheerful death of Socrates. (The *Republic*, too, should be mentioned here, though myth follows reasoning.)

The successive myths of the *Gorgias*, the *Phaedo*, and the *Republic* (the myth of Er) are likewise reviewed in relation to the idea of rewards and punishments hereafter. So much is familiar; more novel is the consideration together of passages on the wages of sin from the *Theaetetus* (176c ff.) and the *Laws* (728b), in which it appears that sinners must expect not merely judgment hereafter but the dread punishment *here* of moral degradation, which is self-punishment. Later in the *Laws* (899d-905d) Plato reverts to the divine moral economy and argues that God's ἐπιμέλεια for man and the σωτηρία καὶ ἀπερὶ τοῦ θλου demand the recompense of each soul hereafter. Here Plato's ideas converge; punishment once more seems transcendent, from without, yet the symbols of the myth (the "fiery men" of the *Republic*) have dropped out of sight.

Moral freedom, as we noted, is stipulated in the *Gorgias* myth; it is most effectively dramatized in the myth of Er, in the choice before the Moirai and

the spindle of Necessity, and summed up in the words of the "prophet" (*Rep.* 617de). As in the "Choice of Heracles" of Prodicus, a thousand acts of choice are symbolized in a single solemn choice. Plato recurs to the theme in the moral struggle of the *Phaedrus* myth (248b). The dialectical restatement comes in the *Laws* (904bc; cf. 900e): God left the building of our characters to our individual wills, for we make ourselves generally what we desire.

Stöcklein properly regards the treatment of the gods in the earlier books of the *Republic* as not forming the basis of a religious philosophy. The *Timaeus*, especially in the account of the δημιουργός, begins to provide such a basis, in truly mythical form (not merely popular mythology). But it is in the *Theaetetus* (176b) that the goal of life is said to be *ὁμοίωσις θεῶ* (not, as we might have expected, *δικαιοσύνη*). Plato's ethics, it turns out, rests on religion; and here for the first time he deals with religion apart from myth. (Stöcklein does not admit any identification of the ἀγαθόν of the *Republic* with God, since *θεός* always is, or has, *ψυχή*.) The dialectic treatment of the theme continues in the *Sophist* (265c), the *Philebus* (23c ff.; 30b-d), and the *Laws* (Book x), which in their several ways deal with the divine creation and ordering of the κόσμος. I am glad to see Stöcklein make short shrift of the silly notion that Plato ever believed in an "evil world-soul." This oft-held and oft-refuted notion arose from a misinterpretation of *Laws* 896c ff. If the passage is read carefully, it yields the conviction that *ψυχή* has more than one form, at least a good and an evil; and also that the κόσμος is controlled by wholly good soul, whether one or more (898c).

The final section of Stöcklein's work is devoted to Plato's own utterances on his myth-making. These are few and, for the most part, casual. A remark in the *Timaeus* (29b-d) assigning myth to the world of becoming, dialectic to the world of the eternal, is not supported, except in the *Timaeus* and the *Critias*, by Plato's practice. Sometimes, indeed, a Platonic speaker resorts to myth when a problem is becoming difficult to state in logical terms; this reminds us of the remark of Socrates (*Rep.* 506c-d) that he cannot give *ἐπιστήμη* of τὸ ἀγαθόν, only *δόξα*. That is the cue: "What the soul is, is hard to say; what it is like, is easy" (*Phaedr.* 246a, in substance). "We should naturally think little of myths, if we had anything better" (*Gorg.* 527a; cf. *Phaed.* 108d; 114d). These *obiter dicta* are given more developed expression in the *Politicus*, where the definition of the πολιτικός ἀνὴρ is assisted by a παράδειγμα from a different field: "It is hard to give an idea of lofty things without an example" (277d). Here the example itself is explained by another example—that of children learning to read, and proceeding from the known to the unknown. The "example" partly resembles, partly differs from, the object; juxtaposition brings to light the common traits. Hence likeness is an inevitable means toward the understanding of an unknown; metaphors are needed, since names are as yet lacking; a terminology will perhaps follow.

Such, in brief, is Stöcklein's argument, which carries the more conviction since he has attempted to reduce to his formula only those myths which may

fairly be called *Vorstufe* of *Logos*. Yet one question, or doubt, remains. Supposing Stöcklein to be correct, and *Mythos* to precede *Logos*, by what mystical power did Plato reach those particular myths in advance of his reasoning? Do dreamers dream what has never entered their waking consciousnesses? Do poets and myth-makers fashion with unerring instinct the concrete images which their mature intellects will approve, without ever having pondered these themes before? It seems at least possible that in Plato myth and reason matured together, but that he often chose myth for the first expression of what in later years he preferred to restate in logical terms.

WILLIAM C. GREENE

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Untersuchungen zur Magistratur in Athen, Teil II. By ULRICH KAHRSTEDT.
Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1936. Pp. 330. Rm. 21.

This is the second part of Kahrstedt's study of public law at Athens. It is a veritable mine of information, and yet, despite the encyclopedic discussion of magistracy and its functions, Kahrstedt has space for much interpretation and some speculation. The book poses many problems and no doubt will be the starting-point for studies by others; indeed, it is clear that the monograph before us would hardly have been possible without the work of Dinsmoor, Ferguson, Meritt, and West.

After a discussion of the conception of office, Kahrstedt considers candidacy. Mere citizenship was not enough, since for practically every office there was an age qualification. Except for jury service, which was not a genuine office, it was also necessary to belong to one of the first three tax classes, although by the fifth century this limitation did not operate. A person dependent on charity, on the other hand, could not become a candidate. As a rule, a candidate must declare himself. The normal way of winning an office in classical and Hellenistic times was of course by election or lot. Kahrstedt's discussion of the method of choosing by lot must be reviewed, however, in connection with the new discoveries from the agora. It is interesting to observe that by the end of the fourth century this democratic device was more and more given up in favor of straight election. Perhaps the Athenians were influenced by their experience, ever since the Persian wars, with electing military leaders. Upon taking office the magistrate submitted to an examination, sacrificed, and took an oath. His term normally was for a year, and during his term or afterward, as one might expect of the Athenian democracy, he was liable to impeachment.

Kahrstedt has a penetrating study of dual office-holding and the growth of *collegia*. By Alexander's time, apparently, it was not unusual for a man to hold more than one office, though earlier in the century it was actually prohibited. The case of the *collegia* was just the reverse. This was due in large

part to the development of the archonship in early times. To the three original archons had been added the six *thesmothetae*, and thus it was inevitable that many other *collegia*, such as the Eleven, should be formed. By the fourth century there was a reaction, hastened probably by the fact that the board of *strategoi* was abolished and the powers separated. The *collegium* as an institution, however, was never given up. Finance in relation to magistracy is also fully discussed. All officers of the state who were responsible for money for thirty days or more—the archons, envoys, priests, generals, the *boulé*, etc.—had to give an account of their stewardship. Not all magistrates, however, were responsible for money, nor were all persons who handled money magistrates. It need hardly be added that a prize of Athenian democracy was the payment of the various officials, soldiers, architects, and, above all, the jurors. A discussion of other powers of the magistrates, their meeting places and privileges, and an appendix on the bodies of the Athenian state which did not involve magistracy, conclude the book. All must be grateful to Kahrstedt for a work which is typical of German scholarship at its best.

C. A. ROBINSON, JR.

Brown University

Thessaly in the Fourth Century B.C. By H.D. WESTLAKE. London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1935. Pp. viii+248 and map. 8s. 6d. net.

The central figure of this small book is Jason of Pherae, for his ephemeral success in the unification of Thessaly is presented both as an incident fraught with warning for Greece, unheeded to be sure, and as a lesson to Jason's more able successor and imitator, Philip of Macedon.

Chapters on the geography and people, extremely summary, serve as an introduction to the fourth century and supply the reader with a brief account of the "dark ages" of Thessalian history. Westlake's more detailed treatment begins with the rise of cities and the urbanization of politics which gave rise to disunion, rivalry, and tyranny. Factional struggles between noble houses within the cities and strife between city and city, accompanied frequently by intervention from outside, together produced a weakness quite in contrast with the wealth and potential strength of the Thessalian people. A chapter entitled "Larisa and Lycophron of Pherae" describes the workings of these disjunctive forces and prepares the reader's mind to appreciate the greatness of the leader who was able to break with the traditional policies of his land, to dispense with foreign support, and to create a national Thessalian state sufficiently powerful to threaten the Greek world. The completion of Jason's program became impossible upon his death, for Jason, unlike Philip, had no successor competent to carry on his work. Alexander of Pherae was unable to stem the renewal of anarchical strife.

Anarchy led naturally to intervention, and Philip, "who put to excellent

use the leaves which he took from his predecessor's book," first attached Thessaly as an appanage to his enlarged kingdom and then, following the route which Jason had planned, marched on to Delphi and the rest of Greece. The contrast between Philip's success and Jason's failure is again heightened by a comparison of their respective successors, Alexander of Phrae and the greater Alexander of Macedon. Where the one failed the other was able to maintain and increase his predecessor's achievements.

As a study of the career of Jason the essay merits attention. As a history of Thessaly in the fourth century the book is adequate within the limits fixed by its brevity. Though it was not written for specialists, there are passages that specialists can read with profit.

The map at the end of the book deserves a word of comment, for it serves as a graphic illustration of the difficulty of securing clarity through the sacrifice of detail. The map itself is perfectly clear, and, except for a slight error or two, such as the transposition of Pelinna and Pharcadon, it is correct; but the description of the roads and passes mentioned in the text would have been much clearer if the modern Greek place-names used to fix their position had not been deliberately excluded from the map.

In another way the map reflects a characteristic of the book. It contains the names of less than twenty-five Thessalian towns, four of which are not even included in the Index. Yet of the twenty-five or more Thessalian towns to which fourth-century mints have been ascribed, about half appear neither on the map nor in the text. Although nothing better illustrates the particularism that dominated Thessalian politics than this multiplicity of local coinages, Westlake refers to it only in passing when he comments upon the failure of Jason to establish a mint for united Thessaly.

†ALLEN B. WEST

University of Cincinnati

The Foundations of Roman Italy. By JOSHUA WHATMOUGH. ("Methuen's Handbooks of Archaeology.") London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1937. Pp. xx+420; with 12 pls., 8 maps, and 148 illus.

Professor Whatmough has striven to give us a picture of the history and status of the various districts of Italy as they were before they were absorbed under the spreading power of Rome. He has used with skill all the evidence: the archeological, the inscriptional, the literary—the abundance and the importance of which differ, but all are essential to the completed whole. With regret the reviewer admits his unfamiliarity with much of the archeological evidence; but the exposition made by Professor Whatmough is notable for its freedom from prejudgments, and the conclusions are sane and convincing.

Each district of the peninsula is considered in turn, after a general introduc-

† Deceased.

tion; the northern sections come first, and the southern last, with added chapters on Sicily and the other islands, and final chapters treating religion, literature, and government, and the unification of Italy, in which we note the splendid grasp of the author upon the subject, and his remarkable power of synthesis.

Certain conclusions attract my attention, among them the following: While Messapian and Venetic are offshoots of the ancient Illyrian language, the modern Albanian is not, but is more probably derived from a branch of Thracian (pp. 176-77). The Umbri as a people were in Italy before the Italic Indo-Europeans came down into Italy, and the inscriptions which we say are in the Umbrian language do not represent the speech of the old Umbri; the name has been transferred by us to the invaders, whose dialect may have been spoken in but a small part of the district which we call Umbria (pp. 193-96). The chapter on the Etruscans and on their language (pp. 208-38) is extremely good; Whatmough's conclusion is that the Etruscans arrived by sea, reaching the west coast of Italy in the middle of the eighth century B.C. The linguistic ancestors of the Latin-speakers of later times were the southern "Villanovans" (pp. 264-65). The Oscans were a pre-Italic people who got their "Oscan" speech from Italic invaders who settled in that part of Italy (p. 303). Archeology gives no basis for separating the Sicani and the Siculi of Sicily; rather they are the same, having linguistic affiliations with Messapian and Illyrian and perhaps only borrowings from Latin (pp. 338-40, 363-66). In connection with most of these items here mentioned, Whatmough's careful distinction between physical ancestry and linguistic ancestry (p. 132) is to be noted.

Now a few special points. Page 118: Equation of Latin *uicus*, "village," with Umb. *vuku* is dubious (cf. Sturtevant, *Lang.*, X, 9-11, and von Blumenthal, *Igw. Tafeln*, pp. 34-35). Pages 233-34: I feel doubt also about taking the second part of such a Latin word as *Quinquatrus* (implied by Whatmough's citation of Faliscan *decimatrus*) as dialectal for *-altrus*, pure Latin *-altero-*; consider, besides other objections, the change of the stem-final. Page 285: Survival of the original distinction between prim. Indo-Eur. $\hat{k}u$ and q^w into Italic times appears to me almost impossible, despite Umb. *ekvine* and a few other forms (against the evidence of Greek $\kappa\upsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\nu\omicron\varsigma$ for *Curinus* rather than *Quirinus*, cf. gen. $\kappa\upsilon\rho\eta\eta\upsilon\iota\omicron\varsigma$ of Luke 2:2 for *Quirinius*). Page 286: The statement about syncope is somewhat misleading, since syncope did occur in Latin (as Whatmough knows); it is merely less frequent there than in Oscan and Umbrian. Page 289: To call Bouianum Vetus one of the "most southern outposts of the Samnites" is a little startling, unless there is a dating implied which is not expressed. Page 307: I should hardly take seriously Horace's doubt whether he himself, and therefore his birthplace Venusia, was Lucanian or Apulian; the poet meant only that he came of a region of warriors, and did it more effectively by citing two regions of warriors near the boundary between which he was born. Page 346: Nor should I take seriously Horace's jesting mention of the antique foot-bath that Sisyphus had used; for he was

satirizing collectors of forged antiquities. Page 386, line 2: The hypothetical Oscan nominatives are dubious in the terminations; certainly *Herculos* should read *Hercul* (or *Herkul*, to accord with the alphabetic implications of the *s* in *Fluusa*). Page 412: In the first footnote *inu-* is twice printed for *inu-*; so also on page 385, line 26, *tittes* for *tithes*, and in not a few places an added comma would help the reader (e.g., after *south*, p. 147, l. 23; after *Europe*, p. 148, l. 8; after *spoil*, p. 148, l. 25, after which *were* should be *was*).

But these are slight blemishes; it is a splendid volume, and the publisher is justified in saying on the jacket that "this description of Italy in the middle of the last millennium before Christ illuminates the success of Rome in achieving a united Italy, where others had failed or shrunk from the task—an achievement which prepared the way for the course of events over many succeeding centuries." One might add that under this illumination the extension of Rome's power in ancient times is seen to be an even more remarkable achievement than he has previously believed it to be.

ROLAND G. KENT

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Principes: Studien zur Geschichte des Augustus, Vol. I. By WILHELM WEBER. Stuttgart-Berlin: W. Kohlhammer, 1936. Pp. vii + 240 + 265. Rm. 24.

"Formidable" and "perverse" are the first adjectives suggested by reading Professor Weber's study of the Augustan principate; "formidable" because 240 pages of text hardly balance 265 pages of closely printed notes, and "perverse" because many of the discussions most significant for scholars are scattered obscurely through the notes. Professor Weber's interpretation of the principate is conveniently summarized in the following two quotations: "Das Bild des felix Augustus als Anerkennung des optimus, felicissimus status und als Norm für alle Zukunft; der Divus Augustus als der göttliche Schirmherr des Staats; der Principat des Tiberius als Fortdauer des novus status" (p. 102); and: "Darum sind diese [the *Res gestae*] das Werk des vir humanus und zugleich der Mythos des neuen Gotts" (p. 239). The first of these summarizes the first two chapters, in which Professor Weber analyzes the events of the summer of A.D. 14 and those which immediately followed the death of Augustus in the light of the two traditions, favorable and hostile, preserved respectively in Velleius, with whom Suetonius in part agrees, and in Tacitus-Dio. He follows E. Meyer's thesis that Augustus consciously modeled his position not merely on that of Caesar—and Sulla—but more especially on that of Pompey as interpreted by Cicero. He feels, however, that Augustus consciously assumed to himself the implications of divinity, and of translation to the gods after death, which Cicero attached to the great statesman on the basis of Stoic theory and Greek hero- and emperor-worship. He suggests that the ultimate presentation of this superhuman character in the funeral of

Augustus and in the institution of the worship of him as *divus* may have been achieved by the machinations of Livia.

Professor Weber realizes that a proper interpretation of the principate must ultimately depend upon a thorough understanding of Augustus' own description of his achievements as preserved in the *Res gestae divi Augusti*. He therefore devotes his third, and most important, chapter, comprising more than half the book, to a minute study of the text, vocabulary, style, arrangement, and meaning of this document. He concludes that the Latin version preserves accurately the text and arrangement of the bronze steles designed by Augustus himself for erection before his tomb in Rome. The Greek translation was made by someone closely familiar with Roman political thought and phraseology, who therefore reproduced the Latin flavor of the original though he occasionally altered certain phrases to emphasize their significance for the Greeks. Such a translator could only be found in intimate association with Augustus, not in a provincial capital like Ancyra, and may have been the imperial secretary, Polybius. He argues, furthermore, that Augustus' original record was not a haphazard enlargement of a sketchy summary first composed about 2 B.C. but a very careful presentation of what Augustus wished to be thought about himself. By a perhaps hypercritical dissection of the word order, rhythmical phrasing, material presented or suppressed, and construction, he supports his picture of a magnanimous, self-sacrificing *princeps* whose achievements in bringing peace, order, and prosperity to the *orbis Romanus* raised him to a superhuman plane. Inasmuch as Professor Weber states in his Introduction that he undertook this study, which is only the first of two volumes, as part of a larger attempt to describe various theories of monarchy, one wonders how far his Augustus is meant to adumbrate *Der Führer*. At least the *Res gestae*, which Professor Weber calculates at about 2,500 words in 271 lines, without the heading or summary, compares favorably for conciseness with *Mein Kampf*.

Students of the Augustan principate must take account of this book. Even if they do not accept its general conclusions, they will admire the broad sweep of scholarship and the resultant insight into the Roman mind on which these are based. Professor Weber has, in essence, given a commentary on the *Res gestae*, but a commentary of that profounder sort which does not merely annotate words and constructions but which seeks to expound the meaning of a document in the light of its individual and communal background. Students will also curse the book. The detailed commentary is there, but elaborated in the notes, in which lurk many discussions arising from the text but extending far beyond it and of significance in their own right. The various emendations of the text were made available before publication here to J. Gagé, and are therefore accessible in his recent edition of the *Res gestae* (Paris, 1935). As examples, however, of important notes might be mentioned that on the mystery of Agrippa Postumus; or the thorough investigation into the *ludi Palatini* in the course of which he attempts to fix the assassination of

Gaius on the twenty-second rather than the twenty-fourth of January; or the full exposition of the various expenditures of Augustus on the people, troops, colonies, and the like; or the interesting analysis of Philo's tribute to Augustus (*Leg. ad Gaium* xxi. 143 ff.) into stanzas of rhythmical prose. It can only be hoped that an index will be provided in the next volume to make this wealth of material more easily available. In conclusion, it may be remarked that the work is printed attractively and with remarkable accuracy, especially as regards the elaborate representation of the textual readings and the innumerable references. Though the notes are on the whole simply expressed, the text presents a rather high-flown and difficult style.

MASON HAMMOND

Harvard University

Greek Ostraca in the University of Michigan Collection, Part I: "Texts." ("Humanistic Series," No. 34.) By LEIV AMUNDSEN. University of Michigan Press, 1935. Pp. xx+232 and 8 pls. \$3.50.

This interesting volume is dedicated to the late Professor Francis W. Kelsey, who organized and raised the money for the excavations at Karanis and for the purchase of papyri. Dr. Askren of Medinet-el-Fayum, who has practiced among the natives for years, has been of great help to the University of Michigan. The first ninety-seven ostraca here published, including on Plate II a pen drawing of Sobk, the crocodile god, lying on a litter on top of an altar like one found at Karanis, are a miscellaneous lot purchased from Dr. Askren's collection. These undoubtedly all come from the Fayum. The others (Nos. 98-699) were found in the excavations of 1924-29 and date mostly from Aurelian to Diocletian. The collection, then, should be valuable in working out for the Fayum family trees and prosopography and data about accounts, receipts, payments in money and kind, deliveries, transportation of grain from the granaries to the harbor, lists of donkey-drivers and caravans and even of liturgical workers, and other important economic items about grain, beans, wine, oil, wool, cloth, wood, doors, etc. Other lists are religious or magical or give names of natives (one a list of divinities in the genitive), a quotation from a report on an assembly, datings, notes to accounts, private letters, a writing exercise of the alphabet disarranged, etc. There are fourteen good indexes, which must have entailed much labor. Full details are given of the conditions of finding, but only the Greek text with very brief notes and no translation or commentary is here published. This is reserved for another volume but should have been issued with the texts in order to furnish the necessary discussion of some of the datings and other matters which need explanation. The transcripts are well done by Dr. Amundsen, a thorough scholar, helped by the Rockefeller Foundation. He knows papyri and ostraca. I treasure a letter of Sappho to myself, in excellent papyrological Greek, which he forged on a genuine piece of papyrus and buried for me to dig up

at Karanis. With only eight plates it is difficult to check the readings, but they all seem to be correct. I should prefer to accent abbreviated forms such as 'Απολινάρις (for 'Απολινάριος), 'Αφροδίσις, 'Ατίσις, and 'Αμμώνις with an acute instead of the circumflex so that the reader will realize that *ις* is for *ιος*. Certainly 'Αρτεμῖς should not be accented 'Αρτέμῖς (Index, p. 191). In No. 563, line 13, it is a feminine name (cf. Buckler-Robinson, *Sardis*, VII, 1, No. 3, also of the second century A.D.) and the genitive would be 'Αρτέμ(ιδος) rather than the Doric 'Αρτέμ(υτος). Certainly it cannot be a masculine or father's name as given in the Index. Page 49, No. 157, line 3, correct *η ἔριους*, not to *ε* but to *ξέτους* (A.D. 276, not A.D. 275). I miss any reference to U. Wilcken's epoch-making *Griechische Ostraka* (Berlin, 1899).

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An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome, Vol. II: Roman Egypt to the Reign of Diocletian. By ALLAN CHESTER JOHNSON. Edited by TENNEY FRANK. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1936. Pp. viii+732.

In conformity with the plan of the series to which it belongs, this volume presents in usable form the available material bearing on the economic life of Egypt under the Principate. Papyri, ostraka, inscriptions, coins, and literary references are all drawn upon for whatever information they may have to offer. The book is divided into five chapters, of which the first four deal, respectively, with the land, the people, industry and commerce, and taxation, while the fifth comprises miscellaneous topics which do not fit into the preceding categories. Each chapter in turn is subdivided into a number of sections devoted to special topics and containing an introduction, a group of select documents in translation, and, where possible, reference lists of others relating to the subject under consideration arranged in chronological order with summaries of the essential features of their contents. The translated texts, which number 445, have been chosen with great care and form an exceedingly useful *Chrestomathie*. Their value is greatly enhanced by the introductory commentaries, which give penetrating analyses of the problems involved and in some cases suggest new solutions. There is a good selected bibliography and an index, but no list of the translations, which would have been very useful. In this volume, Professor Johnson has not only made available to students of ancient history and economics in general the rich but not too readily accessible information contained in papyrus documents, but he has also produced a work of unusual value to papyrologists; one that will take its place among the authoritative manuals in the field which all research workers henceforth will have to take into account. In view of the high standard of scholarship displayed by the author in his work as editor, it may seem invidious to note a relatively unimportant omission. But since chapter i, vii,

"Farm Accounts," aims at completeness, it should contain the Michigan waxed diptych published as "An Overseer's Day-Book from the Fayoum" in *JHS*, XLI (1921), 217-21.

A. E. R. BOAK

University of Michigan

A Greek-English Lexicon, Part IX: *σίσιλλος-τραγάω*. By H. G. LIDDELL and R. SCOTT. Revised by H. STUART-JONES. Oxford, 1936. Pp. 1601-1808. \$3.50.

In 1896 a competent observer, none other than J. P. Postgate, after uttering the truism that a good dictionary exhibits usages of words arranged in the natural order of development, added: "I may observe in passing, that *in this respect* the Latin lexicon of Lewis and Short is superior to the Greek one of Liddell and Scott." In 1936 the revision of Liddell and Scott by a historian turned lexicographer and a reluctant etymologist approaches its end almost unimproved *in this respect*. The sound rule that meanings must be traced not through particulars but through universals is still honored in the breach at least as much as in the observance. For example, *συλλαβή*. In the edition of 1897 it is defined by these meanings, in this order: "conception, pregnancy—that which holds together—that which is held together—a syllable—literae (*sic*)—[in music] the Fourth"; and now, after forty years, as follows: "conception, pregnancy—grip, hold—that which holds together—that which is held together—a syllable—literae (*sic*)—the letters of the alphabet—apices—[in music] perfect fourth—sum [of two numbers]." Was it too much trouble to arrange the meanings in a better order? The article *συλλαμβάνω*, to be sure, is much better, but so it was in 1897 in this respect, in which there is no essential difference; even *σύλληψις* is better than *συλλαβή*, but not much, and again the definitions stand in the same order as they did forty years ago. Here are a few other items which on comparison of the old and new editions show the same failure to revise the order of the meanings: *σκιά*, *σκενάζω*, *στροφή* (another telling example of a confused arrangement of primary and derivative meanings), and above all *τε*—there is no hint in the etymological note (E) of how the meanings "and," "both . . . and" arose. But no; a perverse inhibition against revising the topsy-turvy order prevailed, and the usages A, B, C stand in the same sequence as in the old edition. *S.v.* *σῆτος* is meaning III ("food rejected in digestion") omitted from the new edition (cf. *σιτῶν* III) by intent or by accident? It is perfectly good in the places cited in the old edition.

The cheese-paring parsimony that dictated tying together bundles of words sometimes totally unrelated save by a common prefix is exasperating to every user of this dictionary. But besides the entanglements to be penetrated in finding a word, another unfortunate consequence (to put it mildly) has ensued, namely, divisions of words which are not only unetymological but

also contrary to the principles of the Clarendon Press itself, e.g., *συνάλεμμα, συναλλ-αγή*. But it may be something worse than economy that is responsible for a certain meanness in the matter of cross-references: *σφυχή*, of which we may expect to hear in due course, does not appear now, as it should, with a cross-reference to *ψυχή*; neither (p. 1768, cf. p. 1785) does the Locrian *τέκνα* (i.e., *τέχνη*), which should have been given as a noteworthy graphic or phonetic variant (*κ* for *χ* before *ν*; cf. Cret. *τνατός, τετνακός*) if nothing more (*τέχνη* from **τεκσνᾶ*; cf. *τέκτων*).

Errors that I have noted, of one sort or another, include the astonishing assertion (p. 1755) that *ὦ τᾶν* is "not in Ar(istophanes)." This is not even copied from the old edition either. On the etymology, which is not faithfully dealt with, see Kretschmer's suggestion *Glotta*, I, 58 (or in Gercke-Norden, *Einleitung* [3d ed.], I, 492). If the gloss *τάσις' menta* is right in that shape, then *τάσις* is not the same word as *τάσις' tentigo*. But is *menta* right? Philoxenus *TE* 71 has *tentio*: *τάσις*. Hope of correction on different lines is suggested by Kretschmer's discussion of *μίνθη*, *Glotta*, XII, 105 (cf. 283), or by the glosses discussed by Loewe (*Prodromus*, pp. 303 f.). *συφουκία* in line 2 of *IG*, V, 2, 343 is not "settlement" but an "agreement for joint-citizenship" (cf. *IG*, IX, 1, 32.4). *κάσις ξύνουρος* (p. 1723) does not mean "twin sister," and I do not see how it could. *σίτος* is rendered "grain," but in its compounds (except *σιτόχροος*) and derivatives the highly ambiguous rendering "corn" is foisted upon the whole of the English-speaking community of North America, in whose usage "corn" means something that *σίτος* never meant and could not possibly have meant. *S.v. οικοδόμος* (in the Addenda) *οἶκει* is said to be due to "dissimilation"; *οἶκει*, not *οἶκοι*, has been held (Giles [2d ed.], p. 40, n. 1) to be "probably the earliest [*sic*] Greek form," but it is on all counts more likely that both *οἶκει* and *οἶκοι* were inherited, no less than *πεῖ* and *ποῖ* or Latin *hic* and *huc*. Schwyzler's survey (*Gr. Gram.*, pp. 257 f.) of the evidence shows how rare the so-called dissimilation of vowels is in Greek, *λοιπεῖς* and *οικοδόμεις* notwithstanding. It is astonishing to read the suggestion that *τοφίων* in *Tab. Heracl.* i. 137 means "a tufa quarry," and then, in brackets, "Latin *tōfus*, prob. borrowed from an Italic dialect." We may swallow *φ* for Italic *f*, and even Greek *ο* for Italic *ō* (or *ū*; cf. *tufus* Gloss., Ital. *tufo*), though that is a little harder, since Hesychius knows a form *τοῦφος*. But Hesychius glosses *τοῦφος* by *τάφος*. Now in the Heraclidean dialect we have *ο* for *α* in *κοθαράς, ἀγκοθαρίοντι, ἀνεπιγρόφως*, and we have *ι* for *ε* before *α* and *ω* in *ἀδικίων, σικία, ἐγφηληθίωντι*, and in other words. It is clear, therefore, that Buck is right in taking *τοφίων* to mean "burial-place," and the equivalent of *ταφών* which is now cited in Liddell and Scott (p. 1761). The prohibition is against digging *graves* in the sacred lands; cf. *ἐνταφή* (which the Addenda printed in this very part of L. and Sc. obligingly furnish), and *ἐντοφήων* at Delphi (Schwyzler 323, C 21). Or is the Delphian *ἐντοφήων* also borrowed from "an Italic dialect"? I have stood on the site of Heraclea (Policoro), and I should much like to see tufa quarries anywhere near the alluvial soil (*ῥᾶσος*) belonging

to the temples of Dionysus and Athena Polias which the regulations engraved on the *Tab. Heracl.* were drawn to conserve.

Addendis addendum is *Τυνδαρίδαι IG* v. 1, 305, 919, 937. Greek words in Latin authors, Cicero and the rest, are in general taken into account; but the *Σοφοκλείς* of the younger Pliny *Ep.* ii. 14. 5 seems to have been overlooked. And if it was thought worth while to cite, *s.v.* *ταυροβόλιον*, "in Lat. form *taurobolium*, *CIL* 10. 1596," why then not also, e.g., *teletis* (i.e., *τελεταῖς*) *CIL* 6. 1779. 14, 27, and such like? Or *tau* [Verg.] *Cat.* ii. 4 (cf. *Class. Phil.*, XXXI [1936], 193, *PID*, II, 186, 190)? We are given *τάρπη*, Syracusan according to Hesychius, but the significant variant *δάρπη* (see *PID*, II, 471, 475, and Bechtel, *Gr. Dial.*, II, 289) has been suppressed. The *σχόινος* of *Tab. Heracl.*, where it is feminine throughout, was well worth citing. In the Addenda the missing reference to Plaut. *MG* is 1.86, and the references to lines (e.g., for *ἀνατίθημι*, l. 8) should have been added for forms quoted from the inscription of Olynthus published in *Trans. Amer. Phil. Assoc.*, LXV, 105. Still in the Addenda, *s.v.* *-ήρης*, Brewster's paper (*HSCP*, XLIV [1933], 205) should be added to the reference to Tarn; Brewster was a rower.

Bad Latin spellings are, I must suppose, partly survivals from older editions, e.g., *literae* (above), partly a reversion to type, like *jumentum* (*s.v.* *συρματική*), or *cujus*, for even the home of lost causes is said to favor these no longer.

I have protested before about the failure to indicate etymologies on any consistent plan. Granted that silence is sometimes desirable in a Greek lexicon, yet, if etymologies are included at all, what is the justification for complete silence at *σκεδάννυμι*, *σφάλλω*, *σύν*, *τέχνη* (see above, *τέκτων*), *τάνυ*, or at many other words which have interesting cognates? No principle is apparent that will account for the decision, on the one hand, to advance here and there an etymology, supported only by a Lithuanian, Lettish, or Polish word, which will mean little to most users of the dictionary, and in any case was to be had already in Boisacq (e.g., at *ταχύς*) or may even have been culled from Pott or Curtius (e.g., at *σκνίψ*), and, on the other, to confront the reader with a stony silence elsewhere, even where an English cognate was available. And if paper is so precious, or wisdom and discretion so great, we can well spare elementary information about heteroclitic stems at *σκῶρ*, or about retroformates at *τρέποντος*. The equation of *σκαῖός* and *scaevius* is thought to be merely "probable"; but *ταῶς* and *paus*, where the connection is much more hypothetical, are confidently linked together. From *σφίδες* or *σφίδη* we are told "Lat. *fides* is perh. borrowed"; with this contrast Walde-Hofmann, *s.v.* *fides*, "Entlehnung aus *σφίδες* ist lautl. nicht möglich." *S.v.* *τήκω*, with so many hyphens scattered about, one (or two) inserted in *tā-b-es* would show the extent of the relationship. *στόλος* is referred to *στέλλω*, but *στέλλω* itself is "explained" as from an I. Eu. **squel*- "not found in cog. languages"! Boisacq rightly rejected this figment and hence did not find it necessary to divorce *στελέα* (where Eng. *steal* is Spenserian). Anecdotal etymology is mostly

counted untrustworthy by good etymologists; but here nine lines are devoted to it *s.v.* *συκοφάντης*. After these nine, Cook's suggestion (*CR*, XXI [1907], 133 ff.), which is not a "mere guess," deserved at least a tenth. The semantic shift is not a whit more startling than in *φρήν* (*φρένες*): *φρονέω* or in *σπλάγχχον*: *σπλαγχχνεύω*. With the gloss of Hesychius *συκιδαφόρος ἐνιοτε δὲ συκοφάντης, ποτὲ δὲ δὲ συκόπρωκτος* cf. Juv. ii. 13 (*σῦκον*, "marisca"). *συγκρητίζω* (-ισμός) is another word for which nothing more than anecdotal etymology, of the same doubtful character, is presented. The wording of the etymological note at *τέλλω* is open to misunderstanding. And the judgment of Boisacq and of Walde-Pokorny is superior to Schulze's, repeated here, that *τίνω* is "not related to *τίω*."

Some minutiae: for the account of the usage of *σῶς* something might have been learnt from the article by Powell, *CQ*, XXVIII (1934), 159 ff.; *s.v.* *σῶεις* for dialectic read dialectal. At *τόργος* the form *Τόργιον* (*PID*, II, 464) has been omitted. *στέγαν* (p. 1636, *s.v.* *στέγη*, 3) is not plural. *συνόδων* is given preference over *συνόδων* as the nominative singular; for Attic *ὁδῶν*, not *ὁδούς*, see Solmsen, *Beiträge*, I, 30 ff. Despite epigraphic and other testimony the traditional spelling of the present stem of *σῶζω* has been allowed to stand in quotations from authors. At *τόπος* add (3) in medieval writers, *seat of disease*.

Finally the dialects. The new Liddell and Scott is not quite so good as previously I had supposed. Cret. *σποδδῶν* (= *σπουδῆν*), Boeot. *τιούχα* (for *τύχη*), Cret. *τρατός* (i.e., *θν-*), and Locrian *τετθμός* (*θεσμός*) are omitted; Buck's interpretation of Arc. *στύμεον*, "cavern" (cf. *στόμιον*), is quite acceptable ("dub. sens." is all that L. and Sc. can offer), and his interpretations of Delph. *συμπιπίσκω*, "invite to drink together," and of Arg., *τελαμῶ(ν)*, "the pedestal which would itself be called a *στήλη* in Attic" (Buck, *Gr. Dial.* [2d ed.], p. 240) are better than those offered here, viz. "give to drink together" and "base of a *στήλη*." Ion. *σφηνόπους* means "with wedge-shaped feet" rather than "with wedge-shaped legs." The transcription (p. 1779) of the Ionic *τεΤαράροντα* is not accurate.

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Codices Latini antiquiores: A Palaeographical Guide to Latin Manuscripts Prior to the Ninth Century, Part II: "Great Britain and Ireland." Edited by E. A. LOWE. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1935. Pp. xviii+53. Pls. 277. \$20.

Part I of this magnificent work was reviewed in *Classical Philology*, XXXI, 170. That part dealt with the 117 manuscripts now in the Vatican which antedate the ninth century; the present part covers 160 manuscripts of the period now found in British and Irish libraries. The plan is to give a facsimile of several lines of text from every manuscript, together with descriptive text. The Bibliography indicates that facsimiles of about one hundred of these had been previously published.

Exigencies of publication necessitated a division of the material according to the libraries and countries in which the manuscripts have chanced to find a resting place. Since manuscripts illustrating different kinds of script are scattered throughout the libraries of Europe and even America, few general conclusions of a paleographical nature can be drawn from the material in any one part, not even by Lowe, who no doubt has available extensive notes of which he gives but selections. We must therefore wait for the completion of the entire work and for detailed studies of the material by Lowe and others. But the present Part II furnishes a partial exception. As Lowe points out, over half of the manuscripts are in Insular script and furnish a fine opportunity for study of the origins of that highly individualistic hand.

One small but very important item may be added to Lowe's list: the two Latin alphabets on a papyrus fragment (Antinoë Papyrus I of the Egypt Exploration Society). These were published with facsimile by H. J. M. Milne, *Greek Shorthand Manuals* (London, 1934) (cf. my article in *Amer. Jour. Philol.*, LVI [1935], 147).

Biblical manuscripts make up three-eighths of the total in the volume. Classical authors are meagerly represented by small fragments, chiefly on papyrus. Three of these are made known for the first time. Included is a Virgil fragment of the third or fourth century with Greek translation, intended to teach Latin to Greek boys. A long mark is found over two vowels (not one, as Lowe says).

Lowe calls attention to some interesting coincidences in unusual sizes of manuscripts and suggests that these indicate that the manuscripts were produced in the same scriptorium. He affirms that Insular manuscripts, unlike those on the Continent, were ruled for writing after the sheets were folded into gatherings. This leads also to a difference in the pricking preparatory to ruling. The common Continental gathering was the quaternion (cf. our quire); but in England and Ireland there was much variation, with preference for the quinion. Lowe's suggestion that the latter was due to the influence of oriental manuscripts seems unlikely. He himself points out that the Irish word for book comes from *quinio*. Perhaps he is right in rejecting the view that the Irish learned the practice from manuscripts in rustic capitals, some of the existing examples of which are in this form, since no influence of this script on Insular is noticeable. It may be that the practice is to be associated with the peculiar style of Continental half-uncial, of which no trace is left, on which Insular script was based.

The statement that "it is hard to say to what extent Latin art and letters took root in Roman soil during the centuries of the Roman occupation" seems rather too negative when we recall the ancient testimony and Haverfield's presentation of the archeological evidence.

In his discussion of Insular script Lowe stresses the temperamental differences between the Irish and English people as an explanation for the irregularities of Irish script and writing practices and for the disciplined regularity

of Anglo-Saxon. A prominent place is given to early English charters in the study of Anglo-Saxon script. Since they "are as calligraphic as manuscripts," it would seem that the general ban on charters in Lowe's work might well have been lifted for this volume. The Book of Durrow is called Anglo-Saxon because of the regularity of its writing, its influence on English illumination, and the relation of its text to that of English books. But as there is contrary evidence, Lowe says in the description accompanying the facsimile: "Written in Northumbria by a hand trained in the Irish manner." This seems a little too definite. All we can say is that the manuscript has characteristics which suggest both Irish and English connections.

An examination of Lowe's remarks on abbreviations reveals nothing that is not found in Lindsay's *Notae Latinae*, except some additional examples of certain abbreviations. This is both a comfort and a disappointment.

B. L. ULLMAN

La Pecia dans les manuscrits universitaires du XIII^e et du XIV^e siècle. By JEAN DESTREZ. Paris: Editions Jacques Vautrain, 1935. Pp. 104; 36 pls. Fr. 275 (plates alone, Fr. 180).

This is an extraordinarily interesting work, based on the most minute researches, and well shows how the study of minutiae may (though it does not always) lead to important results. The book is an intimate account of the university bookstore of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, of the paleography of those centuries, and of textual criticism in what may be called university textbooks, though its implications transcend those limits.

When the universities were established, there was a growing demand for textbooks. As a result, the copying of books, in certain fields at least, passed from the monks to professionals, both clerics and laymen. Regulations were passed and enforced by the universities to secure for their students reasonably correct copies of the required texts. Thus arose a sort of rental-library arrangement, according to which the stationers, under supervision of university authorities, rented out small sections of books for copying. These sections were known as *peciae*, "pieces." Generally they were four folios long, as a longer section would take too much time to copy, and thus impatient students and their scribes would be delayed. This is, of course, a variation of the earlier practice of turning over to a number of scribes the various gatherings of an exemplar in order to have it copied quickly. We discover this situation from differences in script. Under the new plan, which began about 1225, scribes often put in the margins the serial number of the *pecia*. Around the details of these and related indications Destrez has constructed his valuable book. He examined closely some seven thousand manuscripts of three hundred different works and found a thousand which carried indications of *peciae*. Some thirty actual

exemplars rented out by the bookstores were identified. The University of Padua declared in 1264 that without exemplars a university could not exist.

Sometimes the ink varies from *pecia* to *pecia*, as they were copied at various times. Or the scribe may find that the next *pecia* of the exemplar is out on loan and so, if he is in a hurry, he may skip it and leave a space. In filling it in later he may find that he has left too much or too little space. His management of the problem reveals interesting and instructive variations.

The second chapter goes beyond the *pecia* and presents the results of Destrez's paleographical study of the manuscripts he examined. Such a detailed study of the period is entirely new and presents valuable data for determining the date of a manuscript and its place of origin. Even so, Destrez promises a much fuller documented study of the subject. The thirty-six beautiful plates (with two exceptions in full size) are well chosen to illustrate the different styles. Eighteen represent the University of Paris, eight Bologna, five each Oxford and Naples. They are furnished in an album unbound, so that they may be used in classes. The album may even be separately purchased.

University demands made an industry out of the manufacture of books and caused great changes in script, ornamentation, abbreviation, and other features. Scribes had to earn a living instead of a remission of sins. Destrez makes valuable observations on practices which distinguish the various writing centers. For example, Bologna is marked not only by large formal lettering but also by wide margins, position of catchword in the center of the page at the end of gatherings, indication of *pecia* in margin in thin, small letters, etc.

As exemplars of the more popular works wore out in a given university center they were replaced. Destrez shows how some works never had more than one exemplar, others as many as five at least. He even thinks that the chronology of the exemplars can be determined by the number of *peciae* into which the work was divided: the later the exemplar the greater the number of *peciae*. Destrez explains this as caused by the desire of scribes, who were paid by the *pecia*, to write as large as possible in making exemplars. But until fuller documentation is available, some reserves about so rigid a principle of chronology are necessary. Destrez points out the usefulness of *pecia* indications in facilitating the classification of manuscripts.

These are but samples of the many interesting observations in the volume. There are only a few points that may be questioned. On page 16 it is stated that on Plate VII at the beginning of a *pecia* the scribe erroneously wrote *species* (abbreviated *spes*), which he then corrected to *spiritus sanctus* (abbreviated *spc. s*). But the *s* (for *sanctus*) was added in the margin, apparently by a corrector, just as was done earlier in the same line. On pages 29-30 Destrez argues that the scribe who made the exemplar of Thomas Aquinas' commentary on Isaiah for the Paris stationer shortened the colophon (as we see it in some copies), and that those Paris manuscripts which show the full colophon must have obtained it from Naples, where the work was originally

"published." This may be true, but it would seem simpler, pending fuller information, to argue that there was a Paris exemplar which had the complete colophon. On page 50 the change from the numbered signature at the end of a gathering to the catchword (*réclame*) is attributed to about the time when the University of Paris was founded. But the new style is found as early as the eleventh century and is common in the twelfth.

Though the present work is thoroughly worth while, scholars will await with interest the fuller study which Destrez has promised.

B. L. ULLMAN

Thesaurus linguae Latinae epigraphicae. By LESLIE F. SMITH, JOHN H. McLEAN, and CLINTON W. KEYES. ("The Olcott Dictionary of the Latin Inscriptions," Vol. II, Fasc. 1-4, "Asturica"—"Avillinlanus.") New York: Columbia University Press, 1935. Pp. 1-96. \$0.75 per fascicle.

With these fascicles three members of the classical department of Columbia University resume the publication of the *Dictionary of the Latin Inscriptions*, initiated by Professor George N. Olcott, also of Columbia University. Although Professor Olcott had collected a large amount of material, he had published only the first volume ("A"—"Asturia") when he died in Rome in 1912. The present editors have taken over the material left by him, added much of their own, and now through these four fascicles offer a substantial part of Volume II. Their task involves not only the editing of Professor Olcott's material but also the consideration of the large numbers of inscriptions which have been found since 1912. They plan to keep the successive fascicles abreast of the latest published material.

The scope of the work is the same as that which Professor Olcott adopted in the first volume. Geographical and mythological names are included but not those of contemporary or historical persons. Christian inscriptions are given so far as possible.

The dictionary is intended for those interested in phonetics and lexicography as well as for students of epigraphy, archeology, and religion. It is accordingly more comprehensive than Ruggiero's *Dizionario epigrafico*, which is confined to archeology. In mentioning religion I have in mind the article in the first fascicle on Attis (which shows at a glance the diffusion of this cult throughout the Roman world) and the excellent article on *augur* in the second fascicle (pp. 36 ff.). *Augustalis* is treated at length in the third fascicle (pp. 52 ff.), and in the fourth (pp. 76-94) there is a conspectus of the occurrences of *augustus*.

The dictionary is being carried on under the auspices of the Columbia University Council on Research in the Humanities. It is a project of major importance and the fascicles before us show careful and scholarly work.

GORDON J. LAING

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An Introduction to Sophocles. By T. B. L. WEBSTER. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936. Pp. vi+202. \$4.50.

Professor Webster's book forms a good introduction to the serious study of Sophocles. Instead of treating the plays separately, he has wisely employed the analytical and comparative method, dividing the main part of his work into sections on the life, thought, characters, plot, song, and style of Sophocles. A catalogue of the papyrus fragments, including those of the extant plays, would have been a desirable addition. More serious, however, is the volume's lack of a bibliography, especially since references are cryptic and not always accurate. On the other hand, there is usually ample documentation, and Webster is obviously well acquainted with current literature on the dramatists.

The author's discussions are stimulating, although there is much with which one may disagree since they necessarily contain many generalizations and subjective interpretations. With regard to the chronology of the plays it seems unsound to argue (p. 4) that the *Trachiniae* and the *Tereus* should be assigned to the same period because "... both dealt with the tragedy of a cultured woman married to a wild husband; in both the woman bewailed the lot of women." More acceptable are the author's arguments based on meter, technique, and language. Again, Webster (pp. 4-5) assigns the *Oedipus Tyrannus* to 429 B.C., in part because he concludes that the description of the plague must have been inspired by the Athenian plague at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. But it has been argued, with more plausibility, that since the play contains the description of a plague it must have been produced before or long after the actual plague at Athens. In his consideration of the date of the *Electra*, the author (p. 5) states that the second edition of the *Clouds* of Aristophanes must be later than 418 B.C. No authority for this unconventional view is given, although Geissler is cited (with the series given but no title and with an incorrect date of publication) in the same paragraph. Geissler gives the date of the extant edition of the *Clouds* as 419/418 B.C., pointing out that it cannot be later than 417 B.C.¹ The chronology of the plays is an old problem, and in the absence of new evidence it should be handled with more caution and reserve than the author has shown.²

In considering the religion of the dramatist Webster (p. 22) points out that the *Trachiniae*, *Tyrannus*, *Electra*, *Philoctetes*, and *Coloneus* all begin with the announcement of an oracle and end with its fulfilment, and that the oracle is one of the leading motives in all these plays. This is a pertinent observation, but the religious significance of oracles is here given undue emphasis since the author does not point out the dramatic importance of oracles as used by Sophocles for foreshadowing (cf. Webster, p. 111) and for other technical

¹ Paul Geissler, *Chronologie der altattischen Komödie* ("Philologische Untersuchungen," Heft 30) (Berlin: Weidmann, 1925), pp. 37 and 46.

² Cf. the discussions of Mario Untersteiner, *Sofocle* (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1935), pp. 494-506.

effects.³ Occasionally elsewhere Webster seems to give too little consideration to the dramatic aspect of the plays. Unfortunate is the statement (pp. 169-70) that "... in the later plays the story only provides a series of emotions through which the chief character passes."

On page 110 the statement is made that all prologues in Sophocles are dialogues, and it is argued that Deianeira's first speech in the *Trachiniae* is answered by the nurse and that it only superficially resembles "the Euripidean programme speeches." With this the present reviewer cannot agree, since the opening speeches of the *Heracleidae*, *Andromache*, *Hercules*, and *Electra* of Euripides appear similar in various important respects. In fact, Webster sometimes gives the impression of having a predilection for Sophocles and of attempting to praise him by disparaging Euripides.

In spite of the views here criticized, this book is a very welcome addition to the literature on the dramatists in English and may be read with profit by anyone interested in Sophocles.

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Antikes Führertum: Cicero "De officiis" und das Lebensideal des Panaetios. By MAX POHLENZ. ("Neue Wege zur Antike," Vol. II [Reihe: Interpretationen], Heft 3.) Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1934. Pp. i+ii+148.

In this attractive and well-printed volume Professor Pohlenz has undertaken and carried through a task both interesting and important. He has again focused the attention of classicists and philosophical students, in general, upon Cicero's famous, though rarely studied, treatise *De officiis*. Specifically, he has sought to separate Cicero's supplementary ideas from the basic thought of Panaetius. He has laid especial emphasis upon the political implications of the theories which he attributes to Panaetius; and in this way he has tried to form a just conception of Panaetius' *Lebensideal* and in particular of his view of political *Führertum*.

Professor Pohlenz' discussion is admirably clear. His volume falls into two rather well-defined parts. In the first, which extends from page 2 to page 126, he treats section by section the first two books of *De officiis*, expounding the several ideas found there, interpreting them in the light of Cicero's other works and of other classical sources, and pointing out, when necessary, the differences between Panaetius' ideas and Cicero's paraphrase or modification of them. For, as Professor Pohlenz justly points out (p. 3), "Cicero ist kein blosser Uebersetzer," but he has his own opinions, and in writing for his fellow-Romans he changes and re-works Panaetius' thought. Because of the nature of Book iii of *De officiis* (cf. pp. 7-8), it can hardly be used as a means of reconstituting the ideas of Panaetius. In the second part of Pohlenz' volume (i.e., pp. 127-46), the reader finds a very succinct and accurate ac-

³ Cf. Tycho von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Die dramatische Technik des Sophokles* ("Philologische Untersuchungen," Heft 22) (Berlin: Weidmann, 1917), pp. 130-33.

count of Panaetius' *Lebensideal*, a view which puts great emphasis (cf. pp. 137-38) upon the importance of political leadership.

It would be difficult to praise too highly the stimulating character of the volume or its utility to students of Cicero and of the history of post-Aristotelian thought. The reminder (p. 3) that Cicero's philosophical works "sind ein Element der abendländischen Kultur, das sich nicht wegdenken lässt," helps us to view Cicero again in proper historical perspective, less as the great orator than as the medium by which much of Hellenistic culture has been handed on to the modern world. That part of the book which concerns specifically the first two books of *De officiis* (i.e., pp. 2-126) supplies a valuable and explicit commentary upon the philosophical thought. How rich and complete this treatment is may be seen from the discussion of *fortitudo* (*Hochsinn*), which covers pages 40-55 and is a consecutive note on *De officiis* i. 61-92. By emphasizing the role of the *Führer*, or philosophical director of the state, Pohlenz has thrown further light upon that interesting figure of ancient political speculation from at least the time of Plato's *Politikos* to the publication of Cicero's *De re publica*, and he has shown what part was played by Panaetius in the evolution of this important political and philosophical conception.

In general, the volume under review provides little material for adverse criticism. One may note, perhaps, that Pohlenz cites few works written in languages other than German. In his treatment of Panaetius' *Führer* he does not seem to have made adequate use of the fifth book of *De re publica* or of the material scattered through the fragments of the Neo-Pythagoreans. In a narrower sense it may be urged that, in a book so solid and so sound, an index of authors quoted would give great help to the consulting scholar. But these are small points and should not minimize the value and excellence of the book.

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Handschriftliche Untersuchungen zu Senecas "Epistulae morales" und "Naturalis quaestiones." By O. FOERSTER. ("Würzburger Studien zur Altertumswissenschaft," Heft 10.) Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1936. Pp. 56.

In this monograph Foerster presents for the first time a scientific attempt to establish the relationship of some of the manuscripts of Epistles 1-88 of Seneca to Lucilius. For this purpose he chose the six most important manuscripts: p (Parisinus 8540), P (Parisinus 8658 A), b (Parisinus 8539), L (Laurentianus plut. LXXVI 40), V (Marcianus CCLXX), Q (Quirinianus B II 6). It is proved by common errors that all these manuscripts are derived from a single archetype; it is also proved by individual errors (chiefly omissions) that no one of these six is derived from another. Foerster shows that L and Q are copies of the same manuscript, which he calls α , also that P and b are copies of a single exemplar δ , which with V comes from another lost

manuscript called γ . p , γ , and a represent three separate copies of the archetype. The demonstration (p. 32) of the existence of doublets in the archetype provides a very clever way of explaining such difficult points as cases of agreement in error between p and a single descendant of γ . Another crucial point is the source of several correct readings in Q for Epistles 71-88. Beltrami (*Bolletino di filologia classica*, XLIII [N.S. VIII, 1936], 110-13) appears not to be satisfied with Foerster's explanation of corrections made by comparing with the archetype. Admittedly, collations of other later and hitherto unused manuscripts of Seneca's epistles must be made in order that we may have more complete evidence for the tradition. It would, for example, be most helpful to know whether Epistles 53-88, which are copied by a second scribe in M (Metensis 300), are derived from the same tradition as Epistles 1-52. Further study is most important for Epistles 71-88, which are not found in L and p .

Pages 35-45 contain discussion of the manuscript evidence for the titles of the books into which the epistles are divided and the formulas of greeting and farewell of each epistle. The second part of the pamphlet is devoted to a description of Codex Monacensis Electoralis 175 of Seneca's *Naturales quaestiones*. Foerster proves that this manuscript is a direct copy of C and has, therefore, no special interest for establishing the text.

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CLAUDE W. BARLOW

Plutarchi Vitae parallelae: Galba et Otho. Recognovit KONRAT ZIEGLER. Leipzig: Teubner, 1935.

The Teubner edition of the *Lives* is now complete, except for the Index, which we continue to await eagerly. Mr. Ziegler's text, as one might expect, is brilliant, or clever, rather than conservative. He has, for the first time, satisfactorily established the manuscript tradition of these lives, and this has led him to many new conjectures and to the adoption of many old ones which other editors passed by. Of the 225 conjectures accepted by him, some 60 are his own, which makes an average of one to each of the 60 pages of his text; and he prints 40 more of his own suggestions in the apparatus. About half of these 100 are, in my opinion, necessary and right. The others are never worse than improbable.

On one matter of principle I must take issue with the editor: transposition to avoid hiatus at the end of a clause or sentence.¹ Since the days of Benseler and Schellens very few have ventured to protest against emendations whose only object is to eliminate hiatus; good, bad, and indifferent—editors and critics have swallowed them all.² Almost alone, Mr. Kronenberg³ has lately

¹ E.g., at p. 14. 2; and cf. Schellens, *De hiatu in Plut. Mor.* pp. 20 f.

² And there is the practice of usually sober editors like Nachstädt, who, in editing *De glor. Ath.*, first rightly remarks, "hiatus solito plures admissi, non tollendi," and then proceeds to accept Benseler's conjecture at 346 C.

³ *Mnemosyne* (3d ser.), I, 167.

ventured to complain about the excision of hiatus after proper names and before the forms of *ὄν*. From long, if not assiduous, observation I am inclined to affirm that there are too many cases of hiatus in the genuine works of Plutarch: "more than the editors can remove, more even than they can detect," as Housman might say. For example, at the end of a sentence there are at least two in the *Galba*, at page 5. 10 and at page 34. 18. The first is instructive, for no ingenuity can remove it. But I forbear to give further examples lest on the morrow I open my Plutarch and find him *quantum mutatus ab illo*. Of our lynx-eyed moderns, Mr. Pohlenz is perhaps the keenest in tracking the brash hiatus to its lair; but it is not to be believed that Plutarch was more observant than we are, whatever his theories of composition may have been and however thoroughly it be proved "Plutarchum osorem fuisse hiatus acerbissimum."

In all reverence for Mr. Ziegler's judgment, which I know to be far superior to my own, I append a few remarks and queries on his text:

Galba iv. 6 (p. 5.18): I continue to agree with Nohl (*Hermes*, XV, 622) that στρατιωτικοῦ is right.

iv. 7 (p. 5.20): Is not Bryan's μή better?

x. 4 (p. 12.8): Read καὶ for καίτοι?

xiii. 3 (p. 15.3): It seems better to read δοκεῖν with Reiske.

xx. 5 (p. 24.7): Reiske's conjecture seems better than Ziegler's deletion.

xxii. 5 (p. 26.5): There is something wrong in this sentence. I suggest a lacuna after ὥς, adding (μειζόν τι ἢ) vel sim.

xxii. 11 (p. 27.1): τῆς for τὰς (Nohl) may be right.

xxiii. 2 (p. 27.15): Read μηδενί?

xxiv. 1 (p. 29.3): I dislike Ziegler's emendation very much indeed.

xxvi. 1 (p. 31.20): Ἰκέλου for Κέλσου Nohl rightly, comparing Tac. *Hist.* i. 32, 33.

xxvi. 2 (p. 31.23): Ziegler should have printed one of his conjectures, all three of which are superior to a number he accepts.

Otho v. 4 (p. 42.21): Read, perhaps, αὐτήν.

xii. 1 (p. 50.25): An easier emendation may be στραπειῶν.

xii. 6 (p. 51.23): αἰθῆς for αἰθροῖς Kronenberg (*Mnem.*, LV, 78) should be mentioned.

xviii. 1 (p. 59.10): At *Galba* ii. 1 Ziegler discovers a fragment of the *Vita Neronis*. On the same principle if we read ἔξει at *Otho* xviii. 1, or even if we do not, we shall have a fragment of the *Vita Vitellii*.

I have noticed but one misprint: at page 40.25 the critical note should be shifted to 41.1.

I hope these few remarks will not lead anyone to question the great merits of this and of all Mr. Ziegler's editions. If he is not weary of Plutarch, and if he does not wish to re-edit Lindskog's somewhat inferior productions, he may be assured of a warm welcome when he turns his attention to the *Moralia*.

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Virgile: Enéide, Books vii-xii. Text established by RENÉ DURAND. Translated by ANDRÉ BELLESSERT. Paris: Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres," 1936.

The volume before us completes, as Tome IV, the poems of Virgil in the "Budé Collection," and is the work of two scholars instead of only one. This is due to the demise of M. Henri Goelzer, who died shortly after the publication of the first volume of the *Aeneid*, and whose standard of orthography Professor Durand, "in the interest of unity," has wisely decided to follow. Thus, whatever be the spelling the best codices show, he retains, e.g., *-uos* for *-uus*, *-uom* for *uum*, *-uont* for *uunt*, and *-is* for *-es* in *i*-stem accusative forms. Otherwise we may assume that he is following his own judgment in his adoption of a reading where there is a conflict of evidence.

The "Budé Collection" corresponds closely to the "Loeb Classical Library," but there is this initial difference that, in the French publication, the Latin text follows, instead of preceding, the translation. This would seem to imply that the translation is the more important element, for it strikes the eye first, but surely it is but illustrative matter and even at its best is merely a kind of commentary upon the original.

If, however, the Latin text is of secondary importance, then it hardly seems appropriate to provide it with an elaborate *apparatus criticus*, much more complete than the average first-class texts of Virgil show. Many of the readings cited are of no concern whatever as regards the interpretation of the text, and merely exhibit variations of orthography or other technical peculiarities of the manuscripts. Professor Durand is under the spell of Sabbadini, whose critical edition of 1930 is really the basis for the present text. No effort, apparently, was made to check the accuracy of Sabbadini, though we now have several facsimiles of the chief codices, and a detailed article on the subject appeared in the Transactions of the American Philological Association for 1932 (LXIII, 206-29).

Let us take a few examples. P shows no trace of an original *c* in *equum* (vii. 189 and 651), or in *equus* (xi. 493). In ix. 773 there is no evidence that *ungere* was originally *tinguere*. In x. 251 the original reading of M is *supera*, not *super*, and in x. 521 *contenderat* should be recorded as a reading of M². In xi. 118 P has not corrected *cui* from *sua*, and in xi. 316 P reads *antiquus*, not *anticus*, Ribbeck being more correct here than Sabbadini. In vii. 430 Professor Durand reads *iube* (not *para*), following the text of Sabbadini, who, however, shows by his own lemma that he meant to read *para*. In viii. 205 he notes "*furis* M (teste Sabbadini)," but why *teste Sabbadini*? Ribbeck long ago recorded the fact, and if there was any doubt the editor could have looked up the facsimile of M.

In his *Avertissement*, Professor Durand mentions Professor Mackail's edition (1930) of the *Aeneid*, but I can find little evidence that he has been influenced by it. Thus, in viii. 383 he has nothing to say about punctuation. In

ix. 146, where Mackail retains *qui* (*quis* being commonly read), only Lejay's approval is cited. In ix. 412 Mackail's acceptance and interpretation of *adversigo* unnoticed. The same is true of *suos* in ix. 464, and of *funera* in ix. 486, but the most striking instance is in xii. 465, where an editor might at least have given the manuscript evidence in favor of *equo*, as contrasted with *aequo*.

M. Bellessort's translation is, of course, adapted to the Latin text, and doubtless satisfies French taste, but to us it must often appear rather too free. At any rate, the general editors of the "Loeb" series would never have accepted *le sénat romain* as a rendering of *pater Romanus* in ix. 449. In x. 861 they would have rejected *ensemble* (or its equivalent) in "nous avons vécu longtemps ensemble," and in xi. 180 they would have asked for some equivalent to *vitae* in "Ce n'est pas de la joie que je cherche." But *chacun à son goût* is an adage applicable even to translations.

There is another feature which the "Loeb" editors would have frowned upon, and that is the freedom with which M. Bellessort comments upon the stylistic features of his author. Take a few examples:

Dans la réponse de Latinus il faut admirer la simplicité et même la bonhomie [p. 20, on vii.259 ff.].

Il me semble qu'aucun poète n'a dépassé en simplicité, en noblesse, en pureté lumineuse, en variété, cet épisode d'Enée chez Evandre dans le décor sauvage de la Rome future [p. 50, on viii. 102 ff.].

Tous ces vers ont une splendeur "parnassienne" [p. 62, on viii. 432].

Tout ce morceau est un des plus splendides que Virgile ait écrits [p. 72, on viii. 675 ff.].

Mais combien Virgile surpasse Homère! [p. 86, on ix. 176 ff.].

Le grand peintre de l'antiquité, c'est Virgile [p. 110, on the closing scene of Book ix].

The trouble with such comments lies in the fact that they are purely subjective, rather than informative, and, being subjective, may not always be acceptable to other literary critics. Take the striking simile in xii. 701 ff., where the hero, in his stature and majestic fury, is compared to mountain heights. M. Bellessort says: "L'hyperbole est forte: on peut se demander si Virgile, corrigeant son poème, l'eût maintenue" (p. 222). On the other hand, Professor Mackail comments on "the relevance and aptness of this superb simile," and my own explanation of the apparent "hyperbole" is given in my *Love of Nature among the Greeks and Romans* (p. 33). However, most of these sidelights in the Budé *Virgile* will give much pleasurable satisfaction to the reader, whether of French or of English speech.

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The Odes of Quintus Horatius Flaccus: Translated into English Verse in Horatian Meters. By JUSTIN LOOMIS VAN GUNDY, Ph.D. Published by the department of classics, Monmouth College, Monmouth, Ill. \$1.25.

Professor van Gundy has made a brave and laudable effort to translate the *Odes* of Horace into English verse after the manner of the original. Horatian meters are very diverse, and as many of these are strangers in English poetry, we are not surprised if the translator's efforts are very unequal, being sometimes good but more commonly indifferent or even distinctly bad.

One of the best of the Sapphic renderings is the first stanza of the Pompeius Grosphus ode (ii. 16):

Sailors caught by storm on the wide Aegean
Pray the gods for peace, when dark clouds conceal the
Moon, and friendly stars do not shine to give them
Surely their bearing;

but I confess that it is hard to find many satisfactory parallels. This is what the translator makes of the last stanza of the *Integer vitae* ode:

Place me in equatorial, arid regions,
In those lands devoid of all habitation:
Even there I'll love Lal'ge, sweetly smiling
Sweetly conversing.

Only the Adonic dipody here conforms strictly to the requirements of the Latin, and it is easy to suggest that the barbarous "Lal'ge" might have been avoided thus: "There I'll love my Lalage, sweetly smiling."

But perhaps the translator is more successful with Alcaics. Here is a stanza true to type:

Oft Faunus migrates, changing Lycaeum for
Our lovely bright Lucretilis, and he then
Defends my goats from fiery Summer's
Heat and the blasts of the wind and rain-storm.

But why the neuter form "Lycaeum," and to what in the original does "bright" correspond?

The more I read the *Odes* of Horace in the original and in verse translations, the more convinced I become that the poet's thought is comparatively commonplace, but is disguised by the *curiosa felicitas* of expression. Mr. Chester Rowell undoubtedly struck the nail on the head when, a year ago, in an article on "Twenty Centuries for Horace" he told us that the poet said "rather ordinary things, but said them with exquisite perfection." This is perhaps the reason why all attempts to reproduce the *Odes*, especially in the un-English measures of the original, are likely to be unsuccessful.

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La Notation ekphonétique. By CARSTEN HÖEG. ("Monumenta musicae Byzantinae subsidia," Vol. I, Fasc. 2.) Copenhagen: Levin & Munksgaard, 1935. Pp. 162. Pls. 3.

This valuable work is a study of the notation used in lectionary manuscripts to indicate the musical reading of the text. It is a careful and thorough piece of work. The author finds the key to the notation in four brief Byzantine tables which give the names of the signs; three of these are reproduced in the plates. The student of Byzantine music will find here a convincing discussion of the significance, use, and origin of this system of notation.

All relevant material has been assembled and presented, at least in samples. Thus a reconstruction of the text and notation of one lection is given from the collation of more than 170 manuscripts. The critical apparatus on the text supports the thesis I have argued elsewhere¹—that there is a common lectionary text. The support for variants in Matt. 18:10–20 includes a fair proportion of the 170-odd manuscripts in only two instances, both in verse 15. About 76 manuscripts read *αμαρτηση*, and an equal number read *και ελεγγον*—both of these readings are supported also by the vast majority of late Byzantine manuscripts and appear in the text of Stephanus. This would seem to indicate that the only text type to influence any large number of lectionaries is the Byzantine type (von Soden's *K*). The transcription in Western musical notation of two lections as they are chanted today is included.

The printing is of the highest caliber. The reproduction of the neums, and the mass of detailed manuscript evidence must have involved great difficulties, yet typographical errors are conspicuous by their absence. I noted only one slight error in a matter of fact: the reference to the "twelve" *ἐωθινά* (p. 72) is a slip for "eleven."

This reviewer hesitates to express any judgment of the generalizations of Mr. Höeg, aside from approval of the reserve with which these generalizations are proposed. Like the author, he had felt that there was some genetic link between Jewish lection practice and the Byzantine lectionary. But Mr. Höeg's very tentative summary leaves still unsolved the problem of how the Jewish influence was carried across to the gentile church that created the system. He speaks of the Christian system as more than a simple imitation of the Jewish system, and is careful to emphasize the extent of the Greek contribution to the formation of the "notation ekphonétique."

In the course of studies of the text of the lectionaries I have noticed an evidence of Jewish influence which the author does not mention. In the adaptation of the beginning of the lection to independent existence there is a needless rearrangement of word order to fit the Semitic pattern. This is seen in the sequences verb-subject, substantive-adjective, and occurs not only in the stereo-

¹ "Is there a Lectionary Text of the Gospels?" *Harvard Theological Review*, XXV (1932), 73–84.

types, e.g., τῷ καιρῷ ἐκείνῳ (not a gospel phrase), εἶπεν ὁ κύριος τὴν παραβολὴν ταύτην, but also in the nonstereotyped portion of the incipit, e.g., τῷ καιρῷ ἐκείνῳ εἰσῆλθεν ὁ Ἰησοῦς εἰς Καπερναοὺμ (Luke 7:1).

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ERNEST CADMAN COLWELL

The Shorter Latin Poems of Master Henry of Avranches Relating to England.

By JOSIAH COX RUSSELL and JOHN PAUL HEIRONIMUS. ("Mediaeval Academy of America Studies and Documents," No. 1.) Cambridge: Mediaeval Academy of America, 1935. Pp. xxiv+162. \$2.00.

Students of Medieval Latin poetry will welcome this first publication in the series of "Studies and Documents" of the Mediaeval Academy of America. The work was lithoprinted by Edwards Brothers of Ann Arbor, Michigan, who are to be complimented for the quality of their workmanship.

Henry of Avranches was a wandering poet of the thirteenth century who is generally missing from our handbooks of literature. Even Miss Helen Waddell's recent stimulating book, *The Wandering Scholars* (London, 1927), leaves him out. From 1243 to 1264 Henry was a court poet to Henry III of England. In 1250 the title of *Archipoeta* was conferred on him; and because he was often referred to as *Primas*, *Versificator Magnus*, and *Archipoeta*, it is not surprising to find him confused with the famous Continental *Archipoeta* who wrote "Mihi est propositum in taberna mori."¹ Such titles as *Primas* and *Archipoeta* are not to be taken as meaning poet-laureate, as Father Paul Grosjean takes them.²

After a brief Preface the editors give a rather full Table of Contents and a catalogue of the poems attributed to Master Henry, followed by sections on "Problems of Mediaeval Authors and Authorship," "Sources for the Knowledge of the Poems of Master Henry of Avranches," "The History of the Reputation of Master Henry of Avranches," and "The Career of Master Henry of Avranches." In these will be found (as well as in the introductory notes to the poems themselves) some corrections of errors in Mr. Russell's article in *Speculum*, III, 34-63. John Leland in his *Itinerary* attributed Henry's poems to one "William of Ramsey," whose ghost is now laid (pp. 13-15) by Russell and Heironimus after being handed down from Leland, through John Bale, Polycarp Leyser, Thomas Wright, T. D. Hardy, and other antiquarians to the *Dictionary of National Biography*.

The text of the Latin poems (pp. 23-155), mainly the work of Mr. Heironimus, with many emendations proposed by Mr. W. B. Sedgwick, is well done. I have noted very few mistakes: Page xviii, No. 95: *Bodelian* should be *Bod-*

¹ W. Meyer, "Die Oxforder Gedichte des Primas," *Nachr. der Kön. Ges. d. Wiss. zu Göttingen*, 1907, p. 76; M. Manitius, *Die Gedichte des Archipoeta* (München, 1913), p. 1.

² "Magister Henricus de Abrincis," *Studies* (1928), pp. 295-308.

leian; page 105: No indication of where footnote 3 is to be attached; page 139, footnote 16: Cotton manuscript reads *illius* instead of *istius*; *Philomena* is in folios 195r-207v of Cotton and in folios 97r-125r of Lambeth; page 139, footnote 19, should read folios 207v and 224r.

Finally, I may say that this study is a very important addition to our meager knowledge of Henry III as a literary patron, of the literary interests of his court, and of the literary ideals and practices of thirteenth-century England.

MILLETT HENSHAW

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A Short History of Greece. By DAVID M. ROBINSON. New York: Huxley House, 1936. Pp. xi+227; with 2 maps.

A short history of Greece, planned expressly in relation to current archeological interests, might supply a real need, but such a history remains to be written. The extravagant claims of the editor of the new "History of Civilization Series," to which the present volume belongs, make the imperfections of the book the more glaring. Its lack of internal unity, of sound proportion, of adequate organization, and even of clear English style suggests that the careful execution of the plan outlined in the distinguished author's Preface was prevented by the pressure of his many other interests. Even the proofreading was carelessly handled, and the substantial list of errata is far from complete. The treatment of Greek literature and art is usually banal; what grade would be given a student who wrote on examination that Aeschylus wrote the *Oresteia* "with no incest and in fine literary language and with uplifting thoughts"? The pleasant description of Olynthus does not atone for this and similar passages, nor for the fourfold repetition of Ruskin's description of geometric art as the "vile concatenation of straight lines" in a Greek history that has no room for the reforms of Cleisthenes.

EVA MATTHEWS SANFORD

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The Minoan-Mycenaean Background of Greek Athletics. By WILLIAM ROBBINS RIDINGTON. (Dissertation.) Philadelphia: Westbrook Publishing Co., 1935. Pp. 94.

As archeology and exploration continue to extend the frontiers of ancient history in the pre-Hellenic period of the Aegean and the Near East, Greece is being robbed of some of the credit for originality which was once hers by universal consent. In 1923 the late Gustave Glotz asserted, without convincing such an authority on the subject as E. N. Gardiner, that Cretan sports were the source of the Greek athletic tradition. Dr. Ridington, under the

competent guidance of Professor W. W. Hyde, the author of *Olympic Victor Monuments and Greek Athletic Art*, now comes to the support of Glotz with a fuller array of arguments and evidence.

While the archeological evidence has accumulated a little since 1923, it is still thin on some points, and probability is all that Ridington claims (pp. 12, 16, 38, 63). He avoids the word "origin" in favor of the more cautious "background." The only athletic sports which excavation has proved to have been practiced by the Minoans are boxing, dancing, and tauromachy. Of these three, only boxing was in historical times known at the major athletic festivals, and bull-grappling was definitely considered to belong to the realm of acrobatics or "stunts." Thus Ridington is forced to fall back in large measure on the traditions of literature and mythography. For example, he reminds us of the often suggested possibility that the Homeric Phaeacians (who so loved to box, wrestle, jump, and run) were Minoans. He notices a few pre-Greek words in the athletic vocabulary. He traces the connections of Olympia, Delphi, and the other sites of the Panhellenic games with the Minoan civilization. Attacking the problem from every possible angle, he makes out a pretty good case for his thesis. That the Minoan-Mycenaean sports served as a "background" for later developments is about all that should be admitted; the *esprit* and the ideals of Greek athletics did not come from Crete.

Ridington has presented his subject matter in a perspicuous arrangement and has provided documentation of the evidence with elaborate care. The printer has made few errata, and those mostly in proper names and foreign words in the footnotes and bibliography (Artemison, Reserches, Antonius Liberalis, etc.). The name of Doerpfeld, however, which recurs rather often, is constantly misspelled "Doerpfeldt."

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Die Antike: Zeitschrift für Kunst und Kultur des klassischen Altertums. Vol. XII. 1936. Pp. 332. In four parts.

This volume of *Die Antike* maintains the high standards of its predecessors. Its format and typography are admirable; it contains twenty plates and many illustrations in the text; and it brings to the intelligent, classically educated person a great variety of intellectually interesting reading.

In a study of the familiar bronze maiden from Beroia, by W. H. Schuchhardt, a new restoration is suggested, and the figure is moved from the fifth century to the early part of the third, probably with justification; and the Mantinea base and other sculptures are discussed in comparison. The late Oskar Waldhauer, of the Hermitage Museum, publishes four fragmentary bronze feet, from life-size statues of different periods. Feet and hands are exceedingly useful in the study of sculpture, whether one is distinguishing periods or individual styles, but they are virtually never illustrated; these four

feet constitute a very considerable fraction of the feet in ancient sculpture which are adequately photographed. An article by K. A. Neugebauer on the family of Septimius Severus starts from a tondo painting on wood, about a foot in diameter, which came to the Berlin museum in 1932. In it the emperor, Julia Domna, and the young Caracalla are portrayed; there was originally a figure of Geta also, but it was erased. Josef Liegle is the author of "Architekturbilder auf antiken Münzen," with a good series of thirty-five illustrations; and K. L. Skutsch contributes a study of scales and weighing in ancient art. Otto Brendel's article on the shield of Achilles might prove disappointing to Homerists; in art Achilles acquired, and transmitted to Alexander the Great, a shield with decoration taken from the heavens as viewed by ancient astronomers. By a stroke of editorial genius, there is reprinted a lecture on Olympia which was delivered by Ernst Curtius in 1852. From this lecture grew the excavations at Olympia and, perhaps, the revival of the Olympic games, which in 1936 were celebrated in Germany.

The articles thus far mentioned belong to the broad field of archeology, but *Die Antike* is not exclusively an archeological magazine. There is a paper on Horace, and one of a series on "Homerische Szenen." On the border between literature and philosophy is "Das homerische Gleichnis und der Anfang der Philosophie"; more distinctly philosophic is "Seneca als Denker römischer Willenshaltung." Helmut Berve presents an interesting historical study of the men who succeeded the tyrants and preceded the fully developed Polis; we err with Aristotle, in the author's opinion, in overemphasizing the early importance of political institutions as opposed to individuals.

Of special interest in Germany are two articles on Wilhelm von Humboldt and Heinz Horn's "Die Antike im Weltbild der deutschen Lebensphilosophie."

Since its beginning, *Die Antike* has been edited by Werner Jaeger, who has made it a favorite everywhere among those conversant with the glory and the grandeur of classical antiquity. Professor Jaeger has now left Germany and joined the faculty of the University of Chicago. It is to be hoped that *Die Antike* will be worthily continued.

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